Louisiana Personal Injury Lawyer Blog

In our most recent post, we began a review of the Third Circuit Court of Appeal's application of the law of the case doctrine in a lawsuit that followed an auto accident in Vernon Parish. The plaintiffs, in opposing UUT’s motion for summary judgment, argued that UUT's no-coverage arguments had previously been heard in a "peremptory exception of no right of action" filed by UUT which the trial court had denied. Both the Third Circuit and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs of appeal in that ruling; thus, the plaintiffs argued that the law of the case doctrine should "preclude UUT from re-litigating those same arguments" in the instant case. The plaintiffs also argued that the federal case cited by UUT offered "no precedential value in this state court action." UUT's reply asserted that the exceptions previously heard by the trial court "dealt with procedural, rather than substantive, matters," and were not properly before the trial court at the exceptions hearing. In sum, UUT argued that the trial court's rulings on the exceptions were interlocutory and therefore "subject to revision by the trial court at any time prior to rendition of final judgment." The trial court granted UUT's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ claims based on the finding that there was no coverage under the UUT policy. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that UUT’s arguments had previously been heard and rejected in an earlier action (the peremptory exception) and therefore "the law of the case doctrine should have been applied because no new argument or evidence was produced by UUT."

The Third Circuit concluded that UUT showed that "the policy it issued to Olympic did not provide coverage for the plaintiffs’ claims." The truck Coronado wrecked was a vehicle leased from Olympic, and the UUT policy by its language excluded coverage for leased vehicles. Rather than refute UUT’s position on the merits, the plaintiffs simply "argued that the issue had already been litigated and that the trial court was bound to follow its earlier ruling." The court rejected that the law of the case doctrine applied. It noted that UUT did not raise coverage issues when it filed its exceptions in the trial court. Instead, "the plaintiffs brought up the issue of coverage in their opposition to UUT’s exceptions." In fact, UUT was not even made aware of the plaintiffs' position on coverage until the day of the hearing. "Clearly," the court concluded, "the issue of coverage under the UUT policy was not squarely before the trial court at the hearing on the exceptions." In the view of the court, "[t]he issues raised in the motion for summary judgment filed by UUT ... did not cause indefinite re-litigation of the same issue[s] as were raised in its [exceptions motion]." Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of UUT.

The Willis case is a stark reminder to litigants that the rules of civil procedure in Louisiana can be extremely complex. Even when the disputed issue in a case (such as whether an auto insurance policy covers a particular driver) is fairly straightforward, a plaintiff can face a complicated path to a resolution without the counsel of an experienced attorney.

Continue reading ""Law of the Case" Doctrine, Part 2" »

Under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, judgments are either interlocutory or final. A judgment that "determines the merits [of an issue] in whole or in part" is a final judgment, while a judgment that determines "only preliminary matters" is an interlocutory judgment. Generally speaking, final judgments can be appealed, but interlocutory judgments cannot unless there is a statutory exception that permits the appeal. See La.Code Civ.P. art. 2083. If a court renders a judgment that addresses fewer than all of the claims or that concerns fewer than all litigants in a case, that judgment is not final and may be revised by the court at any time prior to a final judgment. See La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(B). With parallel reasoning, if a court of appeal denies a writ of appeal, thereby declining to exercise its supervisory oversight of a trial court, the court of appeal cannot affirm, reverse, or modify the judgment of the trial court. This means that "any language in the court of appeal’s ... writ denial purporting to find no error in the trial court’s ... ruling is without effect." See Bulot v. Intracoastal Tubular Services, Inc..

Related is the "law of the case doctrine." This principle pertains to:

"(a) the binding force of trial court rulings during later stages of the trial, (b) the conclusive effects of appellate rulings at the trial on remand, and (c) the rule that an appellate court will ordinarily not reconsider its own rulings of law on a subsequent appeal in the same case." Petition of Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans.

The doctrine is intended to avoid endless re-litigation of the same issue and to promote consistency of result in the same litigation. It also promotes efficiency by affording the parties a single opportunity to resolve the matter at issue.

The law of the case doctrine was reviewed by Louisiana's Third Circuit Court of Appeal in the recent case of Willis v. Gulf Coast Building Supply. The case centered on an auto accident on November 7, 2005. Steve Coronado was operating a tractor-trailer in Vernon Parish on behalf of his employer, Gulf Coast Building Supply, when he struck multiple vehicles. Six lawsuits were filed by various plaintiffs naming as defendants Coronado, Gulf Coast, Home State County Mutual Insurance Company, Gulf Coast's primary insurer, and Universal Underwriters of Texas Insurance Company (UUT), Gulf Coast's excess insurance carrier. UUT filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to have the plaintiffs’ claims dismissed because its policy did not cover their claims. The tractor trailer that Coronado was driving at the time of the accident was leased to Gulf Coast by Olympic International; the lease agreement specified that Gulf Coast was responsible for providing liability insurance and that Gulf Coast would name Olympic as an additional insured on its policy. UUT's policy covered Olympic, but Gulf Coast and Coronado were not named as insured parties. Also, no provision in the policy extended coverage to lessees of the named insured’s property. Therefore, UUT argued that its policy excluded coverage for the plaintiffs’ claims. To further support its position, UUT pointed the trial court to a decision rendered in a case arising out of the same accident that had been filed in federal court by a different plaintiff. In that matter, the federal court granted summary judgment in favor of UUT and dismissed the case on the basis that the UUT policy did not provide coverage for the claims. That decision was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

In a subsequent post, we'll examine the plaintiffs' response to UUT's motion and the court's judgment.

Continue reading "Exploring the "Law of the Case" Doctrine in Vernon Parish Car Accident Litigation" »

Under Louisiana jurisprudence, special damages are the category of damages that can be "established to a reasonable mathematical certainty." Myers v. Broussard. Special damages include awards for past and future lost earnings, since a plaintiff's forgone income can be numerically calculated by the court. Given the relatively high level of precision, "when a trier of fact assesses special damages, the discretion is more limited or narrower than the discretion to assess general damages," Eddy v. Litton, though the standard of review is still abuse of discretion. The plaintiff carries the burden to prove that he has suffered a loss of income to induce the court to award damages for lost wages in an amount that equals what the plaintiff would have likely earned if he had not been injured by the defendant and been able to work. In cases where there is "no basis for a precise mathematical calculation of the amount of lost earnings," the trial court may award a "reasonable" amount of damages. However, "to allow a plaintiff to recover damages for lost wages in the absence of independent support is highly speculative.” Turner v. Cleveland Trust Co.

The Third Circuit recently considered an automobile collision case in which the plaintiff was awarded damages for lost wages by the trial court. Lori Johnson claimed that, due to the injuries she sustained when her car was struck from behind by David St. Romaine on Highway 1 in Marksville, she was unable to perform her part-time weekend work as a farrier (horse-shoer). The trial court awarded Johnson $7,200 for loss of income, which St. Romaine appealed. The Third Circuit reviewed the trial record containing Johnson's testimony that she was unable support a horse's weight on her injured shoulder and therefore could not install the shoes. She estimated that she typically earned between $400 and $750 per month, but was unsure of the exact amount because it was a cash business and she did not keep records. Johnson also admitted that she did not report her income from the farrier business to the IRS. The court concluded that, "[a]lthough the uncorroborated testimony of the plaintiff can support a lost wage award, based on the facts of this case, we find that Johnson’s testimony regarding the lost wage claim is insufficient." In the court's view, Johnson's wage calculation was a mere "guesstimate" that could not support an award for foregone income. Thus, the court concluded that it was error for the trial court to award damages for lost wages based on only this speculative information, and reversed that part of the judgment.

This case reminds litigants that claims for special damages must be corroborated by some minimum amount proof. Although the court allows that a plaintiff's testimony alone can in some cases support a special damages award, the facts of each situation will weigh heavily on the court's decision process. Clearly, here, the Third Circuit did not approve of the trial court's treatment of Johnson's claim for wages, perhaps particularly because Johnson did not report her income as taxable.

Continue reading "The Plaintiff's Burden in Proving Special Damages" »

On behalf of the Berniard Law Firm, we'd like to wish all of our clients and employees a Happy and Safe Holidays and New Years.

