Louisiana Personal Injury Lawyer Blog

To win a case, a plaintiff must prove the elements of his or her legal claim, or cause of action. Each cause of action is comprised of certain required elements. For example, in a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: duty, breach, causation, and damages. In Louisiana, a resident can sue a municipality for failing to repair a defect in a public street or walkway. In a recent case, the Third Judicial District Court for the Parish of Union (“Court”) discussed the elements required to prevail in such a claim.

At issue in Carol Smithwick and Glenn Smithwick, Individually and as the Administrators of the Estate of the Minor Child, Carsen Smithwick v. City of Farmerville, Community Trust Bank, CTB Financial Corp. and First United Bank, was whether the plaintiffs proved that the City of Farmerville (“City”) had actual or constructive notice of a public way defect - an essential element of the cause of action. Plaintiff Carol Smithwick waited one afternoon for her son at a school bus stop, which encompassed an intersection between two city streets. Ms. Smithwick sustained injuries when she stepped onto the shoulder of one of the streets and tripped on a shallow depression. Seeking $6.2 million in damages, Ms. Smithwick claimed the injury to her right ankle from the fall caused a medical complication in her right knee.

In dismissing the suit, the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs could not prove that the City had constructive or actual notice of a defective condition even though the hole, which caused Ms. Smithwick's injuries, presented an unreasonable risk of harm. On appeal, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. According to the Court, a municipality will be held liable for injuries from a defect in the condition of a public way if it had actual or constructive notice of the defect. A municipality has actual notice of a defect or condition if one of its agents or employees had a duty to keep the area in good repair or to report defective or dangerous conditions. Constructive notice is proven if a plaintiff can show a defective condition existed for a considerable amount of time and reasonable diligence by the municipality would have resulted in its discovery.

The plaintiffs argued that the City had actual notice of the depression because one of its maintenance personnel, who trimmed the area at issue, stated at a deposition that he knew of the shallow depression. However, the hole described by the employee was in an area different from the location of the depression in question. The plaintiffs also argued that the City had constructive notice of the defect because the City's personnel trimmed and/or mowed the area during the growing season twice a month. However, the Court disagreed and found the argument speculative since the area had not been trimmed since 2004 and there was no evidence establishing that the hole existed since that time.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to show the City had actual or constructive notice of the defective condition. Moreover, the Court reasoned that throughout the school year, the area was used as a school bus stop and no other parent or child noticed or was injured by the depression.

Smithwick v. City of Farmerville illustrates how important it is to seek competent legal counsel to discuss whether you have a viable claim, which includes whether there is evidence proving each element of a cause of action. Our lawyers can help save you time and money.

Continue reading " Municipality Must Have Notice of a Defect in a Public Walkway to be Liable for Injuries " »

Previously on this blog, we have discussed the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act ("LMMA") and its requirement that "all claims against healthcare providers be reviewed or 'filtered' through a medical review panel before proceeding to any other court." A plaintiff who fails to do this is subject to the defendant's "exception of prematurity," which is a procedural mechanism by which the defendant can petition the court to dismiss the plaintiff's claim until the medical review panel has properly conducted its review. The defendants in the case of Heacock v. Cook attempted to invoke the exception in a case that involved a sexual relationship between a doctor and his patient.

In December of 2005, Margaret Heacock was admitted to the Palmetto Addiction Recovery Center (“Palmetto”) in Rayville for an inpatient substance abuse treatment program. After being discharged in May of 2006, she underwent outpatient treatment which continued through January, 2008. In 2009, Heacock filed two lawsuits against Palmetto and her treating physician, Dr. Douglas Cook. Both suits alleged essentially the same facts: that Dr. Cook "entered into an inappropriate, sexual relationship" with Heacock during the time she was his patient; one suit's theory of recovery was based on intentional tort, and the other on negligence. Dr. Cook and Palmetto filed exceptions of prematurity, seeking to have all claims dismissed in the trial court and instead brought before the medical review panel. After a hearing, the trial court determined that Heacock's claims sounded primarily in medical malpractice and therefore required a review by the medical panel. Thus, the trial court dismissed Heacock's suits without prejudice. Heacock appealed, arguing that it was error for the trial court to require the panel's review given that her allegations gave rise to a general tort claim, and not a medical malpractice claim.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeal noted that the LMMA applies only to “malpractice” as defined by the statute, while other tort liability on the part of a health care provider is
governed by general tort law. Further, Louisiana statute provides separate and distinct definitions for "malpractice" and "tort," the former extending only to unintentional actions. Thus, "by definition, 'malpractice' does not include the intentional acts of the
health care provider." Noting that "Dr. Cook took deliberate action as a physician by becoming involved in a sexual relationship with his patient," the court reasoned that Heacock's claim of intentional tort against Dr. Cook was not “malpractice” as defined by the LMMA. Instead, "this type of deliberate action, a sexual relationship, has been deemed to be an intentional tort, and, as such, not considered a malpractice claim." The court, concluding that the trial court erred in granting Dr. Cook’s exception of prematurity for Heacock's claim of intentional tort, reversed the trial court's judgment as to the intentional tort action and affirmed the trial court's judgment as to the negligence claim.

The Heacock case reveals the limits of the LMMA and its requirement for panel review before a case can proceed to trial. Intentional torts, even when committed by a healthcare provider, are outside of the LMMA's scope. Indeed, only actions in negligence that meet the state's specific definition of "malpractice" trigger the application of the Act. This is a critical point for a plaintiff who, like Heacock, may have several possible theories of recovery against a defendant medical provider. Any action that can be styled as an intentional tort will avoid the delay of the LMMA's review process.

Continue reading " Ouachita Parish Case Examines the Applicability of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act to Intentional Torts " »

Unfortunate instances can occur when a wild animal is involved. The First Circuit Court of Appeal for the State of Louisiana ruled that defendants Mr. and Mrs. Rivett, who were sued in addition to their insurer, are not liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff when he was riding their horse. The plaintiff sued under an ordinary negligence claim under Article 2321 of the Civil Code of Louisiana (amended in 1996), which renders the owner of an animal liable for damage caused by the animal. For the owners of all animals except dogs, an ordinary negligence standard applies. For dogs, a strict liability standard was retained.

In order to recover under Article 2321, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the defendant had a duty to conform his or her conduct to a specific standard of care (the duty element); (2) the defendant failed to conform his or her conduct to the appropriate standard (the breach of duty element); (3) the defendant’s substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (4) the defendant’s substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries (the scope of liability or scope of protection element); and (5) actual damages (the damages element). If the plaintiff fails to show any of these elements, there is no liability. The First Circuit referred to this analysis as the duty/risk analysis.

On appeal, the plaintiff asserted that the trial court committed five legal errors. The First Circuit found that the trial court did err by not instructing the jury with the correct standard with which to evaluate the defendants’ conduct and therefore set aside the jury verdict finding for the defendants. The court reviewed the case de novo, without giving any weight to the factual findings of the incorrectly instructed jury as it usually would, and still found that the plaintiff had not been able to establish that the defendants were negligent for the injuries caused by the startled horse.

In this case, the defendants own four horses and keep them for recreational purposes. They had owned Breeze, the horse at issue, for approximately one year and had not experienced nor knew of any previous occasions when Breeze was uncontrollable. The evidence at trial was contradictory as to what the plaintiff told Mrs. Rivett about his previous riding experience and exactly when the horse began to run, against the plaintiff’s wishes. However, there was uncontradicted testimony by Mrs. Rivett that Breeze was the calmest of the four horses they owned and had never been uncontrollable or hard to handle. Mrs. Rivett rode Breeze frequently and never saw any indication that Breeze had a bad disposition or a mean spirit. In addition, an equine behavior expert examined Breeze and found nothing that would lead him to conclude that Breeze was uncontrollable or skittish.

Since the appellate court found that the plaintiff could not show that the Rivetts were negligent, it dismissed the plaintiff’s case and charged him with the costs of the appeal.

If you have been injured by an animal other than a dog, you must be able to show that the owner failed to comport with a duty of care. If you have been injured by a dog, the owner is strictly liable for the damage, and the standard the plaintiff must prove is not as high. Speaking with an attorney about this burden of proof, as well as financial compensation for harm suffered, is the best course of action when trying to remedy such an incident.

Continue reading " Pointe Coupee Parish Owners of Horse Not Liable For Injuries Sustained By Guest " »

In 1996, a group of plaintiffs filed a petition for damages against the city of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge alleging that the operation and maintenance of the North Wastewater Treatment Facility caused personal inconvenience, mental suffering, embarrassment, and personal injuries, threatening their health and safety, as well as damaged their land and property. The trial court awarded monetary damages to nineteen plaintiffs for stigma damages and added plaintiffs back who had been dismissed for no property interested, awarding damages for discomfort and inconvenience. However, in a 2009 decision (that can be found here: 2009CA1076), the Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed many of the damage awards based on errors of law.

