Louisiana Personal Injury Lawyer Blog

In previous posts on this blog, we have discussed the elements that the victim of a car accident must prove in order to recover from an at-fault driver. Whether the defendant's negligent conduct caused the accident and the victim's injuries is a question to be resolved by the fact-finder. This role is usually assumed by the jury, but can also be left to the judge in the case of a bench trial. Much deference is given to a fact-finder's decision on such issues: the appropriate standard for appellate review of factual determinations is the "manifest error/clearly wrong standard." This high standard means that an appellate court can set aside the trial court's factual determination only if it is "clearly wrong in light of the record reviewed in its entirety." In order to overturn a factual finding, the appellate court must make a two-part inquiry: (1) the court must find from a review of the trial record that no reasonable factual basis exists for the finding; and (2) the record must establish that the trial court's finding was clearly wrong. It is important to note that the appellate court is not merely asked to determine whether the trier of fact was objectively right or wrong; instead the court must decide if the factfinder’s conclusion was reasonable in light of the evidence. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal's opinion in the recent case of Hopkins v. Nola provides an example of an appellate court's application of this analysis to overturn a critical factual finding of the trial court.

On January 17, 2008, Sharnetta Hopkins was involved in a car accident with Brian Nola near the intersection of Desoto Street and Cole Avenue in Monroe, Louisiana. In her complaint, Hopkins alleged that the accident occurred when Nola struck her car after executing an illegal pass. Nola countered that he did nothing wrong, but was actually struck by Hopkins's car when she ran a stop sign. At the bench trial in March, 2010, the parties offered conflicting testimony on the incident. Also, Shawn Maynard, an officer with the Monroe Police Department who responded to the accident and issued Hopkins a citation for running the stop sign, offered testimony as to Hopkins's fault. Nevertheless, the trial court entered a judgment against Nola, awarding Hopkins damages after apportioning 80 percent of the fault to Nola. In its decision, the trial court noted that it effectively ignored Officer Maynard's testimony because he "did not take any photographs, diagram the location of any debris from the accident, and did not talk to all of the witnesses."

On appeal taken by Nola, the Second Circuit reviewed the trial record according to the manifest error standard. The court found that "the trial court committed reversible error in its wholesale dismissal of Officer Maynard’s testimony due to deficiencies in his investigation of the accident." The court reached this conclusion because "the trial court’s articulation in its written ruling of perceived deficiencies is unfounded."
Officer Maynard testified with reference to photos of the accident scene in a manner that was consistent with the accident report he filed immediately following his investigation. Hopkins "did not attempt to offer the written report or cross-examine the officer directly on its contents to show that his memory of the accident at trial differed from the report," or for that matter impugn Maynard's credibility in any way. Additionally, the trial court did not indicate its dismissal of Officer Maynard’s testimony was the result of a credibility assessment based on a finding of bias or untruthfulness. In fact, the evidence clearly supported Maynard's assessment of the situation but was inconsistent with Hopkins's summary of events. Accordingly, the court found that "the objective evidence so contradicts [Hopkins's] story that a reasonable factfinder would not credit that story. The ruling of the trial court was therefore clearly wrong and manifestly erroneous."

The Hopkins case speaks to the critical nature of a plaintiff's ability to establish facts that are consistent with her theory of recovery. As the Second Circuit noted in its opinion,

"Although deference to the factfinder should be accorded, because appellate courts have a constitutional duty to review both law and facts, they have the right and obligation to determine whether a trial court verdict is clearly wrong based on evidence, or clearly without evidentiary support... Therefore, it is not the case that a trial court’s factual determinations cannot ever, or hardly ever, be upset.”

Thus, the court makes clear that findings of fact must be supported by solid evidence in order to survive challenge on appeal. If you have been injured due to someone's negligence, it is essential to seek a qualified attorney who is experienced at building the most favorable case possible based on the actual evidence to be presented at trial.

Continue reading " Appellate Court Reverses Factually Unsupported Judgment in Car Wreck Case " »

Gleason v. Louisiana Dept. of Health and Hospitals is a Medical Malpractice case arising out of the unfortunate death of a 47-year-old severely mentally challenged man, Donnie Gleason. Donnie had been a resident of Northwest since December of 1974 and was nonverbal and incapable of self-medicating, arranging or monitoring his own medical assistance. On December 23, 2002, after two earlier unsuccessful attempts, Donnie was transported to Willis Knighton Medical Center ("Willis Knighton") in Bossier City, to undergo a routine CT scan and EEG after he suffered a seizure. When Donnie returned, he was lethargic and placed in the infirmary.

The documentation of his treatment there showed that Donnie had ingested a foreign object which caused a bowel impaction that precipitated Donnie’s fecal vomiting. Presumably due to his condition, Donnie was unable to expel the vomit and breathed some of the gastric content into his respiratory tract. At Willis Knighton, Donnie was placed on a ventilator in the intensive care unit and diagnosed with bowel obstruction, respiratory failure and aspiration pneumonia relating to the vomit aspiration. After a brief recovery, Donnie once again went into respiratory distressed, was placed on a ventilator, and passed. The staff were unable to revive him.

In Louisiana, medical malpractice complaints must first be filed with the Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund before a lawsuit may be commenced. That organization’s medical review panel ruled for the defendants in this action - Northwest (intermediate care facility) and Willis Knighton (hospital) and their doctors and physician’s assistants individually. The panel concluded that the evidence did not support the conclusion that Northwest failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care because they found no evidence that Donnie ingested a foreign object while there. After the panel ruling, Donnie’s family filed suit against Northwest and Willis Knighton. They alleged, among other things, that Northwest’s failure to properly supervise Donnie and his treatment and its failure to recognize the seriousness of his condition and the inadequacy of the monitoring of Donnie’s respiratory status.