The blog will resume postings in 2012!

The Bailey case, as discussed, was determined based upon the precedent set forth by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Bulot v. Intracoastal Tubular Services, Inc. The focus here is on two causes of action, Whether a plaintiff can file both, and receive punitive damages for, a wrongful death and survivorship cause of action.

The Plaintiffs in Bulot were two families who sued the defendant oil refinery for wrongful death and survival. The District Court granted summary judgment, meaning there were no genuine issues of material fact, in favor of the defendant as to one family's wrongful death action and its claim for punitive damages in its survival action. The Court also granted the defendant's exception of no right of action as to punitive damages for the second family's wrongful death action.

Each family had a family member that died after being exposed to radioactive waste. One family alleged that the deceased had worked for a company that engaged in the cleaning of oilfield tubing and pipes. He died of pancreatic cancer in 1999, allegedly as a result of exposure to radioactive waste while employed by the company. The second family's family member died while La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315.3 ('the statute') was in effect (between 1984 and 1996). The statute provided that punitive damages may be awarded, in addition to general and special damages, if it is proved by the plaintiff that the sustained injuries were caused by the defendant's "wanton or reckless disregard for public safety in the storage, handling, or transportation of hazardous or toxic substances."

In order to establish when a tort cause of action accrued in an occupational disease case like this, the plaintiff must present evidence that the exposures were significant and that such exposures later resulted in the manifestation of damages, in this case disease. In short, the exposures must be "significant and continuous."

The Appeals Court reversed the grant of summary judgment as to the first family's claim for punitive damages in its survival action, as it found there existed genuine issues of material fact as to whether the family's deceased relative's exposures to radioactive material on the jobsite from 1984 to 1992 resulted in his developing cancer. The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to the family's wrongful death claim, however, because the deceased did not die while the statute was in effect. In addition, the Court affirmed the exception of no right of action for the second family's claim for punitive damages in its wrongful death claim. The Court determined that damages pursuant to the statute could not exist as a component of a wrongful death action because the law in effect at the time of death is the law that applies in wrongful death actions.

Although both causes of action arise from a common tort, survival and wrongful death actions are separate and distinct. Each arises at a different time and provudes for damage awards for different injuries and losses. A survival action exists simultaneously with the tort and transmits to the beneficiaries (decendents) upon the victim's death and permits recovery only for the damages suffered by the victim from the time of injury to the moment of death. A wrongful death action arises once the victim has died and it compensates the beneficiaries for their own injuries which they suffer from the moment of the victim's death and after. The statute limits a survivor's recovery to damages actually suffered as a result of the deceased's death, and cannot recover punitive damages as a result.

A claim for damages pursuant to the statute cannot exist as a component of a wrongful death action, as a wrongful death action is limited to compensatory damages for the victim's own injuries. Punitive damages may be awarded, if it is proved that the plaintiff's injuries, were caused by the defendant's disregard for public safety, but the statute provides for the survivors of the original tort victim to recover all damages for injury to that person, his property or otherwise, caused by the offense.

Continue reading "Louisiana Wrongful Death and Punitive Damages Award in Oil Refinery Release (Part II)" »

The Bailey v. Exxon Mobil Corporation case finds its conclusion based on the precedent set forth in Bulot v. Intracoastal Tubular Services. The focus is on the application of a statute, and differentiating events that take place prior to the statute's enactment, and how the Court will analyze events that continuously occur which began before the enactment of the statute and continue after its enactment.

The issue before the Court in Bailey is whether the plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages in a wrongful death action are precluded by Bulot. The plaintiffs in Bailey alleged that either they or their decedents were exposed to naturally occurring radioactive material at over 600 pipe yards throughout Louisiana, six other states, and overseas, through their work with, or with a subsidiary of, the Exxon Mobile Corporation. They also alleged they were entitled to punitive damages under former Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.3.

Punitive damages are intended to reform or deter the defendant and others from engaging in similar conduct to that which formed the basis of the lawsuit. Punitive damages are not intended to compensate the plaintiff, however, the plaintiff often receives most if not all of the punitive damages award. The Court states that the statute in question, La. C.C. art. 2315.3, effective September 3, 1984 and repealed April 16, 1996, provided for punitive damages "if it [were] proved that plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the defendant’s wanton or reckless disregard for public safety in the storage, handling, or transportation of hazardous or toxic substances." The court in Bulot states that "punitive damages cannot be recovered by way of a wrongful death action. The right to a punitive award is a different kind of right or legally enforceable claim than the right to compensatory damages. As such, a claim for damages pursuant to La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315.3 cannot exist as a component of a wrongful death action, as that is limited to compensatory damages for the survivor's (victim's) own injuries."

In Bailey, the defendants filed numerous exceptions, including peremptory exceptions of no cause of action for punitive damages for plaintiffs’ wrongful death claims based on the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit's holding in Bulot v. Intracoastal Tubular Services, Inc. The District Court sustained the defendants’ exceptions of no cause of action for punitive damages in a wrongful death case.

In Bulot, the widow and children of a deceased employee brought survival and wrongful death actions against his employer. They alleged that the deceased’s cancer was the result of occupational exposure to radioactive waste while cleaning oilfield pipes. The District Court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment on the punitive damages claims. His widow and children then appealed to the Court of Appeal where it was held that there were genuine issues of material fact which precluded summary judgment on the punitive damages claim in the survival action. The Court of Appeal also held that punitive damages could not be recovered through a wrongful death action. Thus, according to Bulot, the plaintiffs in Bailey are precluded from recovering punitive damages in a wrongful death action.

For a further discussion of Bulot v. Intracoastal Tubular Services, Inc. please continue reading Part II of this post. If, however, you feel as though you have read all you need and have questions or need expert advice in a potential wrongful death claim of your own, then please do not hesitate to contact the Berniard Law Firm.

As part of our Constitutional right to due process, an individual is allowed to bring grievances before a court. However, certain judicial policies may be enacted to deny plaintiffs from bringing suits that have already been litigated, are being brought with the intent to harass, or are frivolous. The purpose behind such policies is to make courts as efficient as possible by deterring such actions. A recent case out of the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal shines a light on several of these deterrents.

In Mendonca v. Tidewater, Inc., the plaintiff sought to nullify several final judgments made by the district court. Mendonca's list of suits stretched over four years, with multiple appeals and pleas for annulment. However, none of Mendonca's nullity claims or his appeals were successful. In his final appeal for anulment, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down three restrictions that laid Mendonca's long line of cases to rest.

The first of these restrictions was the court's upholding of the defendent's plea of res judicata and failure to state a claim. When res judicata is enacted, the court declares one of two denials. First, that the claim has been subject to a final judgment and thus no longer qualifies for an appeal, or second, that the litigant cannot bring a claim against the same party in a second claim because all claims should have been brought against that party in the initial suit. The policy considerations supporting res judicata is to preserve court resources and protect defendants from being subject to litigation multiple times, with the possibility of having to pay damages more than once. A defendant's plea that a plaintiff has failed to state a claim goes hand-in-hand with res judicata. If res judicata is applicable, then all duplicitous claims cancelled. In Mendonca's case, this means that there were no new claims. Since there were no such claims, the court held that Mendonca's nu
llity actions were a failure to state a new claim.

A second deterrent to brining frivolous, harassing, or duplicitous suits is the possibility of monetary sanctions. Rules of civil procedure require that an attorney make objective inquiries into the facts of a case and the law that pertains to it. These inquiries are held to a high standard as they are seen as an attorney's duty. This means that one's subjective good faith inquiry is not sufficient. When an attorney files a claim, it is important that case history is analyzed to ensure that res judicata does not apply. A failure to inquire about previous claims is a failure to impose the applicable law and is essentially poor lawyering. This was the case in Mendonca's appeal. Any attorney who objectively analyzed the situation would have known that the claim was precluded through res judicata. Yet, Mendonca proceeded. The court interpreted this as an abuse of the judicial system and an attempt to harass the defendant. This abuse justifies the imposition of sanctions.