On appeal, the Louisiana Court of Appeals considered whether the trial court erred because the prescriptive period had expired, erred in awarding damages out of the 1997 expansion of the plant, or erred calculating damage amounts. Under La.R.S.9:5624, the prescriptive period for public property damage claims like this one is two years. The court agreed with plaintiffs that the period did not lapse because the latest expansion of the sewage plant can be viewed as a new public work event - thus plaintiffs were only responsible to file suit within two years of the 1998 expansion, not within two years of the plant's original opening in 1960.

The trial court awarded damages under Article I Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution, which provides that "property shall not be taken or damages by the state or its political subdivisions except for public purposes and with just compensation paid to the owner." The Louisiana Supreme Court has addressed inverse condemnations like this one in the past (where the state is not taking other's property, but rather damaging it through their own property) and noted that "Despite the legislative failure to provide a procedure to seek redress when property is damaged or taken without the proper exercise of eminent domain this Court has held that a cause of action must arise out of the self-executing nature of the constitutional command to pay just compensation." As such, individuals whose land is damaged by the government have constitutional redress.

The Supreme Court has also provided five elements that must be proven in such a case: (1) that the property rights are at issue; (2) that the act alleged to have caused damages was undertaken for public purposes; (3) that the acts of the government violate Civil Code articles 667 through 669; (4) that the government has engaged in excessive or abusive conduct and (5) that their property has either been physically damaged or has suffered "special damage peculiar to their particular property." The Supreme Court has also found that as long as the activities on State land do not exceed the level of causing claimant some inconvenience there can be no taking or damaging of the property right.
Basically, in a case like this one, proof of personal injury, physical damage to property, or the presence of excessive or abusive conduct must be made. Here, the Court of Appeals found that it was unclear whether the trial court applied the correct legal criteria. Plaintiffs suffered inconvenience, but inconvenience alone is not compensable. The Court found that several errors were made at the trial court level:

First, plaintiffs can only be compensated for damages sustained by expansion of the treatment plant that occurred in 1997 and 1998 because earlier claims had prescribed, and as such, damage for odors existent in 1995 were awarded in error. Additionally, the court can only award stigma damages if they resulted from the expansion of the sewage treatment plant. However, plaintiff's real estate expert concluded that the proximity of the treatment plant generally resulted in property damage ranging from 13,000 to 30,000 per home. The expert did not consider the effect of the expansion in particular. The expert testified that only one home was actually damaged by the expansion itself due to the fact that post-expansion his home was no longer directly across the street from a BREC park. Other damages were awarded in error.

Finally, damages were also awarded to a number of plaintiffs for discomfort and inconvenience during the 17 months of expansion itself. However, the evidence did not establish absusive or excessive conduct or any physical damage or personal injury. Ill effects of construction are unavoidable and generally not compensable.
As this case demonstrates, sometimes litigation can be a rollercoaster with claimant's fighting for a favorable ruling only to have it reversed and damages rescinded. Competent representation is crucial to fight all of the battles in the court case, through trial, appeal, and beyond.

Previously on this blog, we examined the concept of a "substitute vehicle" for purposes of extending insurance coverage for an auto that is used only temporarily and in place of a policyholder's usual car. In this situation, the insurer is required by state law to extend the same coverage to the substitute car as was in place for the regular vehicle. This requirement, however, does not necessarily apply to a vehicle that a driver simply borrows from another ownerin addition to the vehicle covered by his policy. A vehicle under this arrangement is known as a "non-owned" auto and, as the plaintiff in Burns v. Couvillionlearned, coverage is determined by the language of the owner's policy.

On October 12, 2005, Linda Burns was driving on Highway 1 in Simmesport when she was rear-ended by a bean harvester farm vehicle operated by Burton Dupuis. At the time of the accident, Dupuis was engaged in work for his employer, Victor Lachney. The bean harvester was owned by Ted and Don Couvillion and had been loaned to Lachney for use by Dupuis that day. Burns filed a lawsuit for damages against the parties and also Progressive Insurance, alleging that Progressive had issued a policy to Lachney which applied to the bean harvester. Progressive admitted that it had issued a policy to Lachney that provided coverage on a different vehicle but denied that coverage extended to the bean harvester. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the trial court granted judgment in favor of Progressive.

On appeal, Burns argued that coverage should apply to the bean harvester because the Progressive policy included an "Employer's Non-Ownership Liability Endorsement," which stated that “[t]he definition of insured auto is modified to include a non-owned auto when you or any of your employees use the non-owned auto in your business.” Progressive countered that the policy had not been modified by the Endorsement because, although it was among the various endorsements and other forms that accompanied the policy, it was not listed on the policy's Declarations Page which specifically identified the forms that modified the policy. In fact, the policy contained the following language:

"All forms in the endorsement section may not pertain to your policy. Please refer to your Declarations Page for form numbers associated with your policy. All other parts of the policy that have not been modified by an endorsement will remain unchanged."

The Third Circuit, applying "ordinary contract principles," noted that the "policy reveals clear and unambiguous language... [and] expressly notes in bold language that not all endorsements pertain to a given policy." Finding that the Employer's Non-Ownership Liability Endorsement did not apply to the policy because it was not among the endorsements and modifications listed on the Declarations page, the court concluded that "Dupuis was not an insured under the Progressive policy and that the [bean harvester] vehicle was not an insured auto under the Progressive policy."

The Burns case reveals a common but potentially troublesome practice among insurers. Many policies are drafted using a standardized, boilerplate template where certain portions may or may not apply to the policy depending on whether they are specifically referenced in the appropriate sections. This can lead to considerable confusion on the part of the insured unless he or she understands the requirements for adding or removing provisions within the policy. This case suggests no hesitation on the part of the court to enforce these types of agreements, so policy owners are well advised to review all insurance documents and confirm they reflect the level of coverage that is expected.

Continue reading " Simmesport Auto Accident Reminds Insurance Policy Holders: Read Your Policy Carefully! " »

Under Louisiana law, an issuer of a property insurance policy is required to follow certain procedures when renewing the policy. Essentially, an insurance company must give a property owner 30 days' notice of either 1) its decision not to renew a policy, or 2) the homeowner's option to renew when it expires. La. R.S. 22:887(G). Case law adds the stipulation that, in most cases, an insurer's failure to provide this notice will result in an automatic renewal of the policy. If there is a dispute, the insurer faces an initial burden to prove that it mailed the required notice, which creates a presumption the insured received the notice. The property owner may rebut this presumption by offering evidence that the notice was never delivered. The ultimate factual determination must be made by the trial court.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this approach in the case of Nolan v. Mabray. On June 18, 2005, Wilson Mabray and Marsh Nolan were shooting off fireworks at Mabray's family farm in Union Parish. Wilson shot a bottle rocket which struck and severely injured Marsh. Wilson's father ("Mabray") maintained a farm-owner's policy issued by Shelter Insurance Company. When March sued for his injuries, Shelter disputed that the policy was in effect at the time of the accident, arguing that the policy had lapsed: Shelter asserted that it mailed Mabray a renewal notice on April 28, 2005 which stated the premium was due on June 2, 2005. However, the company did not receive payment until nearly a month late, on June 29, 2005. At trial, a Shelter employee offered testimony about the company's computer-generated renewal notices and automated mailing process. The employee produced records of the company's April 28 letter and also a separate "lapse letter" mailed on June 20 that warned Mabray his policy had been cancelled. Mabray's local agent, who was copied on the lapse letter, personally contacted Mabray on June 29 and collected payment the same day. On the issue of whether he ever received the renewal notice, Mabray testified by way of deposition that he did not remember receiving it, and that if he had, he would have paid the premium right away. However, Mabray testified it was possible he overlooked the notice as April through June were especially busy months on the farm during which he "might have stuff sit on [his] desk for a couple of weeks before it gets opened.” Mabray further stated that “[he] could certainly not swear that it did not come to [his] mailbox and actually get on [his] desk." He also admitted that several other insurance policies with Shelter had lapsed in the past because he did not pay the premium on time. Based on this evidence, the trial court found that Shelter did mail the renewal notice to Mabray on April 28, 2005 and, therefore, the policy was not in effect at the time of the bottle rocket incident because it had lapsed.

The Second Circuit reversed, finding that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the renewal notice had been mailed. This decision was based primarily on the fact that Shelter did not introduce evidence of any person's actual knowledge that the notice was mailed. The Louisiana Supreme court disagreed. Applying the manifest error standard of review, the Court held that

"the issue of mailing is a factual issue to be decided by the trial court, and testimony from the person who actually mailed the notice is not required. Our Code of Evidence expressly permits the use of records of regularly conducted business activities as exceptions to the hearsay rule."

The Court continued, "while a factual determination on the notice issue may not be appropriate for summary judgment, it is prime for trial on the merits, where the factfinder’s determination is entitled to great weight." With obvious frustration, the Court admonished the Second Circuit for failing to defer to the trial court's finding:

"The evidence cited by the court of appeal to reverse this factual finding was merely evidence in support of its own evaluation of
the facts, and, as we have instructed courts of appeal numerous times, that is not a
permissible basis to overturn a trial court’s factual finding. Merely because there is
some factual support in the record for a contrary view does not permit an appellate
court to overturn a trial court’s factual finding under the manifest error rule."

. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision and reinstated the trial court's judgment.

The Nolan case reminds litigants that the time to settle factual disputes is in the trial court, particularly where the case largely turns on circumstantial evidence. An appellate court must find serious error on the part of a judge or jury in making determinations of fact to substitute its own judgment, even if it feels after reviewing the record that its version of the events in question is more likely.

Continue reading " Union Parish Bottle Rocket Injury Results in Dispute Over Insurance Policy Renewal " »

In Louisiana, a general tort claim has a prescriptive period of one year. This means that the plaintiff must file a claim within one year of the injury bringing about the claim. The prescriptive period has been implemented by the Louisiana legislature in LSA-C.C. art 3492 as follows:

Delictual actions are subject to a liberative prescription of one year. This prescription commences to run from the day the injury or damage is sustained. It does not run against minors or interdicts in actions involving permanent disability and brought pursuant to the Louisiana Products Liability Act or state law governing product liability actions in effect at the time of the injury or damage.

Thus, no one except a child or interdict can complain of the prescriptive period because it is clearly established by law. All attorneys are aware of this period and any action, in order to be timely, must be filed within the one year period. However, Louisiana law also states that this period can be altered by legislation. This means that article 3492 is a fall back provision for cases where the legislature has not created another sort of prescriptive period. Different prescriptive periods are implemented due to the nature of the injury or damage. For example, medical malpractice claims also have a general one year prescriptive period, but the legislation creates leeway to bring a claim past the one year prescriptive period. The prescriptive period for a survival claim based on medical malpractice is implemented by LSA-R.S.9:5828 as follows:

No action for damages for injury or death against any physician...[or] hospital..., whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought unless filed within one year from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect, or within one year from the date of discovery of the alleged act, omission, or neglect; however, even as to claims filed within one year from the date of discovery, in all events such claims shall be filed at the latest within a period of three years from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect.

This means that in medical malpractice claim, in a circumstance where the injury that resulted from the malpractice is not discovered, or could not be discovered within a year of the negligent treatment, the legislature decided that the plaintiff should still be able to bring the claim once the injury is discovered, even if it is more than a year after the negligent treatment. However, the claim must still be filed within an overall three year period. In a recent case, Hammond Ex Rel v. Saint Francis Medicine, a court clarified how a malpractice claim would fit into the category allowed to extend beyond a year of the negligent treatment. Mrs. Hammond sued St. Francis and Dr. Joiner on behalf of her daughter and grand daughter. Her daughter was sent to St. Francis because of an increased heart rate. St. Francis subsequently sent her to Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center-Monroe. When she arrived here, she discovered that her fetus had died. She was then sent to a nursing home where her condition deteriorated further until she was eventually pronounced dead.

Her mother, Mrs. Hammond, filed the medical malpractice claim more than one year after the treatment given to her daughter at St. Francis. At trial, Mrs. Hammond claimed that she did not know that there was any medical malpractice on the part of St. Francis. The evidence was to the contrary. Within months of her daughter's death, she had filed a claim with the medical review board against other defendants, not including St. Francis. Clearly, she had some indication that someone did something to cause the deterioration of her daughter's condition. Further, she provided no evidence that showed that she was unaware of any negligence on the part of St. Francis. The Court held that they could not make a determination based on a mere assertion from Mrs. Hammond that she did not know that St. Francis could be liable. Some evidence needed to be provided in order to claim lack of knowledge which could have allowed her three years to file her claim. Since there was no evidence that she lacked knowledge of St. Francis' alleged liability, her claim falls into the one year prescriptive period which means her claim had prescribed.

Continue reading " Court Throws Out Medical Malpractice Case Because the Case Was Not Timely Filed " »

On June 23rd in Hammond, Louisiana, there was a fatal vehicle crash in the southbound lanes of Interstate 55. A Mercedes SUV, driven by Gwendolyn Jackson, was heading the wrong way and collided with a Hyundai driven by 18 year-old Caleb Perricone. The vehicles collided head on and both Jackson and Perricone were transported to Northoaks Hospital, where Jackson was treated for moderate injuries but Perricone was pronounced dead.

Jackson is suspected of drug impairment and the results of her toxicology test should be soon forthcoming. After she was released from the hospital, she was charged with Vehicular Homicide, Traveling the Wrong Way on a One Way Roadway, and 1st offense Driving While Intoxicated. She was booked at the Tangipahoa Parish Jail in Amite. Though Jackson will have to answer to the State of Louisiana for her allegedly criminal conduct, the result of those proceedings will hardly address the harm and grief inflicted on Perricone and his family.

In order to compensate the people in Perricone's life for the loss of his love, affection, companionship, support, and funeral expenses, the Perricone family might want to consider filing a lawsuit against Jackson and her insurance policy under the theories of Wrongful Death and Survival.

Wrongful Death
A Wrongful Death lawsuit would allow Perricone's family members to recover for the damages they sustained through the wrongful death of the decease: "nonpecuniary loss, variously described as loss of love, affection, companionship, care, attention, nurture, guidance, society, consortium, and like terms." [LAPRAC-PI Sec. 4:210]. Though it's unclear from the story, we know that if Perricone had a spouse, children, or his spouse had children, they would have a primary right of recovery for his Wrongful Death. If he had none, his parents, if surviving, would possess the same right. If he didn't have any surviving parents either, his siblings would possess the right. In the absence of siblings as well, the right to recover for Perricone's Wrongful Death action would fall to his grandparents. [LAPRAC-PI Sec. 4:194].

Survival Action

In the same order, Perricone's family could also potentially recover in what's known as a Survival Action: compensation for damages sustained from the time the injury is known to the deceased up until his death, including damage to his property. Damages would include compensation for Perricone's pain and suffering, which was likely considering the unfortunate fact that he was not pronounced dead until he arrived at the hospital.

The negligence of the potential defendant is important to establish Jackson's liability for the accident. Here, however, there is very compelling evidence because she violated several laws. The prosecution of Jackson for the offenses noted above would help the Perricone Family's cause.

The toll of the death of a loved one, in addition to the knowledge that they did not pass immediately, is an immense burden of loss and pain. Thankfully the law can provides relief to ease some of the financial burdens during this difficult time.

Continue reading " Fatal Vehicle Crash in Hammond Illustrates Potential Liability of Surviving Driver " »

Medical Malpractice Claims Against Public Sector Health Providers Must Be Submitted to a Medical Review Panel

The State of Louisiana Division of Administration, headquartered in Baton Rouge, requires that that medical malpractice claims against public sector health care providers must be processed through its administrative procedure, starting with the claim's submission to the Commissioner of Administration.

A request for a medical review panel must be in writing and contain:
- A request for the formation of a medical review panel.
- The name of the patient.
- The names of the claimants.
- The names of defendant state health care providers.
- The dates of the alleged malpractice.
- A brief description of the alleged malpractice as to each named defendant state health care provider.
- A brief description of alleged injuries

Once the claim has been filed, several time-sensitive procedures are triggered. First, the Commissioner of Administration to whom the claim is submitted has 30 days to complete the following:

- Confirm to the claimant that the claimant's complaint has been received.
- Determine whether the defendant is or is not a qualified public health care provider with State of Louisiana.
- Determine amount of filing fee owed or paid.

a. If filing fee not paid, acknowledge claimant, advise of qualifications, request payment of filing fees and diary for forty-five (45) days for money to be collected from claimant or affidavit or forma pauperis ruling.
b. If filing fee paid, acknowledge claimant and advise the Office of Risk Management in order for an attorney to be assigned to represent the defendant(s) and notify defendant(s).

- Notify all named defendants that a complaint has been filed as well as a request for the formation of a Medical Review Panel.

Then, before the claim can move forward, it must be presented to the medical review panel who generally has twelve (12) months after its chairman is selected to render an opinion on the claim. The parties determine the chairman from a list of five local attorneys submitted to the Commissioner of Administration by the Clerk of the Supreme Court. The Medical Review Panel also contains 3 physicians; each party selects one each and then those selected physicians select the third physician.

Once the Panel is formed, the parties may submit evidence and testimony for its consideration and can convene the panel at a mutually convenient time and place. Within 30 days, but in all events with 180 days after the last panel member is selected, it shall issue its expert opinion.

Costs

If the panel finds in favor of the Defendant(s) the Division of Administration shall pay the costs of the Medical Review Panel. If It holds in favor of the Claimant, he shall pay the costs. If, however, the panel finds that there is a material factual issue that needs resolution in court, the costs shall be split between the claimant and the Division of Administration.

The Claimant must pay a filing fee within forty-five days of the acknowledgment letter from the Commissioner - it is $100 per named defendant. But, this fee may be waived by either the submission of an affidavit by a physician certifying that the claim constitutes a breach or an in forma paureris ruling issued by a district court holding that the malpractice claim could properly be brought.