To establish a claim for medical malpractice, a plaintiff must prove (1) the standard of care applicable to the defendant; (2) that the defendant breached that standard of care; and (3) that there was a causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury. The testimony of an expert is generally required to establish the applicable standard of care and whether that standard was breached, unless the negligence is so obvious that it can be inferred with expert guidance. Expert testimony is not required, but is typically relied upon to prove causation when its determination is not a matter of common knowledge.

Northwest filed a motion to be summarily dismissed from the case because Donnie’s family initially did not designate any expert and Donnie’s family asked for an extension, which the Court granted. Even after Donnie’s family submitted an unsigned affidavit from an experienced nurse, the Court granted Northwest’s motion on the ground that the affidavit was not enough to establish a breach of the duty of care.

After another adverse ruling, Donnie’s family appealed to the Court of Appeals (“COA”) seeking a new trial, arguing that the Court needed no additional information to determine causation. The COA found that a fact issue remained regarding Northwest’s duty to protect Donnie from the danger that could result from his access to an object which the circumstances indicate he may have swallowed, since Donnie was primarily in Northwest’s custody in the days leading up to the discovery of the object. Moreover, the COA thought the matter should proceed to trial since the causal link between the object’s impaction of Donnie’s bowels also still needed to be resolved.

Unfortunately, Donnie’s family’s attorneys initially failed to get their expert to sign her affidavit, which required much procedural maneuvers at considerable expense and at the risk of having the case thrown out altogether. All of these remedial steps also delayed what compensation may eventually come to Donnie’s family and cost them more in legal fees. Competent legal representation is invaluable in an area as technical and regulated as medical malpractice. The need for expert testimony and the sufficiency of claims making out an allegation of medical malpractice call for seasoned skills and a conscientious and personal touch.

In a recent medical malpractice case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal for the State of Louisiana found Dr. Donovan Bailey not liable for medical malpractice. His patient, Mrs. Mary Prine, died at the age of 58 a mere two months after being diagnosed with colon cancer. Her surviving spouse and two children sued and claimed that Dr. Bailey's medical negligence caused Mrs. Prine's wrongful death.

In order to prove that Dr. Bailey was medically negligent, the plaintiffs had to prove: 1) a duty of care owed by the health care provider to the plaintiff; 2) breach of that duty by failure to abide by the appropriate standard of care; 3) a causal connection between the breach and the patient’s injury or death; and 4) damages.

Both sides essentially agreed that since 1997, colorectal cancer screening should be recommended to patients 50 years of age or older, and that Dr. Bailey had not done so even though he had been caring for Mrs. Prine since 1997. The only pivotal issue in this case was whether Dr. Bailey was Mrs. Prine's primary health care physician. If he was not, then he could not be liable for medical malpractice because he would owe her no special duty, which is an element for the medical negligence cause of action.

Numerous experts testified about whether Dr. Bailey was Mrs. Prine’s primary health care physician. The plaintiffs' expert testified that an important factor for determining whether a doctor is someone's primary health care physician is whether a doctor is making referrals and receiving reports back. Not receiving reports back would tend to suggest that a doctor is not the primary health care physician. Although Dr. Bailey had referred Mrs. Prine to several doctors, he did not receive reports about her back. Additionally, Mrs. Prine's visits to Dr. Bailey were sporadic and at irregular intervals, and Mrs. Prine used Dr. Bailey on an "as needed" basis.

Another factor in Dr. Bailey's favor was that Mrs. Prine had been seeing other medical personnel for her primary and/or overall health care management; Dr. Bailey was not receiving the results of those medical tests. There was also evidence given by a nurse that Mrs. Prine had said, "I don't want to know if there is something wrong with me," and that she failed to return medical tests and to return for a follow-up x-ray.

Dr. Bailey had completed only a year's internship in family practice and had not been board certified or board eligible. He was not listed as Mrs. Prine’s primary physician on various medical records; a different doctor, an OB-GYN, was.

Before the plaintiffs sued, a medical review panel reviewed the allegations, and all of the doctors on the panel agreed that Dr. Bailey was not Mrs. Prine's primary health care physician. All of the experts agreed that a doctor can have a variety of kinds of patients in his or her practice, so the fact that Dr. Bailey might have had other patients for whom he was the primary health care physician was not at all dispositive.

Because Mrs. Prine's spouse and children were not able to prove that Dr. Bailey was Mrs. Prine’s primary health care physician, they could not show that Dr. Bailey owed Mrs. Prine a special "duty of care" to offer Mrs. Prine colorectal screening, which would probably have saved her life. The plaintiffs therefore lost at the trial court as well as on appeal.

Continue reading " Case Illustrates the Issues Surrounding Medical Malpractice Exceptions " »

The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure generally affords the trial court wide discretion in assessing the costs of litigation to one or more of the parties. "Except as otherwise provided by law, the court may render judgment for costs, or any part thereof, against
any party, as it may consider equitable.” La. C.C.P. Art. 1920. The expenses that the court can tax as costs include the fees of the court clerk or sheriff, witness’ fees, costs of taking depositions, and the cost of photocopies of laws, regulations, medical reports, and hospital records used during the trial. So great is the trial court's discretion, in fact, that the trial court's assessment can be overturned only upon a showing of abuse of discretion.

As mentioned, though, there are limitations in the law to the trial court's authority. For instance, special provisions exist for allocating costs in workers' compensation cases as well as those involving a plaintiff who proceeds in forma pauperis (through a pauper's action). The recent case of Curry v. HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hospital illustrates that one path to reversible error on the part of the trial judge is running afoul of the special rules for impoverished plaintiffs.