Sanctions are typically defined as an order to pay to the other party the amount of reasonable expenses through the employment of an attorney. Yet, "reasonable" is not confined to the actual expense accrued by the attorney. Instead, "reasonable" has been interpreted to mean additional costs that act to deter, punish, and compensate. When sanctions are imposed by a trial judge they are unlikely to be appealed. Appellate judges tend to give deference to the trial judge's intimate knowledge of the case, litigants, and attorneys. For these reasons, Mendonca was sanctioned in the amount of $10,000, all of which were upheld on appeal.

A third way that a court can punish an individual as a deterrent is to issue a sanction revoking in forma pauperis status. In forma pauperis is a legal termed used by a judge to allow a poor individual to file a legal case and/or represent oneself at trial. Allowing one to claim this status is to essentially cut most court associated costs for the needy individual in order to ensure due process. Mendonca qualified and was granted this status. However, courts have held that in forma pauperis status is a privilege, not a right. Therefore, any abuse of this status will result in revocation. The most common reason why in forma pauperis status is revoked is because one brings frivolous suits. Mendonca did this in his case and was punished accordingly.

Res judicata, sanctions, and other rules of civil procedure are complicated, requiring a full analysis of the facts and the law. Such situations should only be approached by a licensed practicing attorney.

Continue reading "Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal Punishes For Duplicitous Suits " »

In 2008, Debra Goulas worked as a bookkeeper for Sunbelt Air Conditioning Supply in Baton Rouge. Jessie Touchet, owner of Sunbelt, and Diane Jones, Goulas's manager, accused her of stealing over $500 from the company during February and April that year. Goulas was tried for felony theft and acquitted. Following the criminal trial, she filed suit against Touchet and Jones in July, 2010 alleging defamation. Specifically, Goulas argued that Touchet and Jones "intentionally and negligently inflicted emotional distress" upon her, and that their accusations were "founded in malice to damage her person and reputation." The complaint sought damages for medical expenses, physical and mental pain and suffering, and loss of wages. The defendants filed an exception of prescription. The basis of the exception was that Goulas's claims were based on the defendants' actions that allegedly occurred during February and April of 2008. By the time Goulas filed suit in 2010, more than one year had passed, thereby prescribing the claims. In October, 2010, the trial judge granted the defendants' exception of prescription and dismissed Goulas's claims with prejudice.

Goulas appealed, alleging error on the trial court's ruling that her defamation claim was prescribed. Goulas reasoned that she could not initiate her defamation action until her criminal trial was concluded in March, 2010; accordingly, she argued that prescription did not begin to run until Frederick Jones publicly accused her of theft when testifying at her trial. The First Circuit noted that Louisiana recognizes a qualified privilege that protects parties from charges of defamation related to statements they make during a trial. "It necessarily follows that, during this time, the one-year period that applies to the filing of a defamation action is suspended." However, the court explained, the suspension of prescription applies "only to allegedly defamatory statements made by parties to a lawsuit." In this situation, Frederick and Jones were not parties to Goulas's criminal prosecution, so the prescription suspension did not apply. The court concluded that "since there has been no suspension of the 2008 alleged defamatory statements," the trial court properly granted the defendants' exception of prescription.

This result was no doubt a painful lesson to the Goulas that prescriptive periods and other rules of Louisiana civil procedure can be complex and confusing. At worst, such as here, missing a deadline can prove fatal to a plaintiff's case. Accordingly, it is critical that victims who think they may have a claim should consult a knowledgeable attorney immediately. Time may very well be of the essence in order to secure a day in court.

Continue reading "Baton Rouge Plaintiff Loses Defamation Claim Due to Prescription " »

The case of Jefferson Block 24 Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Aspen Insurance UK Limited highlights an important battle over money set aside for oil spill recovery, an obviously sensitive and important topic in the Gulf Coast. At the federal district court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, the defendants won a motion for summary judgment and the court dismissed the case. The plaintiffs appealed the determination and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision and remanded the case for further hearing.

The plaintiff, Jefferson Block, owned and operated offshore gas leases, pipelines and a platform in the Gulf of Mexico. In November 2007, a drop in pressure in one of the pipelines was discovered that showed that oil was spilling into the Gulf. Jefferson Block cleaned up the oil under the direction of several government agencies and incurred a cleanup cost of approximately $3 million.

At that time, Jefferson Block owned an insurance policy which provided some coverage in the case of a leak, but was limited to the items set out in a "Declaration." This declaration listed the oil interests that Jefferson Block had in the area but did not specifically reference the 16-inch pipeline that was the cause of the spill.

Underwriters, one of the defendants, denied coverage and plaintiff sued in a Louisiana federal court. The policy provided that the governing law was New York law, and under New York law, the policyholder bears the burden of showing that the insurance contract covers the loss. Courts interpret insurance policies like any other contract, and there is a series of steps courts will take to determine what the terms of the contract are.

First, courts look to the express language of the policy, with reference to the subject matter and purpose of the policy. If the terms are unambiguous, the court will determine the parties' intent from the words in the document, and summary judgment is therefore appropriate as a matter of law.

However, if a policy is ambiguous, the burden of proof shifts to the party asking for summary judgment to show that its proposed interpretation of the policy is the correct one. At this point, the court can accept extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent. If the extrinsic evidence does not unambiguously favor the party that filed for the summary judgment, the court looks to the law for guidance. Typically, ambiguities in insurance policies are construed in favor of the policyholder.

In this case, the court found that because of the purpose of the policy, which was to comply with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, this weighed in favor of finding for the plaintiff. Additionally, the policy referred to facilities "located" within certain areas, and the appellate court agreed with the district court that the word “located” was ambiguous. It also stated that the extrinsic evidence was not so one-sided as to require finding for the defendant.

The district court refused to construe the ambiguities in favor of the plaintiff, and the appellate court held that this was a legal error. For that reason, the court reversed the decision of the district court and sent the case back for further proceedings.

Our previous post discussed the various principles of contract law at work in the Mendoza case, which can be viewed here. This case involved a dispute between an injured worker's employer and another company with which that employer had a contract. A provision of this contract provided for indemnification, the assuming by one entity of the liability of another.

Companies often assume the liabilities of other entities with which they hold contracts. This is seen as a cost of doing business. Indemnification makes up part of or the entirety of the consideration for some corporate contracts. Contracting away your liability can be extremely valuable. The dispute in this case was when the contract actually became effective. The court used various principles discussed in its opinion and the previous post on this topic to determine that the trial court was correct in denying summary judgment to one party and granting it to the other. Mid South, Mr. Mendoza's employer, was to be indemnified and held blameless by EXCO as per their 2008 agreement.

In general, this dispute really came down to an issue of timing. The two companies in question signed an agreement in December 2008. The incident that created Mr. Mendoza's cause of action occurred in October 2007. He filed suit in August of 2008. Mid South did not file an answer to the complaint until July of 2009. After this filing Mid South demanded defense from EXCO; this defense was promptly denied. Mid South again attempted to illicit indemnification and defense from EXCO in September 2009 based on a 2004 contract that Mid South held with Anadarko, a company whose interests were subsequently absorbed by EXCO. EXCO did not respond until after Mid South filed a cross-claim against EXCO. EXCO filed an exception and answer in April 2010 along with a motion for summary judgment. In July 2010, Mid South filed its cross-motion for summary judgment. The former motion for summary judgment was denied and the latter granted in August of 2010. When the trial court denied EXCO's motion to designate the judgment as appealable, EXCO sought aid from a higher court. The Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit of Louisiana granted EXCO's writ application but ultimately sided with the trial court.

The crux of the appellate court's decision was its interpretation of the "Effective Date" provision of the contract which indicated that the agreement was in full force and effect "on the date first above written or on the date on which CONTRACTOR (Mid South) first commenced the performance of any services for COMPANY (EXCO) or first provided goods, equipment or facilities to COMPANY, whichever first occurred, and even though this Agreement may not then have been reduced to writing." There was conflict among the parties whether this clause or the type-written date "December 16, 2008" should take precedence. The court determined after its de novo review of the trial court record that EXCO should have known that it was assuming liability for events earlier than December 16, 2008 because it drafted the 2008 Agreement. EXCO also alleged error because the type-written date was not given precedence over the pre-printed contract language. The court found this allegation to be without merit. The "Effective Date" provision of the contract was drafted with the potential of the occurrence of a situation like this one in mind. It specifically contemplates an incident like Mr. Mendoza's in its language. It was the opinion of the appellate court he phrase "December 16, 2008" being type-written was not as important as influential as the type-written provisions in the precedential cases making up the common law in this area.