Submitting a claim for medical malpractice pursuant to this requirement and its procedures can be an intimidating prospect. In order to bring a successful claim, one really should seek expert advice from an attorney to navigate the often confusing and technical waters of this administrative process.

Continue reading " Medical Malpractice Claims Against Public Sector Health Providers Must Be Submitted to a Medical Review Panel " »

In the Parish of Acadia, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal decided a case that clarifies how punitive damage awards are to be applied to vicarious liability cases. In Bonnie Romero v. Clarendon America, Bonnie Romero (plaintiff) was hit by an 18 wheeler truck. The truck was driven by an employee of Stanford Trucking (Stanford). In their filing, the plaintiff argues that the truck was being driven within the scope of the truck driver's employment. Plaintiff also alleges that the driver was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Stanford asked the driver to submit to a drug and alcohol test following the accident. The driver refused to submit to the test and was subsequently fired. Plaintiff filed for summary judgment asking the court to award punitive damages against Stanford because it was vicariously liable for the driver's actions. Plaintiff also filed a motion to compel Stanford to submit to requests for discovery. Stanford cross-filed for summary judgment stating that it was not vicariously liable for punitive damages as a matter of law. The trial court granted Stanford's summary judgment and denied both of plaintiff's motions.

The Court started its discussion by stating that in Louisiana there is a strong public policy against punitive damages. Thus, in order for an award for punitive damages, the right must be clearly signified in a statute. Even if a statute created a right for punitive damages, it would be strictly construed by a court. As such, it is a matter of how Louisiana statutes are worded in order to determine whether a right for punitive damages exists in a vicarious liability case. Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.4 states in pertinent part,

exemplary damages may be awarded upon proof that injuries on which the action is based were caused by wanton or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others by a defendant whose intoxication while operating a motor vehicle was a cause in fact of the resulting injuries.

Thus, this statute makes clear that when the driver of a vehicle causes an accident due to the driver's intoxication, a right of punitive damages may exist. At this juncture, it is essential to discuss the motives and policy behind punitive damages. Compensatory damages exist to make a person whole. Whether the damages are for injuries, lost wages, mental distress, or any other such variety, the ultimate purpose is to place the person who is injured in the position they would be in if that accident did not happen. The purpose of the punitive damage award, on the other hand, is to punish the person liable for the accident. In cases where the action of the liable party are egregious, or in the case of Article 2315.4 "wanton or reckless", the judicial system steps in to make the person whole, and punish the liable party to discourage such action in the future.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 2320 covers vicarious liability, and states in pertinent part, "In the above cases, responsibility only attaches when the masters or employers, teachers, or artisans might have prevented the act which caused the damage, and have not done it." Plaintiff never alleged either that Stanford was the cause of driver's intoxication, or that Stanford could have prevented the driver's intoxication, but did not do so. In fact, the facts of the case showed that after the accident occurred, Stanford required the driver to submit to a drug and alcohol test, and after the driver refused, he was terminated. The Court referred to a string of cases that held that those who supplied alcohol to drivers who subsequently were involved in automobile accidents were not held liable for punitive damages. The reason was that as Article 2315.4 clearly states, it is the driver of the vehicle who is liable for punitive damages because of the choice of driving while intoxicated. No statute clearly states that the provider of alcohol is vicariously liable for punitive damages, or that an employer can be liable based on the facts of the case. Thus, based on Louisiana's stated policy against punitive damages, Stanford was not held liable for punitive damages in this case.

It is not always clear what rights and claims a plaintiff may have after an accident. Sometimes the law is not so clearly set out that immediate determinations can be made regarding what a plaintiff should expect out of litigation. On many occasions it may take litigation to discover that a plaintiff has more or less claims than originally thought. Legal advice can make the journey after any accident easier to encounter. Solid and competent legal advice can help protect plaintiff rights and enlighten plaintiffs on what types of damages they may attain.

Continue reading " Louisiana Court of Appeal Clarifies Application of Punitive Damage Award " »

Medical malpractice can be a serious issue that involves very unfortunate circumstances and strong feelings. One such case, analyzed below, examines the parameters of such a matter and how they are handled. Because of the sensitive nature of this case, names will not be used and, instead, the individuals involved will be referred to as doctor, plaintiff, etc. The issue in the case is whether the plaintiff, without presentation of any expert testimony, should be able to sustain her case of proving at trial that the defendant's (doctor's) conduct constituted a breach in the appropriate standard of care and this breach resulted in the wrongful death of the unborn child. 

The unfortunate plaintiff in this case came to see defendant doctor complaining of cramps and missing menstrual cycle; she was 28.4 weeks pregnant at the time. The doctor, determining that she needed a higher level of neonatal care due to complications during labor, transferred the patient to Rapides Women's and Children's Hospital "RWCH" (Parish of Rapides). The doctor's order showed that the pregnant woman was suffering from placental tear and an obstetrician-gynecologist at RWCH accepted this transfer. Upon the plaintiff's arrival, fetal heart rates were no longer detectable; after a C section, doctor delivered a still-born fetus.

The plaintiff claims that it was primarily due to the doctor's negligence in failing to meet the applicable standard of care during the medical procedure that the fetus was still-born. The defendant doctor, on the other hand, argues that his actions did not fall below the appropriate standard of care.

The question that remains is what comprises an "applicable standard of care?" The plaintiff argues that doctor waited too long in performing a C-section and this delay was the reason for the death of the fetus. The plaintiff maintained that the doctor's failure to respond in a timely manner to her emergency constituted negligence on his part, and he is, therefore, liable for the death of the fetus. As one can imagine, this is a very tragic situation for the plaintiff and could potentially minimize her trust in the medical profession as a whole. 

The "applicable standard of care" could be violated in numerous ways, in anything from amputating the wrong arm to a less extreme case of waiting an extra minute to begin a procedure. In this case, the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the doctor did not exercise proper care during the procedure, a tough situation for someone who has just lost an unborn child. In such instances it is essential to have the best team of experts to help the meet the burden of proof. While in this case, the court found that the fetus was dead on arrival and granted summary judgment for the defendant, it is not uncommon for a doctor to fail to order a C-section or another procedure at the correct time. A deceased chance of survival could be a matter of minutes, and this is why you need the best help you can find, both at trial and from your legal representative.

If you feel that there was has been a breach of a standard or lack of due care which resulted in any harm to you or your loved one, contact the Berniard Law Firm with any questions or concerns.

Continue reading " Medical Malpractice Suit for Wrongful Death Action of Unborn Child   " »

The appellate process in the American judicial system is an important aspect of rights afforded to parties in a litigation. The determinations made at the trial court level are usually left unchanged. The factual analysis of the trial court is left unchanged except under extreme circumstances. It would take a fundamental error on the part of the trial judge to be reversed on a factual matter. Even more protected is the credibility determinations made by the trial judge. The reason for this is that trial judges are usually the only ones who are present to view the body language and tone of voice of any witness on the stand. Further, the trial judge is usually the one who is the best equipped to make appropriate credibility determinations due to experience. An appellate court would have to find the factual and credibility determinations made by a trial judge to be wholly unsupported by the evidence in order to overturn a trial court determination. Louisiana law states that a court of appeal may not set aside a trial court's finding of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Regarding credibility determinations, the law in Louisiana states that where testimony conflicts, an appellate court should not disturb the factual findings of the trial court because it feels that its evaluations and inferences are more reasonable.

Shakeya Johnson v. The City of Shreveport, is a recent case that outlines the process by which an appellate court can review a trial court's determination. On July 4th, 2007, in the city of Shreveport, Shakeya Johnson (plaintiff) was driving down Creswell avenue. As she approached the intersection with Marshall street, where the intersection on her road was regulated by a red traffic light, a police officer was headed towards the same intersection from Marshall street, where his road was regulated by a yellow traffic light. This meant that, at the intersectio,n Shakeya was supposed to make a complete stop as if she were at a stop sign. Instead of doing this, she ran the into the intersection and into the passenger side of the police officer's vehicle. After the accident, she filed suit claiming that the police officer was at fault for the accident and was liable for lost wages and medical expenses incurred due to the accident. Further, Shakeya's mother, Shirley, was also a plaintiff because she was the owner of the vehicle and claimed that the officer was liable for damage to her property. The trial court found, based on the evidence at hand, that the evidence available indicated that Shakeya was at fault for the accident.

The facts used by the trial court were based on photos that showed that Shakeya's side of the intersection was regulated by a red light. Thus, she had the responsibility to stop at the intersection. Further, photos showed that the officer's passenger side was hit, which indicated that the officer was well in the intersection by the time Shakeya got there. At trial, there was contradiction from the plaintiff's witnesses as to whether there was a fifth passenger in the vehicle that Shakeya was driving that night. This led the judge to make a credibility determination of plaintiff's witnesses that was also used in the trial judge's ultimate determination. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court's findings were reasonable under the evidence presented at trial. It was clear to the appellate court that the factual and credibility determinations made by the trial court were reasonable. Thus, the appellate court upheld the trial court's determination.