Matha Curry, an elderly stroke survivor, visited the HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hospital in Homer, Louisiana on August 29, 2002 for physical therapy. While under the care of a nurse technician, Curry fell and fractured her arm in two places. She subsequently filed a pauper's suit against the hospital, which admitted fault for the accident. The trial court reviewed the depositions of Curry, the nurse technician, and two physicians. It awarded Curry $30,000 in general damages for pain and suffering and $3,199 in special damages for medical expenses. Court costs were assessed against the hospital. The court assessed the costs of one of the physician's depositions, to which Curry’s lawyer was late by three hours, against Curry. It also ordered the costs of the medical records used during the trial and the costs of the second physician's deposition to be shared equally between Curry and the hospital. Curry appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in assessing costs against her. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal noted that the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure includes special rules for the waiver of costs for indigent plaintiffs. In sum, the Code provides that the defendant is liable for paying the impoverished plaintiff's costs if the plaintiff prevails. The hospital argued that the cost-sharing for one deposition and medical records was fair in light of Curry's last minute refusal, prior to the trial, to execute the settlement agreement that accompanied the settlement check that she deposited and was later forced to return. However, the court stated, "While we are sympathetic to the frustrations experienced by [the hospital] in its good-faith attempt to settle the matter, the [pauper] provisions ... are mandatory. The assessment of the costs ... against Curry was an abuse of discretion." Likewise, the court rejected the hospital's argument that the assessment of the costs of the deposition to which Curry's attorney arrived late was permissible as a penalty because "[t]he trial court never referred to it as a sanction." Accordingly, the court reversed the portion of the trial court's judgment that assessed costs against Curry and instead taxed all costs of the action to the hospital.

This case, while perhaps somewhat unusual in that it involved an impoverished plaintiff, is instructive on the issue of the costs of litigation. Especially in cases involving expert witnesses or significant documents, records, or other paperwork, ancillary costs can add up quickly. It is important for any plaintiff to understand the trial court's role in assessing costs so that a successful judgment is not unduly reduced by these expenses.

Continue reading " The Impoverished Plaintiff and the Assessment of Court Costs " »

As we have explored in numerous prior posts, a doctor or other healthcare provider owes his or her patient a duty to meet the standard of care applicable to the patient's situation. The failure to follow the standard of care points to the doctor's negligence which, in the case of the death of the patient, can give rise to a claim of "lost chance of survival" for the spouse or children of the deceased. In a lost chance of survival action, the plaintiff "does not have to shoulder the unreasonable burden of proving that the patient would have lived had proper treatment been
given." Rather, the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the doctor's negligent conduct "denied the patient a chance of survival." In other words, a lost chance of survival claim will not be successful if the patient would have died anyway due to causes unrelated to the doctor's actions; the plaintiff must tie the doctor's negligence to the death of the decedent. Whether a plaintiff carries this burden is a question of fact reserved for the jury.

Third Circuit Court of Appeal recently reviewed a jury verdict on this question in the case of Skinner v. Christus St. Francis Cabrini Hospital. Robert Skinner was admitted to Christus Hospital in Alexandria on August 17, 2000 for an elective hemorrhoidectomy and partial sphincterotomy. He died the following morning after spending the night in the hospital. His wife, Pamela Skinner, filed suit against the hospital and Stephen Ford, the nurse who had charge of Mr. Skinner from 7:00 PM to 7:00 AM during the night of his stay. At the trial, various witnesses from the hospital explained that the surgery had gone well. The only reason Mr. Skinner stayed overnight was because of his high level of anxiety over the procedure. Mr. Skinner had a history of mental and physical problems, and was taking numerous prescription medications to address his depression, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and heart burn. Several members of the hospital staff reviewed Mr. Skinner's medication list on separate occasions, and each time he neglected to mention that he had taken a particular antidepressant prior to coming to the hospital. In fact, the toxicology screening that was conducted as part of an autopsy revealed dangerously high levels of the drug in his system--a concentration which the medical experts in the case agreed was "known to kill." Nevertheless, the jury found that the evidence supported the conclusion that the hospital and Nurse Ford failed to properly monitor Mr. Skinner after the surgery, Therefore, the defendants "deviated from the appropriate standard of care in the medical treatment of Mr. Skinner," causing a lost chance of survival. The jury awarded Mrs. Skinner $250,000 in general damages. The defendants appealed, arguing that the jury erred in finding the plaintiff had carried her burden.

The Third Circuit reviewed the record at length and found that Nurse Ford and other hospital staff had properly checked Mr. Skinner's vital signs per the hospital's established schedule throughout the night. It also noted that Mr. Skinner was given several doses of pain medicine to provide him comfort after the surgery. These drugs were administered with the hospital staff's knowledge of the other medications Mr. Skinner had identified that he had taken. It was undisputed that no one at the hospital knew or could have known about the anti-depressant Mr. Skinner had taken but not revealed during several pre-op interviews. The autopsy further revealed that Mr. Skinner's death was caused by heart failure, which the defendants' experts linked to the exceedingly high level of the anti-depressant in his blood. One of the defendants' experts explained that death would have been sudden and without warning, such that an examination only 15 minutes prior to death would likely have revealed nothing unusual even to a careful and experienced practitioner. Another expert opined that "Mr. Skinner would have looked absolutely fine five minutes before he died." In light of this evidence, and Mrs. Skinner's "fail[ure] to produce a scintilla of evidence" that pointed to the hospital's negligence, the court concluded, "we are convinced that the jury manifestly erred in its determination that Christus Hospital/Nurse Ford’s negligence caused Mr. Skinner a lost chance of survival." Accordingly, the court vacated the trial court's judgment that awarded Mrs. Skinner $250,000 in general damages for the lost chance of survival.

The Skinner case, while tragic, offers a reminder to plaintiffs that their burden in a lost chance of survival action is not a light one. The theory of recovery can only be employed where a healthcare provider's negligence played a direct role in denying the decedent the treatment that could have saved his life. As the Skinner case demonstrates, healthcare providers are not held to a standard that requires them to respond to complications about which they could not have known or reasonably discovered.