A court's interpretation of a contract can make a crucial difference to the parties involved. EXCO tried to get out of a contract that it had drafted itself. This is a difficult position from which to argue. Almost all of the interpretation tools that a court may use will caution against giving undue deference to the drafter of the contract. Companies must strive to write contracts containing language by which they intend to be bound. Courts must strive to fairly and equitably interpret contracts but they do not have to interpret them according to unexpressed intentions for which the contracts contain no basis.

Continue reading "Second Circuit Case Demonstrates Importance of Proper Contracts" »

At times accidents on bodies of water are governed by a unique set of federal laws called admiralty laws. The court will thus apply admiralty law as opposed to federal or state law. This law of the water plays an important part in the administration of justice in Louisiana because of the great amount of water-based industries operating out of the state, and the high potential for lawsuits to occur within these industries.

Whether or not admiralty law can or need be applied can be very important to cases because the different set of laws can actually change a party’s rights. For example, under admiralty law if you make a Rule 9(h) declaration designating your maritime claims as claims governed by admiralty jurisdiction, then there is no right to a jury trial, even where you could get a jury trial under state or federal law.

The application of admiralty law was recently at issue in the case Apache v. GlobalSantaFe Drilling Company. In this case, a mobile offshore drilling unit, owned by GlobalSantaFe, collided with an offshore oil and gas production platform, owned in part by Apache Corporation. Apache sued GlobalSantaFe to recover the damages caused to the platform. Apache asserted that the suit could be under both admiralty law and federal law.

Even though both parties requested a jury trial for the suit, GlobalSantaFe later decided it did not want a jury trial. Thus, GlobalSantaFe attempted to strike the requests for a jury trial by arguing that Apache had made a Rule 9(h) declaration, designating the claim for admiralty jurisdiction and losing the right to a jury trial.

Despite the fact that Apache had asserted the claim under both admiralty and federal law, the parties later stipulated to the fact that: “Apache did not make a 9(h) declaration.” In situations where it is not clear whether a party made a 9(h) declaration, courts look to the totality of the circumstances, considering, for example, whether the claim is viable under any other sector of law.

Here, not only is the claim viable under federal law, but the parties also stipulated to the fact that Apache did not make a 9(h) declaration. When a party stipulates to a fact it has made a formal concession. Thus, GlobalSantaFe is bound by its stipulation, and cannot strike the requests for a jury trial on the basis of Apache making a 9(h) declaration.

3rd Circuit Uses Helicopter Injury Case to Clarify "Injury Within the Scope of Employment"

Injuries in the workplace occur frequently and thus many states have forced employers to purchase workers' compensation insurance. Under workers' compensation, the employer's insurance agrees to pay for any lost wages and medical bills as a result of the employee's injury. In exchange for this security the employer may use workers' compensation as an affirmative defense with the burden of proof on the employer to insulate the employer from tort liability. This essentially minimizes an injured's claim. However, as Herbert v. Richard illustrates, it is vital that one consider whether or not the injury occurred while within the scope of employment. Depending on the answer to this question, an employer may be barred from using workers' compensation as an affirmative defense to protect itself from tort liability, resulting in a potentially greater claim by the injured.

In Herbert v. Richard, an employee fell from a helicopter while netting deer in Mexico on behalf of a game management company, Game Management Inc (GMI). Though the deer netting enterprise was GMI's, the employee worked for Industrial Helicopters, Inc., a company owned by the same family that owned GMI. Mr. Herbert, the employee, had been a fuel truck driver for twenty nine years and had only been on GMI's netting excursions once before the injury. Industrial sought to invoke a workers' compensation affirmative defense arguing that Mr. Herbert was either within the scope of his employment, was a borrowed employee from Industrial, or, alternatively, that Industrial and GMI were joint employers.

There are two issues that must be considered when determining if an injury has occurred within the scope of employment. The first gauge is whether or not the employee was engaged in the employer's business at the time of injury. If the injury occurred while acting on behalf of the employer's business, then it is likely that the injury falls within the scope of employment. For example, if an employee at a warehouse is responsible for loading the company truck and making deliveries to regional retail stores, an injury that occurs while loading the truck at the warehouse would fall under scope of employment. However, if the injured occurred while participating in business not related to the employer, then the injury would fall outside the scope of employment.

The second way an injury falls within the scope of employment is if the obligations of the employment caused the employee to be at the site of the accident at the time the accident occurred. Applying this to the example above, we see that if the truck driver was injured while unloading the company truck at a retail store his injury would fall within the scope of his employment because his job requires him to unload trucks at various stores. Even an injury obtained from an accident while in route to the retail store in this example would fall within the scope of employment because the truck driver is en route to the store only as a part of his employment. In these instances the employer would be able to use workers' compensation as an affirmative defense and therefore protect itself from tort liability unless the tort was intentional.

The following questions also may be helpful in determining whether an injury has occurred within the scope of employment: Was I doing the act on behalf of my employer? Had I done that type of task for my employer before? Was I being paid for the work that was being completed at the time of the injury? Is this the type of work my employer regularly asks its employees to take part in? In addition to these questions, it is important to consider whether the injured was a "borrowed employee" or was working under "joint employment."

These issues will be discussed in our next post.

In the event that a landowner plans to do any form of significant work on an area of land, whether cosmetic, such as landscaping, or extensive, the work should be preceded by the contracting of one qualified and certified to inspect the property and physically mark the location of utility cables upon it. This is to prevent damage to the utility cables, and to prevent the costs of repair to the companies which own the cables. Such action invokes the Louisiana Damage Prevention Act - Louisiana Underground Utilities and Facilities Damage Prevention Law.

An incident central to the MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. Hagan case was noted at causing a $20,000 a minute loss to the utility company for every minute the cable was out of commission. It thus seems rational that the possible negligence and/or trespass in damaging the cable, property owned by a utility company, can cause significant troubles, even if it occurs within the property of the landowner.

The most substantial part involved in this case is the determination of what the definition of trespass and negligence is when a landowner affects the transposed property of the utility company. Without a doubt, a landowner has the right to be on and use the land, but the utility company also has been given the right by law to continue to leave its utility cable in/on the land and continue using it, and retains this right even if the contract for use of the land was made with a previous landowner. If a servitude is involved with having the utility cable in/on the land, then there is a possible claim for Trespass to Land in conjunction with a negligence claim. However, if there is not a servitude, and only a right to continue to use the utility cable on the land exists, then the recourse if damage occurs would be Trespass to Chattels, for damage to personal property, not Trespass to Land, as attempted in this case.

The intent question is one of strict liability, whether the only intent needed is the intent to perform the action, in this case intentionally using the backhoe, and a result, damaging the utility cable, occurred. More succinctly, the aforementioned case notes a trespass is "an unlawful physical invasion of property in the possession of another and the only intent required is the trespasser's intent to perform the act which constitutes the trespass." Thus, "an individual need only refrain from taking intentional action that results in harm to another." However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has yet to rule on the intent standard in regard to claims of trespass to underground cables, and hence, the issue at hand. The Certified Question for the Louisiana Supreme Court is:

"Is the proposed jury instruction in this case, which states that "[a] Defendant may be held liable for an inadvertent trespass resulting from an intentional act," a correct statement of Louisiana law when the trespass at issue is the severing of an underground cable located on property owned by one of the alleged trespassers, and the property is not subject to a servitude by the owners of the underground cable but only to the contractual right to keep it, as an existing cable, underneath the property?"

The ruling by the Louisiana Supreme Court will not only impact a landowner, but the contractors and excavators who will more commonly perform the excavations, and are more likely to cause damage to underground utility cables. This could also bring up further issues in agency, for if it was to be found that an individual who caused the resulting damage was acting as an agent of another, the principal, then the principal would incur the legal wrath of the utility companies.