While this case went against the plaintiff, in the event that another party were responsible, a skilled attorney would be able to provide the representation necessary to receive the ruling you deserve. If you have been the victim of reckless driving, or have been hurt in any type of accident, you should seek legal and medical advice immediately. Speaking to an attorney can help inform you of your rights.

Continue reading " Accident Involving Police Car Tests Appellate Court Ruling Basis " »

In a recent unpublished opinion, a panel of the Louisiana 1st Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court's award of additur in a personal injury lawsuit stemming from a low-speed rear-end automobile accident occurring in Terrebonne Parish in October 2005. The plaintiff sued for damages for personal injuries, medical expenses, and loss of wages, as well as loss of consortium for his wife and their two minor children. The jury returned a unanimous verdict allocating 70% of the fault to defendants, a towing company, its driver, and the truck's insurer. They awarded damages to plaintiff and his family for the following: past physical pain and suffering, physical disability, impairment, and inconvenience, the effect of plaintiff's injuries and inconvenience on the normal pursuits and pleasures of life, loss of past income, impairment of future earning capacity, past medical expenses, and loss of consortium.

In this matter, plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or Alternatively for a New Trial and/or Additur as to both the allocation of fault and the amount of damages. After a hearing, the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for additur and increased the general damages award (which includes past physical pain and suffering, physical disability and impairment, the effect of the injuries and inconvenience, mental anguish, and future pain and suffering) from $28,000 to $100,000 and otherwise denied the motion. The defendants in the case appealed the decision, asserting that the jury did not abuse its discretion in awarding $28,000 (which was determined to be the case when the award was increased) in general damages and that the trial court abused its discretion by increasing the general damages award to $100,000. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, asserted that the additur was improperly low, the jury erred in its allocation of fault and damages, the trial court should have granted JNOV, and that the jury's decision was a "compromise" or "quotient jury" verdict. Other procedural deficiencies were noted and eventually corrected.

The main issues upon appeal were: 1) whether the jury was unreasonable in allocating fault 70%-30% between the defendants and plaintiff, 2) whether a general damages award of $28,000 was unreasonably low and whether the trial court's resulting additur to $100,000 was improper, 3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant JNOV, and 4) whether the jury compromised its damage awards and did not fully deliberate on all of the issues.

The question of percentages of liability is a factual determination that cannot be overturned unless an appellate court can find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding and that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong. There is a presumption in Louisiana that the following motorist in a rear-end collision is at fault. In this case, however, there was conflicting testimony about whether plaintiff remained stopped the whole time or if he instead stopped, moved forward, and then stopped again. Both the trial court and appellate court were unable to find that the jury acted unreasonably in its allocation of fault.

When a jury awards a damages amount that is less than the lowest reasonable amount, additur becomes proper. Here, the jury awarded nothing for mental anguish or future pain and suffering, which the trial court viewed as unreasonably low given the pain and suffering associated with the surgery and medication needed to correct two disc ruptures. Plaintiff's doctors also testified that the plaintiff's neck would never be the same again and plaintiff testified that he was still in pain but worked in spite of it. Because the trial court found that a general damages award of $28,000 was unreasonable, it had the discretion to raise the award, but only to the lowest reasonable amount. Any further award is an abuse of the trial judge's discretion.

In order to grant JNOV, which is a directed verdict terminating the action without resubmission to another jury, a trial court must find that a verdict is not supported by any substantial evidence. Based on its review of the record, the 1st Circuit panel could not conclude that the evidence pointed so strongly in favor of plaintiffs that its verdict as to the issues other than damages was unreasonable. It therefore affirmed the trial court's judgment in that respect.

Lastly, the plaintiffs claimed that because the jury responded unanimously to all answers to the jury interrogatories, that indicated a decision of consensus and/or quotient (averaging each juror's proposed damage award) rather than a carefully considered verdict. However, neither the trial court nor appellate court could find any evidence indicating that the jury verdict was a quotient verdict.

While much of this is complicated, the issues presented are a great indicator of how complex legal matters can be and the importance of an attorney that can help you receive the award you deserve.

During litigation, competent legal counsel must make efforts to concentrate on two things. First, legal counsel must make sure that all of the most recent cases, statutes, and regulations are being used for litigation. It is embarrassing for legal counsel and risky for a client to proceed before court with expired or outdated law. The impact of such a scenario could mean the prolonging of litigation and a negative overall perception towards the case from the judge. Second, competent legal counsel must pay very close attention to procedural steps needed for successful litigation. This means that all motions and requests for evidence must be made in a timely manner. The art of litigation requires a very structural approach with one step occurring before the next. If one step within the process is missed, misconstrued, or untimely, the result could spell the end of litigation and the client's claim.

The reason for such strict adherence to procedural steps is due to an effort to expedite an already heavily time-burdened legal system. The procedural steps facilitate quick and systematic approaches to litigation. In a recent case, Percival Franklin v. Allstate Insurance Co., the plaintiff was dealt a blow by the implications of untimely filing.

The case began as many other vehicle-based legal issues do. There was an accident, which was followed by an injury to one of the passengers. The plaintiff in the case sued the driver of the other vehicle and that driver's auto insurance. During the litigation process, the defendants filed certain exceptions with the trial court. After review, the trial court agreed to the exceptions and the trial was deemed over at that point. The exceptions were sustained on March 29, 2010. The notice of judgment was mailed on April 7, 2010. On May 24, 2010, plaintiff filed for a new trial which was denied on June 2, 2010. The notice of judgment of this decision was mailed on June 7, 2010. On August 13, 2010, plaintiff filed a motion for appeal. The trial court granted this motion on August 17, 2010. The Appellate court asked the plaintiff why it should not dismiss the appeal as being untimely. Plaintiff stated that under LA.CodeCiv.P.art 2087, the appeal was timely because it was filed within 58 days of the trial court's denial of a new trial. Before reaching its judgment, the Appellate Court described errors in the way the plaintiff viewed the applicable dates. Plaintiff cites that the new trial was denied on June 7, 2010 and that the motion for appeal was filed on August 5. The Court stated that, based on the record, the new trial was denied on June 7 and the appeal was filed on August 13.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1974 states, "[t]he delay for applying for a new trial shall be seven days, exclusive of legal holidays. The delay for applying for a new trial commences to run on the day after the clerk has mailed, or the sheriff has served, the notice of judgment as required by article 1913. This means that after a judgment has been rendered, the plaintiff or defendant, which ever party is making the motion, has seven days to file for new trial, excluding legal holidays. LA.Code Civ.P.art 2087(A)(1) provides that when no motion for a new trial has timely been filed that a devolutive appeal may be taken within 60 days after the expiration of the delay for applying for a new trial. The applicable dates are once again summarized: Judge signed the order sustaining exceptions on March 29, this judgment was mailed on April 7, the delay for new trial expired on April 16, plaintiff filed a motion for new trial on May 24. Thus, we see why the motion for a new trial was rejected by the trial court. The delay for new trial expired on April 16, thus the delay for filing a motion for a devolutive appeal, under LA. Code Civ.P.art 2087(A)(1), expired on June 15, 2010. Plaintiff filed for appeal on August 13, 2010, well beyond the time allowed to file a motion for appeal under Louisiana procedural law. Thus, the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal.

The benefit of competent legal counsel is that legal counsel can help a client traverse the complex procedural framework of the legal system. This helps clients put forth the best claims in a timely fashion. Call the Berniard Law Firm to speak with counsel that can help you with legal advice regarding any claim you may have.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently gave the state of Louisiana a grant of $150,000 to help reduce the public's exposure to asbestos in schools and other state buildings. The money will help building owners comply with statutory requirements, monitor their compliance, and be spent on public outreach efforts.

Under the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act, or AHERA, grants like this one are authorized to protect people who enter public buildings where asbestos may be found. The law requires local education agencies to inspect schools for asbestos and make plans to reduce it where found. The AHERA also created a program to train and accredit individuals who perform asbestos related work. Projects like those authorized and funded through AHERA are so important due to the human risk of asbestos depends on exposure. Contrary to popular belief, removal is not always the best way to reduce exposure. That is where education comes in. Improper removal of asbestos may create danger where none existed before. The EPA only requires removal when it is needed to prevent significant public exposure to asbestos material (example: during building renovation or demolition). If asbestos is discovered, the EPA actually often recommends in-place management, not removal. Management plans can be used to control the release of asbestos fibers when materials are not significantly damaged and not likely to be disturbed.

Beyond providing grants like this one to states to combat asbestos, the EPA plays a broad role in protecting the public from exposure to the toxic fibers. Several EPA Offices deal with asbestos. For example, the Office of Air and Radiation/Office of Air Quality Planning Standards, which has the mission of preserving and improving air quality in the U.S., is responsible for implementing another asbestos law, the Asbestos National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, which sets guidelines for demolition practices and reporting and record keeping requirements for waste disposal. In addition, the Office of Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances regulates asbestos in school buildings and certain asbestos products and maintains the Asbestos Model Accreditation Plan which is used by states to train and accredit asbestos professionals. This Office also protects workers in states without Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Safety and Health Plans.