Continue reading " Court Vacates Jury's Award in Rapides Parish Lost Chance of Survival Case " »

The tort law system is designed to make whole those who have been injured. Since medical science is both an imperfect art and an imperfect science, money is most often the cure for what ails plaintiffs. In each case the jury must decide how much money it takes to remedy the injury the victim suffered? This gets further complicated when considering someone who suffers and will suffer from a permanent condition brought on by another. The issue of damages is strongly linked with the issue of causation. The courts seek to compensate plaintiffs for all of the monetary loss they suffer at the hands of those found liable (those who are found legally responsible). An important aspect of liability is the determination that a wrongdoer was the proximate or legal cause of a plaintiffs injury.

Pain is a somewhat subjective part of the human experience. Torts professors sometimes joke that there is no "Pain-o-meter" for measuring how much something hurts. In our civil justice system, the awarding and amount of pain and suffering awards are a matter for the fact finder. This means that the decision about how much to compensate someone for their pain is often left to a jury of their peers. This is often a difficult decision for jurors to make, especially considering the subjectivity of pain.

Doctors use a chart with a series of faces ranging from one that seems to express mild discomfort to one that has tears dripping down it to figure out how much pain a person is in. That is the height of the technology used to measure pain. Juries are often called upon to answer the question oh what value each of these bring, not for themselves, but for some other injured person. It is the job of the plaintiff's attorney to call for an appropriate standard when compensating for pain. The standards used vary by location. Pain and suffering make up just one piece of an injured person's damages. Juries must also account for lost wages, future wages, medical expense and future medical expenses, among other potential costs.

How much pain is worth $2,654,249.99? That number represents what a judge, in lieu of a jury, granted Ms. Kristin Davis after two corporate defendants and an individual were found liable for her injuries. The trial judge's award contemplated past medical damage, car rental, past lost wages, future lost wages, past household expenses, future household expenses and future medical expenses. The Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit of Louisiana reduced the initial award by a total of $1,782,948. Ms. Davis' award was reduced in part because she failed to prove, in the opinion of the defendants and the Court of Appeal, that she was actually disabled in a way that prevented her from participating in any occupation. The allegation that the accident was caused by the defendant and that these injuries were caused by the accident would both have to be proven beyond a preponderance of the evidence. This means that the fact finder would have to determine that it was more likely than not the injuries were the result of the defendant's negligence.

It was the determination of the Court of Appeal that Ms. Davis did not prove that her alleged future needs beyond a preponderance of the evidence. The court reversed the trial court's findings on these expenses and affirmed a reduced award in the other areas.

Continue reading " No Future Expenses Awards for Ouachita Woman Who Suffered Injuries in Accident " »

The plaintiffs in this case are the family of Cody Ebarb, a 12-year-old boy who suffered a stroke and subsequently died after receiving care from various doctors at Willis Knighton Medical Center in Shreveport-Bossier City, Louisiana. Cody suffered from several pre-existing medical problems, including a viral chronic fatigue syndrome, suspected disease of the connective tissue, and herpes virus of the eye. He had spent much time in medical treatment and was, sadly, a very sick child for much of his life.

On the morning of November 5, while on his way to the pediatrician, Cody suddenly said that he couldn’t see and fell to the floor, moaning. He was transported by EMTs to Willis-Knighton South, and they noted only that he was having seizures. It turned out that he had actually had a stroke due to a small tear in his basilar artery (which is surrounded by the spine).

Dr. Felty, an emergency room physician, performed a basic emergency exam and ran a batter of standard tests. He did not perform a full neurological exam because Cody could not communicate and was moving involuntarily. He also did not order an MRI because subspecialists, not ER physicians, normally do so. While at the hospital, Cody could not open his eyes or speak, but at some point was aware of his surroundings. Eventually, at approximately 2 pm, a pediatrician arrived, ordered Ativan (a widely used sedative and anticonvulsant) and left. Between the hours of 2 pm and 6:30 pm, several doctors examined Cody, who by then had deteriorated and was unable to move his arms or communicate. He was then transferred into the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). During his night in the ICU, Cody went into cardiac arrest and was placed on life support. While on life support, an MRI was taken that showed a very rare torn basilar artery, which resulted in a stroke.

A medical review panel unanimously found that the doctors did not breach the standard of care due to t he complicated nature of the case.

A medical malpractice case is not about hindsight, asking if there was anything the doctors could possibly have done to save someone’s life. Rather, it is about determining whether Cody’s doctors breached the standard of care that doctors are required to abide by. In order to prove that the doctors in this case were medically negligent, the plaintiffs had to prove: 1) a duty of care owed by the health care provider to Cody; 2) breach of that duty by failure to abide by the appropriate standard of care; 3) a causal connection between the breach and the patient’s injury or death; and 4) damages.

It is clear that the doctors owed a duty of care to Cody, who was their patient. At trial, the plaintiffs’ expert and the defense expert strongly disagreed about what the standard of care was and whether the doctors had breached it. The plaintiffs’ experts thought that Dr. Felty should have ordered an MRI right away, which might have shown the torn artery. They also strongly criticized the doctors for keeping incomplete charts. Torn basilar arteries are not always fatal, but do have a high mortality rate. On the other hand, the defense expert testified that by the time Cody arrived in the ER, it was already too late. She also testified that ER doctors do not normally order MRIs and in any event it would have been difficult with an involuntarily moving child. Another defense expert thought that even an early MRI could not have saved Cody.

The jury found that the doctors did not cause Cody’s death. Additionally, causation was difficult for the plaintiffs to prove because no autopsy was performed.

The court noted that the lack of documentation and the fact that Cody lay in the emergency room for four hours even after he had been ordered to be transferred to the ICU were cause for concern, but the jury appeared to have accepted the doctors’ trial testimony and a court is not allowed to re-weigh credibility. Therefore, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal for the State of Louisiana upheld the jury verdict.

Continue reading " Caddo Parish Jury Finds Doctors Not Liable in Medical Malpractice Case; Verdict Upheld " »

For those wishing to be kept abreast of the latest products to receive governmental warnings regarding the safety surrounding their use, feel free to check out SaferProducts.gov. With a list of incident reports from other consumers, this effort by the government hopefully will help enable people to make conscious decisions regarding the products they put in their homes.