Though the Supreme Court of Louisiana has yet to rule on this Certification Question, as to the standard of intent for trespass in this situation, contact the Berniard Law Firm for further information regarding the outcome of this case, for clarification of the Louisiana Damage Prevention Act, and for assistance in determining if your property is subject to similar issues.

The ABA (American Bar Association) has called upon lawyers and non-lawyers alike to submit blogs from across the internet as exceptional examples of legal advice and content. With content about the law ranging widely across the internet, the ABA recognizes the value of those blogs that wish to educate the public about a wide range of issues as examples of how attorneys can help bring an understanding of public policy to the masses.

Through a form, located here, ABA members and/or the public can nominate the efforts of attorneys whose work helps explain the complexities that the law has to offer. While the competition prevents bloggers from nominating themselves, the ABA has requested that the work of their peers be showcased. Due by September 9th, blog suggestions can cover any topic of the law, whether maritime, personal injury, civil or criminal in nature. This possibility of diversity makes the Top 100 list all the more interesting because of the wide variety of content the selected are sure to cover.

If you know of a blog that wishes to discuss legal issues of interest to lawyers (and perhaps those outside of the field), click here to fill out the ABA's form. Limited to 500 words, nominations should explain why the blog, obviously, deserves to be included in the list as well as its value as a whole. Nominated sites should avoid the regurgitation of content from other sites (copy and pasted quotes of news items, etc.), showing that the main focus of the content is original discussion of those issues of law that affect professionals as well as the public.

We will undoubtedly be checking out this list as it is sure to contain content that is of interest not only to residents of Louisiana but across the country. For a directory of 'blawgs,' as categorized by the American Bar Association, you can click here to tour the spectrum of content available by state or topic.

This blog was started as an effort to not only showcase the knowledge of our law firm but to also provide people, whether residents of New Orleans, Louisiana, the Gulf Coast, or throughout the country, a resource that explains how the law is important to their everyday lives. Blogging is a powerful tool not only in the legal profession but as a medium of empowering people who may not realize that an instance of tragedy or harm comes with it legal recourse. We hope that the content we have provided over time has helped people find an answer to legal issues or simply gain a little bit of knowledge about how this country's system of law works. This is said not to shill for a nomination to the aforementioned contest but, instead, to note that this ABA-sponsored contest highlights something we feel strongly about, that being the power of legal blogs.

We hope you continue to enjoy your weekend and will have new content available Monday.

Recently we explored the Third Circuit Court of Appeal's discussion of the legal cause of a tragic natural gas explosion at the Jones residence in Opelousas Parish. Another of Centerpoint's assignments of error on appeal, the last that we'll review from the case, was that the jury incorrectly apportioned fault; the jury assigned 50 percent of the fault to Centerpoint and 50 percent to Carl Jones, Sr. Centerpoint argued that Jones should have been assessed "at least ninety percent of the fault in causing the explosion and fire." The review of fault allocation by an appellate court is based on the "manifestly erroneous" standard. That is, the court must allow the jury's apportionment to stand unless it is clearly wrong.

The court began its review of Centerpoint's argument by focusing on the trial testimony of several of its witnesses. All expressed that the company "clearly recognizes the inherently dangerous nature of its product and has developed numerous measures designed to prevent explosions and fires, such as occurred in this litigation." One witness, the company's former Operations Manager for the state of Louisiana, testified that the procedures for
disconnecting gas service are "based on the inherently dangerous nature of" natural gas and are designed to "protect people from their own ignorance." He further expressed the view that Centerpoint has "an obligation to take every reasonable step to prevent its customers from tampering with its natural gas supply system." The court equated the risk of "catastrophic consequences" created by Centerpoint's conduct to Jones's action in reconnecting the gas supply. Had either party "not breached the applicable duties imposed upon them," reasoned the court, the accident would not have happened. Nevertheless, when comparing their relative conduct, the court concluded that "Centerpoint Energy’s fault far exceeds that of Mr. Jones." It considered Centerpoint to be the "superior actor" in the incident who failed--even in light of the gas industry's general awareness that "customers will attempt to steal gas"--to engage in a "rather simple task" that was designed to "prevent exactly the result which occurred." Thus, the court could "not find that the jury was manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong in apportioning fault equally" between Centerpoint and Jones.

The jury verdict in this case seems to strike a balance between the need for a utility company to prevent natural gas accidents and its inability to prevent all attempts at gas theft by customers. In fact, the court suggested that Centerpoint's fault was actually greater than Jones's, though it could not find error on the jury's part that would allow it substitute its own judgment and increase its share of the fault. Undoubtedly, the jury would have reached a different result if Centerpoint had followed its own procedure in shutting off and securing the gas line and Jones had nevertheless managed to turn the valve back on. Ultimately in the case, the court rejected all of Centerpoint's assignments of error and affirmed the jury's verdict in its entirety.

Continue reading "Opelousas Parish Natural Gas Explosion, Part 3: Assigning Fault" »

In our prior post, we observed the Third Circuit Court of Appeal's finding that the jury correctly held that Centerpoint Energy failed to meet its duty of properly securing the natural gas line and valve when it disconnected service at the Jones residence in Opelousas Parish. Establishing the duty owed by Centerpoint was one of several elements of the duty-risk analysis that Jones was required to establish in order to prevail. Another element that we will now consider is that of causation. Centerpoint argued that its failure to properly shut off and secure the gas supply was not the legal cause of the injuries sustained by the Jones family. Instead, in Centerpoint's view, Jones's "reconnection of the gas service constituted intervening conduct that was not only grossly negligent, intentional, and criminal, but also not foreseeable." Under Louisiana law, an intervening act will relieve the original tortfeasor of liability if it
“superseded the original negligence and alone produced the injury.” Adams v. Rhodia, Inc. However, if the intervening act is foreseeable to the original tortfeasor, it is considered to be "within the scope of the original tortfeasor's negligence." In short, Centerpoint argued it could not possibly have foreseen Jones's attempt to reconnect his gas line and, therefore, its failure to properly secure the line was irrelevant once Jones acted to steal the gas.

The court, however, found that Centerpoint's position was "defeated" by the testimony of its own wtinesses. One employee, the company's Operations Supervisor, explained that the security mechanisms were necessary because it was "common sense that people will try to steal natural gas after their supply has been cut off." Another, Centerpoint’s former Operations Manager for Louisiana, stated that the locking mechanisms were required because "people do not always understand the dangers associated with natural gas." Also, an expert in the field of natural gas operations testified that Centerpoint should have "no illusions" about the potential for people to steal natural gas. The court found that "Jones’s actions in leaving an uncapped gas line open in the house, breaking the plastic locking device and stealing natural gas, and negligently leaving the natural gas running into the house all night, are exactly the unsafe acts that Centerpoint Energy’s duty to properly terminate service is designed to prevent." Thus, it concluded, the jury's finding that Jones’s conduct was foreseeable was well supported, and it correctly determined that Centerpoint could not rely on Jones's intervening criminal act to relieve it of all responsibility for the explosion.

In a third and final post, we will revisit this case to review Centerpoint's argument on appeal that the jury erred in its apportionment of fault between it and Jones.

Continue reading "Opelousas Parish Natural Gas Explosion, Part 2: Determining Causation" »

On May 7, 2003, Centerpoint Energy disconnected the natural gas service at the house of Carl Jones, Sr. and his family because they were past due on an outstanding balance. A short time later, Jones and his son removed the gas stove from the kitchen and replaced it with an electric model. Unfortunately, Jones forgot to cap the gas line before installing the new stove. Late in the evening of June 15, 2004, after having been without a functioning water heater since the disconnection, Jones reconnected the gas line. He did so because he was expecting guests the following day and wished to have a supply of hot water that did not require stove-top heating. To make the reconnection, Jones used a wrench to snap off the red plastic locking device that the Centerpoint technician had installed on the line when he closed the valve. Unable to re-light his water heater, Jones assumed no gas was flowing and went to bed. By morning, the house was filled with gas, and as the family arose several large fireballs erupted. Jones, his wife, and their four children were severely injured in the explosion. Jones sued Centerpoint seeking to recover for his and his family's injuries. A trial was held in July, 2010. After the judge denied Centerpoint's motion for a directed verdict, a jury apportioned half of the fault to Centerpoint and half to Jones and awarded substantial sums to Jones's family members for their injuries. Centerpoint appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in permitting the case to go to the jury at all. In Centerpoint's view, its duty to reasonably disconnect gas service for non-payment did not extend to protecting Jones against the explosion caused "by [his] subsequent negligent, intentional, criminal and then grossly negligent conduct."