In 2005, the EPA released an "Asbestos Project Plan" to bring together their actions related to asbestos and provide a framework to coordinate their approach to identify, evaluate, and reduce risk to human health from asbestos exposure. The plan set forth three key areas of focus:

1. Improving asbestos science and advancing EPA understanding of asbestos toxicology, asbestos-related exposures, sample collection, and analysis. 2. Identifying and addressing ways people are exposed to asbestos and how to reduce exposure 3. Assessing and reducing risks associated with asbestos cleanup.

For more information about what the EPA is doing in our Region (6-which encompasses Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and 66 Tribal areas) you can visit the EPA's website by clicking here. If you feel your health has been compromised from being exposed to asbestos, contact an attorney immediately to discuss your legal rights. Timing can be of the utmost importance in cases relating to asbestos and taking action quickly is essential.

Car accidents occur every day, and the first question that is usually asked is who was at fault for the accident. This determination is not easy, however, a Louisiana second circuit court of appeal's case explored fault in order to allocate liability to the parties respectively. In Gentry v. State Farm, the Court held that both parties were at fault, the defendants were found to be 75% at fault, while the plaintiff, Gentry, was 25% at fault. The court came to this conclusion after looking at both drivers duties while driving, analyzing whether the drivers breached their duties, looking into the rules of the road, determining whether the duties of the road were breached, and looking at the duties that were found to be breached by each driver in order to find the ultimate percentages of fault in order to allocate damages. Thus, it is not always an either/or situation (one party may not be wholly responsible for the car accident) but, rather, partially responsible, so the analysis takes on a more in depth review of the circumstances that existed at the time of the accident.

An appellate court must give great deference to the allocation of fault determined by the trier of fact. Consequently, the allocation of fault may be determined within an acceptable range and any allocation by the fact finder, or trial court within that range, cannot be clearly wrong. The only way an appellate court may disturb the trial court's fault determination is if the apportionment of fault is clearly wrong, allowing the appellate court, only then, to disturb the trial court's award. Here, both parties were seeking a finding of 100% fault for the opposing party, asking the appellate court to reverse the apportionment determination found by the trial court in order to dismiss the percentages of fault that were initially determined. If the trial court's determination of fault is found to be clearly wrong, the appellate court is then permitted to adjust the award, but only to the extent of lowering or raising it to the highest or lowest point respectively which is reasonably within the trial court's discretion.

After reviewing both party's evidence put forward at the trial court level, the appellate court determined that manifest error existed in the record, and allowed for a reframing of liability findings, but only to the minimum extent to achieve reasonableness. So, it is not unheard of for appellate courts to find error of fault determinations held at the trial level, if the trier of fact proves to be clearly wrong, the appellate court may proceed to adjust accordingly.

In the instant case, each side requested the appellate court to assess the other party with 100% fault. But, after reviewing the facts, the appellate court determined they were each at fault at varying percentages. The car accident involved a son driving his father down the right lane of West Bern Kouns four lane highway. At the same time, leaving his plumber and pipefitter's school, the plaintiff apparently came to a stop before entering the highway. It was at this point that the accident occurred, with the defendant's vehicle crashing into the plaintiff's. Here is where the facts become complicated; the defendants stated that the plaintiff pulled his vehicle out in front of them, causing the accident. However, the plaintiff states that as a result of his injuries incurred from the accident, he could not recall anything except stopping before the crash. The accident report assessed the plaintiff's inattentiveness as a cause of the accident, although no one was formally cited with a violation. Also, a witness, who was behind the plaintiff when the accident occurred, stated that the defendant's care traveling at 60-65 miles per hour, struck the plaintiff, and that he never saw the plaintiff's brake lights go out before the crash. This would indicate that the plaintiff did not pull his vehicle out in front of the defendants as they maintained. However, the fact that the plaintiff could not recall any specifics in relation to the accident may have hurt his case. The defendants on the other hand, were determined to have had the right of way and high quality evidence, including:

- The father and son's testimony,
- The accident report's finding that the plaintiff's inattentiveness was a cause of the accident, and
- the witnesses admission that he was unsure whether or not the plaintiff was intruding on the highway or not at the time of the crash.

The appellate court concluded that manifest error was in the record, and permitted them to reframe the liability findings, but only to the minimum extent to achieve reasonableness. The ultimate determination was the plaintiff at 75% fault, and the defendant to be 25% at fault, with costs of court to be assesses on the same basis. The strong evidential support the defendant's offered outweighed and ultimately helped them reduce the fault determination initially made by the trial court.

Fault is not something that can be determined in an "all or nothing," type fashion. Rather, it is a careful weighing of the facts in order to determine how each party may have added to the ultimate fault, the car accident. Both parties here put forth evidence to support their side; however, one the defendant's evidence simply outweighed the plaintiff's. Thus, the appellate court, after reviewing the record, determined that the initial fault determination was clearly wrong, and reallocated the fault percentages to better illustrate the evidentiary findings. Thus, fault is a step by step analysis that requires exploring each piece of the puzzle in order to accurately assess who is at fault, and for how much.

Court systems are very highly burdened. Currently, there are too many cases compared to the number of judges and judicial staff. This phenomenon of law will not likely change any time soon. Therefore, the judicial system had to come up with ways to counter the overflowing process. One of the most logical methods of ending too much litigation is to limit the amount of time a case can sit in the judicial system without action. This is a process called abandonment. In Louisiana, if a case has not progressed, through prosecution or defense, for three years, the case will be thrown out of the court system and will be banned from further action.

The impact of such a rule is significant on any litigation. However, overcoming this outcome is very easy. Any significant action taken on behalf of any party in the case will re-start the time period. Therefore, the only cases that are hurt are cases where the plaintiff has filed a suit and has forgotten about it or has found better things to occupy time with. These cases remain on the books, and when, a few years down the road, the plaintiff remembers that the case is still pending, the case will be denied access to the courts.

Additionally, lawyers and clients should be aware that not all action intervenes on the three year time period. Some action will not stop the clock from running. LSA-C.C.P. art 561 states in relevant part:

This provision shall be operative without formal order, but on ex parte motion of any party or other interested person by affidavit which provides that no step has been timely taken in the prosecution or defense of the action, the trial court shall enter a formal order of dismissal as of the date of its abandonment.

Then the statute goes on to describe what types of actions will constitute a step in the process of litigation:

Any formal discovery as authorized by this Code and served on all parties whether or not filed of record, including the taking of a deposition with or without formal notice, shall be deemed to be a step in the prosecution or defense of an action.

Any discovery will end the clock for abandonment. In a recent case, Mary Brown v. Michael Borg, a court discussed what will constitute a step. The action began with a typical car accident. The plaintiff, Ms. Brown, sued Michael Borg and his insurance company after Mr. Borg, while operating his vehicle, collided with Ms. Brown's vehicle. After the action commenced, the parties relayed discovery requests back and forth. On August 18, 2005, Ms. Brown commenced her action. Attached to the petition was a request for discovery and interrogatories. On October 19, 2005, the defendants responded to the petition and also made discovery requests of their own. Ms. Brown responded to the defendants discovery request on July 17, 2006. On November 28, 2007, Mr. Borg's counsel wrote to Ms. Brown and her counsel, requesting the discovery that was sent on July 17. On December 10, Ms. Brown's counsel reported that all the requested documents and answers were already sent. No other actions were taken by either party. On October 16, 2009, Mr. Borg filed a motion to dismiss the petition due to abandonment. Ms. Brown argued that the communication on November 28, 2007 and December 10, 2007 were actions taken by the parties in furtherance of the prosecution and defense of the petition. However, the Court looked at the circumstances differently.

The Court classified the communication by the parties as indications that action would be taking. The Court argued that the communication indicated that no actions had been taken and that no actions would be done in response. The Court stated that the last action taken by either party was on July 17, 2006 when Ms. Brown responded to the defendants request for discovery. By the time Mr. Borg filed to dismiss the claim on October 16, 2009, by the Court's decision, no action had been taken for over three years. Therefore, there was no longer any case pending, and Ms. Brown had lost her chance to file a petition.

If you have a claim, it is essential that you speak to an attorney as soon as possible. Competent legal counsel will provide continuous and consistent legal representation. If a case is pending for too long without action, Ms. Brown's case demonstrates what can happen.

Continue reading " Plaintiff Takes Too Long in Civil Case, Suffers Consequences " »

In civil litigation, the defendant is responsible for the damage caused to the plaintiff(s) when found responsible for causing harm. This damage may be either physical or property damage. If a defendant is found to be at fault, the next question is usually to what extent the defendant is liable for any resulting injuries. In normal circumstances, experts provide testimony concerning physical and property damage, and any intangible damages such as lost wages, mental distress, etc. In some circumstances, the plaintiff may have a preexisting condition. This preexisting condition may make the damages the plaintiff suffers more likely. Further, the injury or accident may exacerbate the preexisting condition. There is a civil law maxim that "the defendant takes the plaintiff as he is at the time of the accident." This is commonly referred to as the eggshell rule. In a recent case, Miriam Dyess vs. State Farm Insurance Co. ET AL., the Court describes how the eggshell rule relates to an award for damages.