The plaintiff in this case, Suzanne Hammond, was the mother of Latousha Tillman and the grandmother of her stillborn child, Ladaizya Tillman. On March 31, 2004, Ms. Tillman arrived at the St. Francis Hospital emergency room complaining of pain, nausea, and vomiting. She was 25 years old and 23 weeks pregnant. Dr. Joiner treated her and found her heart rate, liver enzymes, and glucose to be elevated, with decreased kidney function. Ms. Tillman was then transferred to another hospital, where problems with her unborn child were discovered. The fetus was found to have no heartbeat and labor was induced 3 days later, on April 4, 2004.

After the birth, Ms. Tillman’s condition dramatically declined and she was placed on life support. She then went into a persistent vegetative state and was pronounced dead on January 24, 2005, after the medical staff was unable to resuscitate her. Ms. Hammond sued St. Francis and Dr. Joiner for a survival action and a wrongful death action with regard to her daughter, and a wrongful death lawsuit as to her stillborn granddaughter.

A survival action compensates the survivors for the damages suffered by a victim from the time of injury to the moment of his or her death. The cause of action is “inherited” – it belongs to the victim and is passed on at death. If there is even a tiny amount of evidence showing any pain of suffering by a victim before her death, damages are warranted.

A wrongful death action, on the other hand, compensates the beneficiaries, usually family members, for their own injuries which they suffer from the moment of the victim’s death on. The wrongful death action belongs to the survivors (in this case, Ms. Hammond), not the victim.

On January 20, 2006, Ms. Hammond filed a request for a medical review panel, alleging that St. Francis Hospital and Dr. Joiner had committed negligence. This was more than a year from the death of the stillborn child and more than a year after Dr. Joiner last treated Ms. Tillman. Under LSA-R.S. 9:5628, a plaintiff may bring a medical malpractice action within one year from the date of the alleged act or one year from the date of discovery, with a three-year total limit.

With respect to the survival claim as to Ms. Tillman, the trial court found that the claim had prescribed, that is, Ms. Hammond filed her claim too late. Article 3492 of LSA-C.C. clearly states that prescription runs against people who are absent or incompetent, including minors and interdicts (those who have been ruled incompetent to care for themselves). There is an exception for products liability cases, but that exception did not apply here.

Ms. Hammond tried to argue that the three-year limit applied, but did not show in the court-filed pleadings that there was some reason for her not to file within the one-year limit. Instead, she should have filed any survival action for Ms. Tillman within a year of the date of discovery of the malpractice, and any wrongful death action for the stillborn child within a year of the child’s death on April 1, 2004. It is the plaintiff’s burden to show that the time limits have not run, and in this case, Ms. Hammond did not state the date of discovery. Therefore, the survival claim with regard to Ms. Tillman and the wrongful death claim with regard to the stillborn child were dismissed.

The wrongful death action with regard to Ms. Tillman had not prescribed, however, because it arose on January 24, 2005, at Ms. Tillman’s death, and Ms. Hammond filed for a medical review panel on January 20, 2006. The case was affirmed and remanded for the wrongful death action with regard to Ms. Tillman to go forward.

Continue reading " Prescription Runs on Ouachita Parish Medical Malpractice and Wrongful Death Survival Action Claim " »

Louisiana law requires all motor vehicle liability insurance policies to extend coverage not only to the insured, but also to any other person with express or implied permission to drive the motor vehicle. Once the insured gives permission, coverage will be denied only if the driver deviates from the permissive use. Consequently, at issue in most lawsuits of this kind is whether the damages caused by the driver are covered by the policy.

A recent case involved Ellen Van, who was driving her car on McReight Street in the city of Bastrop on the same day that minor April Canada was driving a truck owned by the defendant, Steven Ferrell, her live-in boyfriend. April allegedly failed to stop at an intersection and collided with the Van's vehicle. Ellen and her husband, claiming that the collision caused injuries to her back and body, filed suit against Steven Ferrel and his insurer, Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana. In Ellen T. Van and Ralph E. Van v. Steven Ferrell and Safeway Ins. Co., the lower court granted Safeway's motion for summary judgment on the basis of the affirmative defense of nonpermissive use. Safeway contended that April did not have permission to use the truck on the day in question, and, therefore, the damages caused by the accident were not covered by the policy.

On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the lower court's determination that there was no genuine issue of material fact in the case. Specifically, the plaintiffs contested that April's implied permission from Ferrell to drive the truck on the day of the accident was an unresolved, material issue in the case. The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeals, agreeing with the plaintiffs, reversed and remanded the lower court's judgment because the deposition testimony established that an issue remained in the case as to whether April had implied permission to drive Ferrell's truck.

Although Ferrell stated April did not have express permission to drive the truck, he conceded at the deposition that the keys and truck were at the house, which were readily accessible to April, and that he never explicitly told April she did not have permission to drive the truck. Moreover, Ferrell's mother Tracy, who also lived at the home, testified that April had occasionally driven the truck unaccompanied; however, she later stated that April only drove the truck with her or another licensed driver. Most significantly, April testified that she drove Ferrell's truck many times around the area where they lived with Ferrell and Tracy's permission. April further testified that since Tracy and Ferrell knew she had to report to work the day of the accident, she believed she had permission to drive the truck to town.

According to the appellate court, the trial court needed to resolve the credibility of the parties' accounts due to the inconsistent deposition testimony. Since a trial is the only appropriate legal forum to resolve issues in a case dependent on credibility determinations, the appellate court concluded that summary judgment was improper.

As this case demonstrates, it is important to have competent representation to successfully appeal an unfavorable judgment. The ability to challenge the court's rulings and force the proper judicial process is something a plaintiff, or defendant, needs to feel confident their attorney can handle.