An appeal of a trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict requires the appellate court's de novo review because such a motion can be granted "only if the facts and inferences are so overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that the court finds that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict.” The Third Circuit began its analysis by noting that "[t]o prevail in their personal injury suit, the plaintiffs bore the burden of establishing that Centerpoint Energy was at fault in causing the accident, using a duty-risk analysis." Centerpoint argued that Jones failed to meet this burden, in part, because he could not establish that the utility did not conform to the appropriate standard of care when shutting off the gas supply. The court found two sources for the scope of duty imputed to Centerpoint. First, Louisiana case law takes the position that it is

"common knowledge ... that natural gas, being highly flammable and explosive in nature, is an inherently dangerous instrumentality. Those who handle and distribute it are charged with that degree of care commensurate with its dangerous character for the protection of the public from any foreseeable injury." Giordano v. Rheem Manufacturing Co..

In addition, the Code of Federal Regulations provides for three options for "acceptable compliance" when disconnecting natural gas service: (1) the valve that is closed to prevent the flow of gas to the customer must be securely locked; (2) a mechanical device or fitting that will prevent the flow of gas must be installed in the service line or in the meter; or (3) the customer’s piping must be physically disconnected
from the gas supply and the open pipe ends sealed. 49 C.F.R. 192.727(d). In this case, the Centerpoint technician installed an easily circumvented, red plastic locking device on the valve, but, in contravention to Centerpoint's own clear policy, did not install a "blind plate" within the meter that would have blocked the flow of gas even if the valve were to be re-opened. The court, after reviewing extensive expert witness testimony concerning the industry standards for preventing unauthorized tampering with a shut-off gas line, concluded: "reasonable men could find that installing the plastic locking device was not sufficient to comply with the standard of care, that Centerpoint Energy’s technician did not properly install a blind plate on the meter, and, therefore, Centerpoint Energy did not
comply with the applicable standard of care." Thus, the court determined that the jury's verdict, so far as it pertained to the element of Centerpoint's duty, was supported.

In a subsequent post, we will revisit this case to review the court's analysis of Centerpoint's argument concerning the causation element of the duty-risk analysis.

Continue reading "Opelousas Parish Natural Gas Explosion, Part 1: Exploring the Utility Company's Duty " »

In Darren Dugas, et al v. Bayou Teche Water Works, et al, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal for Louisiana (“Court”) provided guidance on Louisiana statute La. R.S. 9:5624, which limits the liability of any government entity in Louisiana in connection with a public works for a two-year statutory period. The plaintiffs, the Dugas family (“Dugas plaintiffs”), sued Bayou Teche Water Works, Inc. (“Bayou Teche”) and its insurer for damages they allegedly sustained from Bayou Teche's dumping of brine into an irrigation canal.

The Dugas plaintiffs owned a stretch of farmland along an irrigation coulee in Iberia Parish, and used the irrigation water for their farming operations. Bayou Teche, the defendant, runs a potable water treatment plant nearby. According to the petition, the Dugas plaintiffs notified Bayou Teche immediately upon discovering the discharge, but Bayou Teche continued to discharge the brine into the waterway for about a year after. After the Dugas plaintiffs brought suit, Bayou Teche answered their petition by merely stating that it was a Louisiana corporation that complied with all applicable statutes and regulations in its operation. The company subsequently filed an exception of prescription, which the trial court granted. In granting the exception, the trial court relied on La. R.S. 9:5624, which states that “[w]hen private property is damaged for public purposes any and all actions for such damages are prescribed by the prescription of two years, which shall begin to run after the completion and acceptance of the public works.” As discussed previously, the statute was adopted to limit governmental exposure from claims for damages to property when the damage is caused by a public work. Nuckolls v. Louisiana State Highway Department. The policy behind the statute is to encourage projects that provide a public purpose or benefit. The statutory period begins to run when the damage is discovered. In other words, the suit must be brought within two years after damages are sustained. Therefore, any suit that is not brought within the two-year period is barred. By granting the exception, the trial court concluded that the Dugas plaintiffs did not bring their lawsuit within the period of time set by the law.
Since the burden of proving the exception of prescription is on the movant, the ultimate issue on appeal was whether Bayou Teche met its burden of proof. After reviewing the record, the Court concluded that Bayou Teche failed to meet its evidentiary burden. The Court reasoned that the evidence introduced at the lower level only addressed the defendant's allegations that the plaintiffs' own negligence caused their damages. At the hearing, Bayou Teche failed to argue how it satisfied the particular elements of the statute. It did not assert it was a government entity nor explain how its water treatment plant and the dumping of brine serve a public purpose.

This case is another classic example of how essential it is to seek a competent attorney who is knowledgeable and experienced at defending your claim.

Continue reading "Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal Reverses Grant of Exception of Prescription" »

The use of asbestos in products such as concrete, bricks, pipes, and other building materials has made way for a large amount of litigation on asbestos-related diseases and deaths. This litigation can help victims of the chemical and their families find some sort of meaning and relief from the toxic material. Litigation on asbestos, however, is very difficult both because the asbestos-related damages did not result from a single, identifiable act, and because it is not only the companies that produced the asbestos which are guilty- it is also those that used and marketed it.

A recent case contains both of these difficulties. Phillip Graf was exposed to asbestos for a period of 30 years while working in several jobs including metal works and drywall. Such extended exposure to such toxic material places one at risk of contracting mesothelioma, a rare form of cancer. Graf suffered from mesothelioma and later died from the disease. His family, Beatrice, Doryk, and Paulette Graf are suing in response to his death. They have named 29 defendants in the case, including Benjamin Moore & Co. and Metropolitan Life. The Graf family claims that the defendants are not only guilty of designing, manufacturing, packaging, transporting, and selling asbestos products, but also aiding and abetting the marketing of asbestos products.

In a traditional personal injury case, the damage results from a single act, but in asbestos cases such as Phillip Graf’s, the damages occurred over periods as long as 30 years or longer. What is worse, typically problems that result from asbestos exposure take years to show. Mesothelioma itself is impossible to detect early on and its symptoms are similar to other diseases, so patients are frequently misdiagnosed. All of this makes it very difficult for plaintiffs to prove that their health problems resulted from asbestos exposure and then link that asbestos exposure to the actions of the defendants. In the Graf case, the Graf family will have to show that the suffering and death Phillip Graf endured from his mesothelioma was caused by asbestos exposure, and that the named defendants caused that exposure.

In one case of asbestos exposure a large amount of defendants may be guilty based upon their involvement in the asbestos use. Unfortunately, an employee cannot typically sue and employer for asbestos exposure because of the Louisiana Workers Compensation Act which requires that such injuries be addressed through workers compensation, not tort suits. As a result, it is important to find other theories of liability on which a victim can sue.

The easiest potential defendant is the building owners, if they are different from the employer. In Phillip Graf’s case, this would be the person or corporation which owned the building in which he was exposed to asbestos. Building owners are strictly liable for damages caused by asbestos on their property.

In the past, most litigation on asbestos focused on the companies that produced asbestos products. However, because of asbestos-related suits, many of these companies have since gone bankrupt. Some plaintiffs have attempted to draw even further chains of causality, suing manufacturers of products used in conjunction with other manufacturers’ asbestos products, such as the manufacturers of pumps and valves. Whether these companies can be liable for failure to warn of asbestos-related hazards in products made by others is still in contention. No matter the theory of liability, as we have illustrated before, to be liable the defendant’s conduct must be a substantial factor in the harm. Thus, for example, for Metropolitan Life, the Graf family will have to show that the company’s aiding and abetting of the marketing and negligence related to asbestos products was a substantial factor in Phillip Graf’s contraction of mesothelioma.