In this case, Dyess was driving in Alexandria, Louisiana, when another car pulled in front of the plaintiff's car. The result was that Dyess ran into the back of the other vehicle. The driver of the other vehicle was insured by State Farm Insurance. Plaintiff was insured by Farmer's Insurances (Farmers). As a result of the injury, Dyess suffered injuries to the neck, shoulder, hand, back, right leg, and has headaches, foot pain, and numbness. The plaintiff was also awarded $103,000 in damages. Farmers appeals the decision stating (1) there was only $1,500 worth of damages, (2) plaintiff denied any injuries at the scene of the accident, and (3) plaintiff's injuries were as a result of a pre-exisiting carpal tunnel syndrome and fibromyalgia. Farmers appealed to set aside or reduce the $103,000 award as manifestly erroneous, and that the court erred in awarding damages and medical expenses for injuries other than those to plaintiff's neck.

The basis of the award that the trial court gave plaintiff was the eggshell rule. The trial court stated that plaintiff was an eggshell victim who already had some medical problems. But, as such, you must take the victim as you find them. The Appellate Court's applicable standard of review is that it cannot set aside findings of fact unless it is manifestly erroneous or unless it is clearly wrong. Where the jury's findings are reasonable, in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse. Although, there was some inconsistent evidence, plaintiff provided uncontroverted evidence that her preexisiting condition was exacerbated due to the accident. Defendant's liability is not mitigated by the fact that plaintiff's preexisting physical infirmity was responsible in part for the consequences of plaintiff's injury by the defendant. It is clear that the defendant takes his victim as he finds him and is responsible for all natural and probable consequences of his tortous conduct. However, plaintiff fails to carry the requisite burden of proving causation if the pre-accident and post-accident conditions are identical in all meaningful respects. Thus, because the plaintiff provided uncontroverted evidence that the injuries exacerbated any pre-existing condition, she has met her burden.

These are the facts upon which the trial court awarded $103,000 in damages. The role of the appellate court is not to fix an award that it deems appropriate to the case, but, instead, to determine whether, based on the effect of the partiuclar injuries on the particular plaintiff in the particular circumstances which plaintiff finds himself in, the award is an abuse of discretion of the trier of fact. The eggshell rule and exacerbated symptoms were reasonable enough factual and legal reasons to find that the trial court's award was within its discretion.

Continue reading " Appellate Court Outlines Standard of Review for Damage Awards " »

Previously on this blog, we have looked at a variety of cases involving premises liability. Most have centered on an injury that occurs when the plaintiff visits a store or other commercial enterprise; in those cases, the defendant faces a heightened "merchant" standard of care under state statute, namely La. R.S. 9:2800.6. This post will add to the discussion by reviewing a recent case in which the First Circuit Court of Appeal considered the premises liability standard applicable to a hospital in a trip-and-fall case.

On August 14, 2007, Marion Terrance visited the cafeteria at the Baton Rouge General Medical Center. Terrance allegedly slipped on the mat in front of the ice machine that had become soaked with water. She injured her groin and lower back in the resulting fall. Terrance filed suit against the hospital alleging negligence due to the "unreasonably dangerous foreign substance" on the floor (water) and that the hospital had failed to clean it up. The hospital denied that the fall occurred at all and argued that it had no knowledge of any foreign substance on the floor. Conflicting testimony was presented during the bench trial. The cafeteria supervisor, upon being informed of Terrance's fall by another employee, immediately inspected the floor around the ice machine and found a dry mat and no spilled water. She also reported that the fall would have occurred just shortly after her most recent routine floor inspection, during which no water was noted. In fact, hospital employees had never noticed any water dripping from the ice machine. Nevertheless, the trial judge entered judgment in favor of Terrance and awarded her $26,910 in damages. The trial court's decision rested on the "unreasonable condition" that existed around the ice machine that caused Terrance to slip and fall. The hospital appealed, arguing that there was no evidence that an unreasonably dangerous condition existed at the time of Terrance's injury.

The First Circuit Court of Appeal began its analysis by establishing that hospitals are not covered by the merchant standard for premises liability contained in La. R.S. 9:2800.6. Instead, general negligence theory would apply. Under this standard, a hospital owes a duty to its visitors to "exercise reasonable care for their safety," but the duty owed is less than that required of a defendant engaged in a commercial enterprise. The court explained that once Terrance made her allegation that she slipped, fell, and injured herself because of a foreign substance on the hospital's premises, the burden then shifted to the hospital to show that it "acted reasonably to discover and correct the dangerous condition reasonably anticipated." The court noted the dispute at trial over the existence of a wet floor at all, but did not find any error in the trial court's factual finding that the water did, in fact, exist and that it caused Terrance to fall. However, the court did take issue with the trial court's immediate award of damages to Terrance without permitting the hospital to attempt to rebut the presumption of negligence:

"The trial court should have analyzed and considered whether the hospital acted reasonably to discover and correct the dangerous condition that it could have reasonably anticipated near the ice machine in the cafeteria... If the trial court had properly considered the hospital burden, a different outcome should have been rendered in this case."

In the court's view, the evidence presented at trial showed that the hospital acted reasonably to discover and correct any dangerous condition that might arise and in doing so discharged its duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of visitors. Finding that the "record supports a finding that the hospital met its burden of proof and therefore absolved itself from liability," the court concluded that the trial court erred in holding the hospital liable for Terrance's injuries and reversed the judgment.

This case points up the distinction in Louisiana jurisprudence between profit-seeking businesses and (presumably non-profit) community service providers like hospitals. The former, which exist primarily to "sell goods, foods, wares, or merchandise," are subject to a heightened duty to keep their premises in a safe condition for all customers and other visitors. The latter are evaluated under simple negligence standards.

Continue reading " Baton Rouge General Medical Center Slip-and-Fall Case Confirms Hospital's Premises Liability Standard " »

The level of care required of medical practitioners is very high. This is because people put their trust, and sometimes their lives and well being in the hands of a doctor or surgeon. The level of care is high because we must attain the very best from the people who perform the most delicate and important tasks the affect our lives. This is true of doctors, lawyers, and anyone else who has the position of a fiduciary. When the level of care falls below the bare minimum, the result can be disastrous. In a recent case, Ronald and Peggy Bianchi v. Dr. Ernesto Kufoy, the Third Circuit Louisiana Court of Appeal had to decide whether damages done to a patient were a result of the doctor's negligence or were an acceptable outcome of the procedure.

On October 30, 2002, Mr. Bianchi went to Dr. Kufoy for a cataract surgery and the implantation of an artificial lens in the right eye. The lining of the old lens was to remain intact so as to allow the placement of the new artificial lens on that lining. However, during the surgery, the old lining was torn out. It was found that this could occur without any negligence. Another artificial lens was used due to this complication, and it was not argued that anything had occurred during this setback that amounted to medical negligence. When Mr. Bianchi returned for his post surgery check-up, he complained of pain in his right eye. Dr. Kufoy checked the eye, but did not investigate the cause of the pain and the resulting loss of eye sight. Over the course of the next few days, Mr. Bianchi's eye pain increased. When he came to see Dr. Kufoy next, Dr. Kufoy diagnosed him with a form of glaucoma and referred him to a specialist. By the time he went to the first specialist, Dr. Jeff Lanier, Biachi had only light perception in his right eye. This was one step above total blindness. Dr. Lanier disagreed with Dr. Kufoy's glaucoma diagnosis, and found that there was a hemorrhage in the choroid, which likely began during the initial surgery. The second specialist drained the hemorrhage.

At trial, the jury found that Dr. Kufoy's actions were lower than the level of care required by his profession. The jury also found that there were clear damages to Mr. and Mrs. Bianchi. In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff has two levels of burden. First, plaintiff must prove by preponderance of the evidence that the doctor's treatment fell below the standard of care required for the profession. Second, the plaintiff must prove that the sub-par standard of care resulted in the injury. The jury based its determination that there was no causation shown on the fact that there was contradicting evidence. The Appellate Court cited to the standards it was using to judge the jury's determination:

When different medical procedures are involved, the defendant is liable not only for harm resulting from his substandard treatment, but for subsequent treatment that seeks to resolve the original harm. Under the appropriate standard of review, we do not consider only so much of the evidence as will uphold or undermine the judgment, but rather the whole of the evidence with an eye to determining whether the judgment is plainly wrong.

The plaintiff does not necessarily have to show that all the damage was as a direct result of the doctor's negligence. Rather, what can be shown is that due to Dr. Kufoy's negligent treatment, there was a loss of a chance of a better medical outcome. Based on the record, when Mr. Bianchi came in for his post-surgery check-up, Dr. Kufoy's failure, on multiple occasions, to diagnose the cause of the eye pain and loss of vision resulted in a much more dire situation by the time Mr. Bianchi received treatment by specialists. The trial court focused on actions taken by Dr. Kufoy at the time of surgery and found that none of the actions by themselves amounted to negligence. However, the record must be viewed in its totality, which shows that the post-op steps taken by Dr. Kufoy were insufficient under reasonable standards of care, which resulted in a loss of a chance of a better medical outcome. The Appellate Court reversed the decision of the jury.