Continue reading " Court of Appeals Rejects Insurance Company's Defense of Nonpermissive Use in Recent Case " »

In a ruling by the Third Circuit Court of Appeal for the State of Louisiana, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) and the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) were found jointly liable for $3.9 million to Vanna McManus and her children, the survivors of a man who drowned at Chivery Dam in Natchitoches Parish.

The deceased, Hugh McManus, was fishing with his friend Stanley Neal at the 70-year-old Chivery Dam in Mr. Neal’s boat. They pulled up close to the dam, killed the motor, and began throwing cast nets. The pair believed that the current in the nearby Saline Bayou would cause them to drift back downstream, but because of water coming over the dam and how close they were when they stopped, they were actually pulled toward the dam. The two men did not notice this until the boat bumped against the dam and began filling with water. The pair abandoned the boat without securing their life vests. Mr. Neal was able to make it to shore by walking on top of the dam, but Mr. McManus drowned. There were no warning signs posted anywhere near the dam announcing that approaching within a certain number of feet was dangerous.

A Natchitoches Parish jury found in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded them $3,880,965.95, with 25% of the fault allocated to LDWF (which owned the dam) and 75% to DOTD (which inspected and maintained the dam). The State of Louisiana appealed, claiming that the jury erred in finding that DOTD and LDWF were liable to the plaintiffs and that DOTD had a legal duty to warn of the alleged dangerous condition that caused Mr. McManus’ death. The jury also concluded that DOTD willfully or maliciously failed to warn against a dangerous condition under La. R.S. 9:2795 and that a dangerous condition existed at Chivery Dam at the time of the accident and that DOTD and/of LDWF had constructive notice of it.

In order to prove liability on the part of the state, the plaintiff has to show: 1) that there was a dangerous condition which presented an unreasonable risk of harm; 2) that the State had actual or constructive knowledge of the condition and enough time to take remedial action; 3) that the State had a duty to warn of the dangerous conditions; and 4) that the State was willful in its inaction. This last requirement overcomes the usual qualified immunity defense; La. R.S. 9:2795 states in part that an owner of land who permits someone else to use the land does not extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purposes except for willful or malicious failure to warn against a dangerous condition. If the condition is obviously dangerous and would be clear to both the owner and a visitor, no duty exists to warn about the danger. If the unreasonably dangerous condition is not “open and obvious,” however, there is a duty to warn the plaintiffs of the danger.

Most of the jury’s findings that the State claimed were error were factual determinations, so the appellate court could not overturn them unless they were clearly wrong. It was clear that there was a reasonable basis for all of the jury’s findings, and the appellate court affirmed all of the trial court’s decisions.

In this case, there was testimony that there were at least two similar occurrences (without injuries) at the dam previous to this tragic incident. One incident involved Mr. McAlpine, a 28-year veteran enforcement agent for LDWF, who would have drowned had he not been able to grab a life preserver. He testified that someone who witnessed the accident had a similar experience and had seen several other accidents in the same area. Because Mr. McAlpine was and is a LDWF agent, LDWF can be said to have constructive knowledge of the unreasonably dangerous condition.

The plaintiffs’ expert witness, an engineer, testified that it was not possible to fix the condition and that the only alternative was to post warnings, buoys, or barricades that would have warned the plaintiffs. He pointed out that even the DOTD website states that the operator is required to correct or post warnings if there is a dangerous condition. He also testified that unless a person had training or experience with dams, there was no way to tell that the condition existed. The State did not refute the expert testimony. The evidence at the trial was enough to show that the State’s failure to post warning signs was willful, since they knew about the problem and had more than enough time to post signs.

Continue reading " Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, Department of Transportation and Development Found Liable for Natchitoches Parish Drowning " »

From the Courts of Equity of the England of yore to Louisiana's Third Circuit, fairness is and has been for a long time an essential component of the law. Civil concepts of fairness still exist today, especially in Louisiana courts dedicated to making whole the victim of a crime.

Edward Signal, like many injury victims, acquired the right to sue at the time of his injury. This right is a commodity of sorts and can be bargained away in an agreement known as a release. Mr. Signal signed one of these agreements with BellSouth Telecommunications after a BellSouth employee, Jared Romero, struck Mr. Signal's vehicle on the on-ramp of Highway 90 from Willow Street in Lafayette. Mr. Signal received a check from BellSouth for the exact amount of the damage to his car. When he cashed this check, he failed to consider an important phrase in the letter that accompanied it. BellSouth indicated that this check was intended to be a "full and final settlement of [Mr. Signal's] claim." There was also language on the back of the check that indicated the check was for "property damages and/or bodily injury." After cashing the check, Mr. Signal discovered the check to not fully cover his damages and filed suit in this matter. In response, BellSouth raised the affirmative defense of res judicata claiming that Mr. Signal's claim was already settled.

The trial court determined that Mr. Signal, a 73-year-old man with a self-assessed third grade reading level, was not quite on even footing with the more sophisticated corporate defendant. In so concluding, the trial court found that Mr. Signal's behavior was reasonable. A reasonable man in his situation would assume that a check for the amount of damage to his car would not also be intended to cover personal damages. The State of Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit affirmed Mr. Signal's right to sue BellSouth for damages arising out of his personal injuries.

There were two essential values at stake in this case: 1) freedom of contract and 2) fairness. The corporate defendant, obviously having more resources and knowledge, was attempting to escape the full extent of its vicarious liability for the actions of its employee while on the job. Would this case have turned out the same if Mr. Signal were a corporate lawyer with a rich knowledge of the law surrounding contracts of adhesion and alternative dispute resolution? Probably not. Should it have? Fairness dictates that the outcome probably should be different.

Releases are an essential mechanism for both plaintiffs and defendants. They offer a kind of safety net for parties on each side of a dispute. A plaintiff exchanges his or her right to sue for the guarantee of some compensation while a defendant receives exemption from suit in exchange for a smaller payout. Both parties benefit if a fair bargain is struck. If one party is of considerably disparate sophistication, as was the case of Mr. Signal, then there is a fundamental, almost extreme aversion to such an agreement.