As cases such as Graf’s show, with the many liability strategies and the problems that arise over the timing of exposure and the development of the disease, litigation in asbestos cases can become extremely complicated. In order to fully protect and preserve your rights in an asbestos case, you need to be sure to retain an attorney who is familiar with the many complexities of asbestos cases.

Continue reading "Asbestos Cases Always Difficult, Involve Negligence and Diverse Defendant Groups" »

Time is of the essence when it comes to filing a suit to address a grievance. If too much time passes, one may be barred from filing a lawsuit. The time period for filing a lawsuit is known as the "prescriptive time period." For example, a lawsuit for personal injury is subject to a one-year period of liberative prescription, following the date of the accident. The issue may become whether or not the time period has passed or not, thus, keeping a close eye on the calendar is the best way to stay safe when filing a lawsuit.

In a recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision, the court explored the time period in which the plaintiff initially filed to determine whether or not he filed in the appropriate time period. The cases arose from a fire at an oil well site in which the plaintiff was severely burned. The oil well accident occurred on September 27, 2007, thus, according to the prescriptive time period, he had one year from this date to file suit against the defendant(s). The plaintiff was employed by a Well Service Company that had contracted with an additional Mineral Company that produced oil and gas. In turn, the Mineral Company contracted with the plaintiff's direct employer to drill a well. The plaintiff filed a tort suit for his personal injuries against the Mineral Company and its insurer on September 4, 2008, falling within the one-year time period allowed for personal injury lawsuits. The plaintiff sustained injuries during the drilling operations, the well penetrated into formations that were pressurized with hydrocarbons. At the time of the incident, the plaintiff was in charge of circulating water through the well while awaiting heavier drilling mud to be pumped into the well to control the hydrocarbon pressure. His direct supervisor, a Well Service Employee, told the plaintiff to stand away from the well because the level the pressure was dangerous. However, the Mineral Supervisor contradicted the former supervisor's orders and told the plaintiff to get on his station at the pump and to abandon it only after shutting the pump off should the gas escape the well.

To the plaintiff's misfortune, he followed the Mineral Company's supervisor, where shortly after a hydrocarbon gas from down-hole escaped from the water tank sufficientily so that it ignited as the plaintiff was attempting to shut off the pump. This caused the hydrocarbon cloud in which the plaintiff was surrounded by, to become ignited, severely burning his entire body. It was only after the plaintiff filed suit against the Mineral Company that he discovered that the alleged Mineral Company supervisor was actually an independent contractor employed by a separate Pipeline Company. Thus, after the one year period, the plaintiff named the Pipe Company as a defendant in an amended petition. The question became whether or not the amended petition was proper, since the prescriptive period of one year had since passed. Thus, the Supreme Court's responsibility was to explore the lower court's decision which sustained the Pipeline Company's argument that too much time had passed and thus, the plaintiff should not be allowed to add them into the initial lawsuit.

Jurisprudence has recognized three different scenarios in which a plaintiff may rely on to establish that prescription has not run. These three situations include, suspension, interruption, and renunciation. In this case, the plaintiff relied on the theory of interruption to argue that his claim had not prescribed. In Louisiana Civil Code Article 1799 provides,

"The interruption of prescription against one solidary obligor is effective against all solidary obligors."

In addition, Louisiana Civil Code Article 3503 declares, "When prescription is interrupted against a solidary obligor, the interruption is effective against all solidqary obligors." Relying on jurisprudence, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirms the principle that for purposes of prescription, parties are solidarily liable to the extent that they share coextensive liability to repair certain elements of the same damage. As such, the plaintiff sustained severe physical injuries after being directly ordered to engage in dangerous activity by an independent contractor who was employed by the Pipeline Company. The companies are solidarily responsible since they held the supervisor out as a company employee and they were directly involved in the injury of the plaintiff. Therefore, prescription was properly interrupted as process was served upon the Mineral Company within the one year prescriptive time period, and since the independent supervisor involved was a solidary obligor, this initial service interrupted prescription amongst all involved and permits the plaintiff to amend the pleading to add the supervisor despite being past the one year prescriptive time period.

Lawsuits are a complicated process that require more than a grievance, they require proper filing within certain time periods, and serving parties at appropriate times. Thus, acquiring legal representation is highly recommended. This will help to ensure that the prescriptive time periods are followed and your legal argument does not fall between the cracks.

Continue reading "Understanding Prescriptive Time Periods When Filing a Lawsuit" »

An explosion at the Multi-Chem Corporation chemical plant, followed by a series of smaller ones, has led to an evacuation of the area's residents. Preliminary reports indicate that no injuries have taken place but it will take some time before a full understanding of the incident is known. The company, which creates oilfield product chemicals, still does not know the full details of the incident. That another explosion has taken place, with the Dow Hahnville incident still in recent memory, leads to a lot of questions regarding the safety standards and practices being utilized at these facilities.

The Associated Press reports that the incident, which appears to have first begun at 4 pm today, featured a significant explosion that could be heard from more than a mile away. The incident led to a one mile radius surrounding the plant being evacuated as all plant employees are accounted for. While the State Police say no one was injured in the incident, previous chemical releases have proven that only after some time are the full effects of an explosion known.

A Multi-Chem Group in Houston spokesman says that the company is still in its exploratory phase and will provide details when they are available. Information is still scarce at this time but we will update this blog as it is available.

Reports are coming in that an explosion has taken place at the New Iberia chemical plant, leading to an immediate evacuation of residents in the area and plant personnel.

More information will be provided as it becomes available.

Over the course of the last century, products liability law has become more detailed and specific in terms of protecting consumers from injury caused by products. If a product is found to be defective, in most cases any sellers along the chain of sale can be held liable. This means that, from the manufacturers to the retailer, all parties can be held liable if damage is caused by a product. The reason for this trend in the law is to give the benefit of the doubt to the consumer because the consumer needs protection. Further, stricter laws force manufacturers to produce better products. If they know that a defective product could potentially results in a multi-million dollar law suit, they will make sure the products they produce are safe.

This protection is especially true as it pertains to young children. Because children have less experience in life, there is a higher chance that they can make a mistake which would be unreasonable to make if it were an adult. However, even the law does not extend such benefits fully to all actions by children and teenagers. In a recent case, Payne v. Gardner, the Louisiana Supreme Court identified a point at which even a teenager could not be protected.

In 2004, in Rapides Parish, Henry Goudeau was playing around an oil well pump. The oil well pumps on oil wells move back and forth like a pendulum. As Henry was playing around the oil well pump, he noticed the movement of the pump and decided to use the pump as a pendulum type swing for recreational purposes. Afer he jumped on the pump when it reached its highest point, his leg got caught in another part of the pump which unfortunately lead Henry to be seriously injured. Henry's mother decided to sue the manufacturer of the pump, Lufkin Industries. A serious battle arose as to whom the blame should fall upon. Should Lufkin have know that their pumps would be used as a ride? Should Henry have used better care in making a determination of whether it was safe to ride on the pump?

In situations like this there can be no simple answer. However, the determination must be made with insight into the facts that existed at the time, and their relation to the law. At the trial court level, the court agreed with Lufkin. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision. The case ultimately found its way to the Supreme Court. The products liablity act in Louisiana is as follows:

The manufacturer of a product shall be liable to a claimant for damage proximately caused by a characteristic of the product that renders the product unreasonably dangerous when such damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product by the claimant or another person or entity.

Further, reasonably anticipated use is defined as, "a use or handling of a product that the product's manufacturer should reasonable expect of an ordinary person in the same or similar circumstances." Lukfin provided evidence that at the time the oil well pump was built, 50 years ago, the sole purpose of the pump was to extract oil. There was never any intent on the part of the company to make its pump available for recreational use. The Supreme Court agreed and stated that on the part of the company, riding the pump would not be a reasonable foreseeable use. Thus, Lufkin had met its burden of proving that it used care when creating its product.

Although Henry was unlucky in his tragic accident and his ultimate case, one can never know who is legally to blame for an injury caused by a product or a machine.