If you feel you have received substandard medical care that has resulted in pain or aggravation of prior symptoms, your first course of action should be to seek a second opinion of a medical specialist. Your second court of action should be to seek legal advice.

Continue reading " Duty of Care Doctors Owe their Patients and Medical Malpractice " »

In several previous posts on this blog, we have explored cases involving premises liability where the plaintiff is injured while visiting a
"restaurant", "store", or other "business". But what about a plaintiff who is injured on his own property by a device that is owned by another party but which is on his property for his own benefit? This situation can arise in the case of utilities, where the dangerous conditions are created by electric power lines, natural gas lines, propane tanks, and the like. The case of Flowers v. Entergy Corp. offers an example.

On January 5, 2001, just outside of Springfield, Louisiana, Randall Flowers parked his truck and trailer in the driveway of his home. He parked the vehicle near a small pump house that served as a water source for washing the truck. When Flowers climbed on top of the trailer to wash it, he came into contact with a power line that provided electricity to his house and was severely injured. Flowers sued Entergy Corp., the local utility that owned and maintained the power line. At trial, both parties produced experts who testified about the National Electric Safety Code (the "Code"), which, though not officially adopted by the state of Louisiana, was relied upon by utilities for minimum safety standards. The Code set minimum heights for power lines in various applications so as to provide clearance for people and equipment passing below. Flowers' expert testified that the power line over the driveway failed to meet the Code requirements for the location where it was installed in that it sagged one and one-half feet too low at its midpoint. He also offered the opinion that Entergy should have performed more frequent inspections, which would have allowed the company to discover the problem sooner. Entergy's witness, who was certified as an expert in electrical engineering, Code interpretations, and accident reconstruction, read the Code differently and established that the height of the power line did not violate the Code. Ultimately, the jury found no fault on the part of Entergy and assigned 100 percent fault to Flowers.

On "appeal", Flowers argued that the jury's verdict was clearly wrong, and that Entergy's failure to maintain the lines at the height suggested by his expert witness was the cause-in-fact of his injury. The First Circuit focused its analysis on the issue of whether Entergy breached a duty it owed to Flowers, which was related to its maintaining the proper height of the power line. The court stated,

"from our review, the record provided the jury a reasonable basis for finding that Entergy ... could not have reasonably foreseen or anticipated plaintiff's choice of location for his chosen activity. Even if the duty or standard of care was breached by the height of the power line, the risk that materialized is not easily associated the breach. ... Thus, the risk was not contemplated by or within the scope of the breached duty, and therefore, not the legal cause of the injury."

The court concluded that, based on the trial record, the jury's verdict could not be considered "clearly wrong" and affirmed the trial court's judgment.

This case reminds property owners that the duty-risk analysis relied on by the courts in these cases does not place all responsibility on the utility company for the safe operation of power lines and other dangers. Indeed, "an electric company is not under a duty to safeguard against occurrences that cannot be reasonably expected or contemplated." In fact, "operators of power lines are not required to anticipate every possible accident which may occur and are not the insurers of safety of persons moving around power lines in the course of everyday living." Clearly the jury in the Flowers case determined that the plaintiff's truck-washing did not fall within the activities that Entergy should have "reasonably expected" would occur around its power lines, and the Court of Appeals did not find this conclusion unreasonable.

Continue reading " Springfield Injury Reminds Homeowners to Use Caution Around Power Lines " »

In many circumstances, state and federal governments are protected by governmental immunity. In some circumstances, e.g. where government acts as a market participant, these immunities are set aside due to the nature of the actions taken by the government. In Louisiana, the Lafayette Consolidated Government (LCG) runs a bus service for its citizens. On one bus drive, a customer of a LCG run bus was injured due to the malfunction of a pull cord that came loose striking the customer in the eye. In Willie Mae Scott (plaintiff) v. LCG, the Appellate Court upheld a trial court decision that granted summary judgment to LCG.

In August of 2006, plaintiff was riding a bus run by LCG. Another customer of the bus pulled on the cord to inform the bus driver that he should stop. Upon pulling the cord, a clamp holding the cord in place came loose striking plaintiff in the eye causing damage needing medical care. Plaintiff sued LCG as a common carrier and argued that, due to LCG's common carrier status, it was under a stronger duty of care than most.

The issues in the case were summarized by the Appellate Court as follows: (1) whether LCG had actual or constructive notice of the pull cord (2) whether LCG was a common carrier, subjecting it to a higher duty of care and (3) whether the existence of other pull cord defects created a genuine issue of material fact. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of LCG stating that there was no genuine issue of material fact. At the appellate level, the Court views the case de novo under the same summary judgment standards used at the trial court level.

Plaintiff argues that LCG had constructive notice of the pull cord defect. As such, they argued that this notice exists due to a lack of plan to check the pull cords. However, the Supreme Court of Louisiana has held in the past that as it relates to governmental entities, a lack of plan to inspect cannot lead to constructive notice. According to La.R.S. 9:2800, constructive knowledge is the existence of facts that infer actual knowledge. To argue that by not planning to check the pull cords LCG had constructive knowledge of the defect is a counterintuitive argument. Plaintiff further alleges that the standards set out by 9:2800 are irrelevant because LCG is a common carrier and is thus subject to a higher duty of care. However, the Appellate Court stated that statutes are supreme law that trump any common custom or usage. 9:2800 speaks directly to the issue of governmental liability in cases like LCG. Therefore, the statute overrules any common law ideal or custom within the legal community. Plaintiff also brought forth evidence that there was three other occasions where a defective pull cord injured a bus passenger. The first circumstance occurred at a time and place that no one could identify. Thus the impact of this evidence was ineffective. The other two incidents occurred on buses manufactured by companies other than the one that manufactured the bus in issue. Therefore, this evidence was irrelevant. The Appellate Court upheld the trial court's holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact.

While this case did not go as the plaintiff hoped, each case is different and there may still be something an intelligent, well-versed attorney can do. If you have been injured to the negligence of another driver, or defect in a vehicle, you may have a claim to damages.

Continue reading " Court Upholds Lower Level of Standard of Duty for Louisiana Governments " »

In a very recent Louisiana Court of Appeals Case, the Court took a rare action to uphold summary judgment when considering whether the lead vehicle in multi car pileup was negligent. The Court found the lead driver, Martin Lopez, was not negligent because he acted with ordinary care. This idea of ordinary care is extremely important

The accident in question occurred in Shreveport, Louisiana. Adam Parisy was driving north on I-49 with 3 passengers. He exited on a high rise ramp that curved over I-49 to Highway 3132, behind a freightliner driven by Lopez. The turbocharger on the 18 wheeler exploded, engulfing the area in smoke. Lopez pulled the liner over, unaware of any collission. Parisy stopped at the top of the ramp because he couldn't see and was rear ended by another drive, who was also rear ended.

Parisy and two of his passengers were seriously injured. Several separate lawsuits were filed, including against Lopez, his insurer, and his employer, which were dismissed via summary judgment.

Under the Sudden Emergency Doctrine, someone who finds themselves in imminent peril, without time to consider all the circumstances or the best steps to take to avoid danger, is not guilty of negligene if he fails to adopt which subsequently appears to be the better method of action, unless the emergency is brought by his own negligence.
Here, plaintiffs argue that the second driver's truck slammed into their vehicle and drove it into Lopez's rig. Because the collision was so severe, they remember only seeing smoke and stopping. The plaintiffs also allege that there are questions of fact as to whether Lopez stopped his vehicle after the turbocharger blew. However, they have no direct testimony to support the theory and only offer proof of a scratch on Parisy's vehicle that was not there before. Lopez's testimony that he did not stop is corroborated by the other two drivers. Additionally, the police report does not indicate there was a collision between Parisy's vehicle and Lopez's truck.

The plaintiffs also argue that Lopez was negligent because his truck caused the smoke and white out. However, the record shows that the turbocharger had been replaced two months before the blowout - there was no advanced warning that the new turbocharger would malfunction and everything indicates that Lopez and his employer exercised ordinary care. It is also argued that Lopez acted negligently in his reaction to the blowout. Lopez was faced with loss of power and visibility and had to make an instance decision, which he did, to put the vehicle and neutral and coast it to a safe location. Now that we are far removed from the accident, the plaintiff's suggest this was not the best course of action, however, Lopez acted with ordinary care in attempting to remove the danger by getting off the ramp.

If you have been in an accident and believe another driver's negligence was to blame, it is important you have an attorney with enough experience to know whether the Sudden Emergency Doctrine or some other law applies that may negatively impact your ability to be successful in your case. One of our talented lawyers would be happy to answer any questions you might have.