A potential plaintiff is fully capable of essentially selling his right to sue but should not be tricked by a potential defendant that outclasses him or her in almost all relevant parameters. This is a noble position summarized extremely poignantly by the trial court in this case. The court said flatly that "this is not acceptable to the Court" when referring to BellSouth apparently trying to take advantage of Mr. Signal's plight. This court and the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit struck a blow for fairness in reaching these conclusions. Decisions like this one and those cited within it enshrine a sense of fair play and justice that help protect future victims from unfair business practices.

Continue reading " Successful Appeal for Fairness in Iberia Parish Car Accident Payment " »

The health and safety of workers is a pressing concern for both employees and employers alike. When an injury occurs at a job site, many questions arise as to the care of the injured and the responsibility of the employer in regard to that care. As an employee, the question of who pays for the care that may become necessary in the immediate, as well as into the future, is of prominent concern. Also, an injured employee may ask what level of responsibility their employer is held to for the circumstances of the accident and how they can receive compensation for health and living expenses resulting from any injury. What some employees may overlook is that their employment status can often dictate the means and method by which they will be able to recover should a lawsuit become necessary.

The importance of a contract between the employer and the employee who wish to have their relationship classified as statutory cannot be overstated. The recent Louisiana Court of Appeals case out of the Parish of Beauregard, Tilley v. Boise Cascade Corp., illustrates how one's employment status under the law can affect the outcome of a claim for compensation after injury. Tilley, an employee of the BE & K Construction Company, was contracted to work for a Boise Cascade Corp. owned paper mill. While performing work at a machine in the mill, Tilley was sprayed by a scalding liquid and suffered injury. Tilley's contract to work had expired six days prior to the accident.

Tilley filed suit. Soon after, Boise Cascade Corp. claimed immunity under Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act Title 23 § 1061, arguing that Tilley was a statutory employee who was only entitled to workers compensation benefits and was not entitled to file suit. Hinging their decision on the contract, the Court of Appeals held that the Boise Cascade failed to prove with any certainty that Tilley’s contract had been extended. Therefore, Tilley was not a statutory employee at the time of the accident and she was free to move forward with her suit.

The determination that an employee is a statutory employee can dictate an injured worker’s recovery options. A regular employee is a worker directly hired by a business to perform its trade or operation. Such an employee is covered under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act. The Act mandates that when an employee is injured the employer must pay a certain amount to them under law. In obtaining the absolute benefit of workers’ compensation, the employee forfeits the right to sue for additional damages with the exception of an injury or death caused intentionally by an employer. This immunity covers suits for employer negligence, and the legal result is that an employee receiving workers compensation benefits cannot sue the employer for additional damages not recoverable under workers’ compensation.

A statutory employee is a worker who is contracted to perform a job for a principal employer through a sub-contractor or intermediary. To be classified as a statutory employee under Louisiana law Title 23 §1061, the worker must be performing work “which is a part of [the] trade, business, or occupation” of the principal employer under a contract which indicates their status as a statutory employee. If an employee is classified as a statutory employee the employer enjoys the same immunity from suit as it does with regular employees in the event of death or injury. Thus, if an employee’s status is that of a statutory employee, the employer is exclusively liable for death or injury under workers compensation and enjoys tort immunity. Immunity shields the statutory employer from further suit, preventing the statutory employee from further recovery. Thus, an employee’s status governs the possible methods of legal redress.

Employee status can have great effect on the remedies which can be sought by employees as well as on the duty of care an employer must exercise. If you find yourself faced with an on the job injury you need the services of an effective legal team to help you determine important issues such as the effect your employment status could have on your claim.

Continue reading " The Effect of Statutory Employee Status on a Claim for Injury on the Job " »

When a caller dials 911 to report an emergency, it is not uncommon for the operator to transfer the caller to the local service provider that is best suited to respond to the incident. For instance, a caller who reports an auto accident can expect to be connected with the nearest ambulance service. In the case of Willis v. Rapides Parish Communications District, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal examined the duty owed by an ambulance dispatcher when a transfer does not go through.

Johnny Willis was involved in a single-car accident on La. Hwy. 488 just outside of Oak Hill. The crash was discovered by a passer-by, Shirley Ponthieux, who called 911. The operator for the Rapides Parish Communications District (RPCD) answered her call, contacted the fire department, and then attempted to transfer her directly to Acadian Ambulance because of another incoming call. The operator did not think that taking the other call would affect the transfer, but in fact it failed and Ponthieux was cut off. Because of the phone confusion and because the fire department could not obtain a cellular signal to call Acadia Ambulance when it arrived on the scene, an ambulance did not arrive until approximately an hour later. Sadly, Mr. Willis died at the hospital. His wife, Carleen Willis, filed suit against RPCD and Acadian Ambulance. Her claim against Acadian cited its failure to "receive and respond to the emergency transmission" and that it "failed to establish and utilize a reliable communications system for the receipt of emergency transmissions." The trial judge granted Acadian Ambulance’s motion for summary judgment, holding that it does not owe a duty to an accident victim until it actually receives a call requesting ambulance service.

On appeal, Willis argued that Acadian Ambulance owed a duty to her husband to properly advise the RPCD of how to communicate with its dispatcher. Further, she cited a letter that Acadian had previously sent to the 911 office in Rankin County, Mississippi that explained the procedures that the 911 operators were to follow. Namely, an operator should remain on the line until Acadian Ambulance answered the call in order for the transfer to be completed, and further should briefly inform the Acadian Ambulance dispatcher of the nature of the call before disconnecting. The court disagreed that the lack of a similar letter to RPCD indicated Acadian's failure to exercise reasonable care. In fact, the court could point to "no statutory or jurisprudential principles that support the imposition of [a] duty" on Acadian Ambulance "to properly train the employees of the RPCD in the use of the RPCD equipment to communicate with Acadian Ambulance." Imposing such a duty, in the view of the court, would be inappropriate under the duty-risk analysis favored by the Louisiana Supreme Court. As soon as the Acadian dispatcher actually received a call that an ambulance was needed, he promptly sent one; this met the duty imposed under the law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Acadian Ambulance from the case.

As this appeal was taken following the trial court's dismissal of Acadian Ambulance from the case, it is not clear what resulted from her action against RPCD which presumably continued following this judgment. The court's decision to affirm the dismissal of Acadian Ambulance illustrates the flexibility of law to determine liability when speculation exists and demonstrates just how complex and difficult civil trials can be for plaintiffs and defendants alike.

Continue reading " Court Clarifies Duty of Ambulance Dispatcher in Dropped 911 Call " »

According to the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, a defendant can file an "exception of prematurity" to challenge whether the plaintiff's cause of action has "matured to
the point where it is ripe for judicial determination.” A classic (mis)application of the exception is found in the 1999 case, Steed v. St. Paul's United Methodist Church. In that case, the church's choir director sued the minister for sexual harassment. The minister filed a counter-claim for defamation, arguing that the choir director's false allegations damaged his reputation in the Monroe community. Before the appellate court, the choir director asserted that the minister's defamation claim was premature because the trial court had not yet entered a judgment declaring that her harassment allegations were false (truth being an absolute defense to defamation). However, because the choir director never filed an exception of prematurity in the trial court, she could not raise the issue on appeal. This is because, as a "dilatory" exception, it is waived if not specifically pled and a court cannot "supply an exception of prematurity on its own motion."

A similar failure to plead the exception plagued the plaintiff in the more recent case of Moreno v. Entergy Corp.. Daniel Moreno was badly shocked while working around overhead power lines in Jefferson Parish. Moreno sued Entergy Corporation, the owner of the power lines. Entergy filed a cross-claim against Moreno's employer, Stewart Interior Contractors, LLC. Entergy argued that, if it were found liable for Moreno's injuries, the Act would create a right of indemnity against Stewart because the contractor violated the Overhead Power Line Safety Act (the "Act") by working near the power lines without first contacting the owner of the lines (Entergy) and making the necessary safety arrangements. The trial court ruled against Entergy, finding that the Act "does not create an independent right of indemnity for damages incurred as a result of injuries suffered by third parties." When Entergy appealed this judgment, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed on the grounds of prematurity, though the exception had not been raised by any party. The Fifth Circuit declared that because no fault had yet been allocated to any party, no cause of action for indemnity had been created. The court entered an “exception of no cause of action on the basis of prematurity,” a judgment which had not been seen previously in Louisiana jurisprudence. Upon review, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the Fifth Circuit erred as a matter of law in supplying the exception to prematurity on its own motion. "Although the court of appeal claimed it was entering an exception of no cause of action, the judgment was not truly based on the legal insufficiency of the allegations [for which it was permitted to raise an exception on its own accord]. It is clear that the court based its ruling solely on the theory that Entergy’s indemnity claim was not ripe for adjudication, which is properly raised only via dilatory exception." Accordingly, the court reversed the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case.

The complexity of dilatory exceptions like prematurity reinforces the importance of retaining a competent attorney in any legal action.

Continue reading " On Prematurity and a Plaintiff's Case for Damages " »

Over the course of the last century, products liability law has become more detailed and specific in terms of protecting consumers from injury caused by products. If a product is found to be defective, in most cases any sellers along the chain of sale can be held liable. This means that, from the manufacturers to the retailer, all parties can be held liable if damage is caused by a product. The reason for this trend in the law is to give the benefit of the doubt to the consumer because the consumer needs protection. Further, stricter laws force manufacturers to produce better products. If they know that a defective product could potentially results in a multi-million dollar law suit, they will make sure the products they produce are safe.

This protection is especially true as it pertains to young children. Because children have less experience in life, there is a higher chance that they can make a mistake which would be unreasonable to make if it were an adult. However, even the law does not extend such benefits fully to all actions by children and teenagers. In a recent case, Payne v. Gardner, the Louisiana Supreme Court identified a point at which even a teenager could not be protected.

In 2004, in Rapides Parish, Henry Goudeau was playing around an oil well pump. The oil well pumps on oil wells move back and forth like a pendulum. As Henry was playing around the oil well pump, he noticed the movement of the pump and decided to use the pump as a pendulum type swing for recreational purposes. Afer he jumped on the pump when it reached its highest point, his leg got caught in another part of the pump which unfortunately lead Henry to be seriously injured. Henry's mother decided to sue the manufacturer of the pump, Lufkin Industries. A serious battle arose as to whom the blame should fall upon. Should Lufkin have know that their pumps would be used as a ride? Should Henry have used better care in making a determination of whether it was safe to ride on the pump?

In situations like this there can be no simple answer. However, the determination must be made with insight into the facts that existed at the time, and their relation to the law. At the trial court level, the court agreed with Lufkin. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision. The case ultimately found its way to the Supreme Court. The products liablity act in Louisiana is as follows:

The manufacturer of a product shall be liable to a claimant for damage proximately caused by a characteristic of the product that renders the product unreasonably dangerous when such damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product by the claimant or another person or entity.

Further, reasonably anticipated use is defined as, "a use or handling of a product that the product's manufacturer should reasonable expect of an ordinary person in the same or similar circumstances." Lukfin provided evidence that at the time the oil well pump was built, 50 years ago, the sole purpose of the pump was to extract oil. There was never any intent on the part of the company to make its pump available for recreational use. The Supreme Court agreed and stated that on the part of the company, riding the pump would not be a reasonable foreseeable use. Thus, Lufkin had met its burden of proving that it used care when creating its product.

Although Henry was unlucky in his tragic accident and his ultimate case, one can never know who is legally to blame for an injury caused by a product or a machine.

Continue reading " Oil Pump Injury Demonstrates Limits of Liability for Child's Injury " »