Continue reading "Oil Pump Injury Demonstrates Limits of Liability for Child's Injury" »

In our last post, we explored the basic elements of class action certification, including the rules that guide a trial court's decision on whether to grant the certification. Although the trial court is granted wide discretion on this question, it must reach its decision through serious analysis; the failure to substantiate its analysis can result in reversal by the appellate court as illustrated in the recent case, Madison v. Chalmette Refining LLC. On January 12, 2007, a group of students, teachers, and parent chaperones visited the Chalmette National Battlefield. During a historical reenactment, the nearby Chalmette Refinery released a significant amount of petroleum coke dust that was carried to the battlefield area. Five individuals (the "Plaintiffs") filed suit in federal court against Chalmette Refining, demanding compensation for a variety of damages including "including personal injury, fear, anguish, discomfort, inconvenience, pain and suffering, emotional distress, psychiatric and psychological damages, evacuation, economic damages, and property damages." The suit sought to represent all individuals who were exposed to the coke dust, specifically:

"all persons entities [sic] located at the Chalmette National Battlefield in St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana, in the early afternoon of Friday, January 12, 2007 and who sustained property damage, personal injuries, emotional, mental, or economic damages and/or inconvenience or evacuation as a result of the incident."

The district court allowed the parties to conduct discovery on the issue of class certification. Chalmette Refining took the deposition of each of the five named class representatives, yet the Plaintiffs conducted no discovery at all. At the hearing on the motion to certify the class, no evidence was introduced; at the conclusion, the district court orally granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.

Even before the district court issued its written order, Chalmette Refining petitioned the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for an interlocutory appeal over the decision to certify the class. The thrust of Chalmette Refining's appeal focused on the district court’s findings of "superiority" and "predominance" as required under Federal Rule 23(b)(3). "Determining whether the plaintiffs can clear the predominance hurdle set by Rule 23(b)(3) requires district courts to consider how a trial on the merits would be conducted if a class were certified." This, naturally, demands a fact-intensive analysis that "will vary depending on the circumstances of any case." The district court's order, in the Fifth Circuit's opinion, revealed that it failed to meet this requirement. Instead, it "adopted a figure-it-out-as-we-go-along approach that ... Fifth Circuit cases have not endorsed." For example, the district court's order provided no evidence that it meaningfully considered how the Plaintiffs’ claims would be tried, or that it weighed whether the case could be “streamlined using other case management tools, including narrowing the claims and potential plaintiffs through summary judgment." The district court also apparently failed to acknowledge or resolve the "significant disparities" among even the named class representatives concerning exposure, location, and mitigation. Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that by failing to adequately balance the common issues against the individual issues, the district court abused its discretion in determining that common issues predominated and in certifying the class. The court was careful, however, not suggest that class treatment is necessarily inappropriate for the case; instead, Fifth Circuit precedent simply required a "more rigorous analysis" than the district court conducted. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s class certification order and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

The Fifth Circuit leaves open the possibility that class certification may still happen in this case if, on remand, the district court properly engages in the analysis required by the Circuit's jurisprudence and Rule 23. It is interesting to note that no evidence was presented by the Plaintiffs in the district court's original hearing on certification. Perhaps had more evidence been in play at that stage, the court would have had more information at its disposal on which to base its analysis and could have avoided the reversal on appeal. Ultimately, this case demonstrates the complexities of class action litigation and reminds plaintiffs that an experienced attorney is essential.

Continue reading "Chemical Release at Chalmette Refinery Results in Battle Over Class Action Certification (Part 2)" »

In this post, we will explore the basic concepts of a class action lawsuit. In particular, we will examine the rules that govern the process by which the court decides whether to recognize a class and permit a group of plaintiffs to litigate under one single action. In a subsequent post, we will examine a recent case from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in which the defendant, a petroleum refinery, challenged the district court's certification of a class of plaintiffs following a chemical release in Chalmette, Louisiana.

A class action is appropriate when numerous plaintiffs who have experienced similar harm collectively bring a suit against the defendant. For actions filed in federal court, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets out the requirements for a court to certify, or recognize, a class in a particular case. The four central prerequisites include:

(1) numerosity--a sufficient number of plaintiffs that for each to bring a unique suit is impracticable; (2) commonality--questions of law or fact are common to each plaintiff; (3) typicality--the named parties’ claims are representative of those of all plaintiffs; and (4) adequacy of representation--the class representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of all plaintiffs.

If each of these requirements is met, the plaintiffs must then meet two additional burdens. First, they must show that questions common to all the plaintiffs predominate over questions that affect only certain individuals. Also, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the class action is better than alternative methods for resolving the controversy. Feder v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp. The district court is responsible for determining whether the class will be certified. “The decision to certify is within the broad discretion of the court, but that discretion must be exercised within the framework of Rule 23.” Castano v. American Tobacco Co. The court's "rigorous analysis" of the class question means "going beyond the pleadings ... [to] understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law in order to make a meaningful determination of the certification issues.” This typically involves the court's allowing the parties to conduct discovery specifically on the issue of class certification before rendering the decision.

Given that class certification involves "important due process concerns of both plaintiffs and defendants," the district court's proper handling of the certification petition is essential. For this reason, Federal Rule 23(f) provides that the parties may file an interlocutory appeal to challenge the court's grant or denial of class certification. The appellate court is charged with ensuring that the district court conducted a sufficiently rigorous analysis if a party challenges the class certification, such as in the recent case of Madison v. Chalmette Refining LLC, which we will take up in a future post.

Continue reading "Chemical Release at Chalmette Refinery Results in Battle Over Class Action Certification" »

On June 19, 2006, CITGO Petroleum Corp. released some four million gallons of hazardous slop oil and seventeen million gallons of wastewater into the Calcasieu River from the waste water treatment unit at its Lake Charles refinery. The overflow was caused in part by a storm that dropped more than six inches of rain in a three-hour period. The slop oil, which contained numerous toxic chemicals, fouled approximately one hundred miles of the river's shoreline. Within a few days, the sludge migrated to the waters surrounding a small industrial plant located on an island in the river owned by the Calcasieu Refining Company ("CRC"), where several employees continued to work during CITGO's clean-up efforts. Some of the workers in the dock area at CRC were directly exposed to the water and slop oil. They reported nausea, rashes, and peeling skin as a result. The vapors from the slop oil led to respiratory and central nervous system injuries to other workers. Complaints included headaches, nausea, dizziness, as well as eye, nose, and throat problems.

In May, 2007, fourteen plaintiffs from the CRC plant filed suit against CITGO for their injuries related to the spill. On September 17, 2008, CITGO entered a plea agreement in federal court over the spill in which it agreed to pay a $13 million criminal fine for various EPA violations. On September 19, 2008, the trial court entered a judgment against CITGO and awarded each CRC plaintiff general damages in the amount of $5,000, punitive damages in the amount of $30,000, and $2,500 for "fear of future injury."

CITGO appealed, citing as error, among other things, that the award for fear of future injury lacked a basis in the evidence and was speculative. In support of its argument, CITGO cited a prior case, Broussard v. Olin Corp., where the plaintiff sought recovery for fear of developing cancer after he was exposed to phosgene gas. Because the plaintiff failed to clearly link phosgene gas exposure to an increased risk of cancer, the court in Broussard concluded that the claim was "mere speculation" and that the facts did not support an award for "anxiety." The Third Circuit distinguished the present case in that CITGO's own technical data showed that

"more than one of the chemicals in the slop oil can cause cancer, particularly benzene, a known carcinogen, and the [Material Safety Data Sheet] discusses chronic lung dysfunction, [and] organ and system damage."

After reviewing the evidence presented at the trial of the plaintiffs' physical conditions following exposure and considering the testimony of several medical experts, the court concluded the "plaintiffs had a justified fear of future injury," and affirmed the trial court's award.

The CITGO case offers a valuable lesson for plaintiffs who seek to recover damages for fear of developing future injuries as a result of exposure to toxic chemicals or other hazards. Such a claim requires that the future injury giving rise to the fear be causally linked to the initial exposure. Otherwise, the court will likely consider the claim to be too speculative.

Continue reading "Lake Charles Toxic Spill Case Explores Claims for Fear of Future Injury" »

In 1996, a group of plaintiffs filed a petition for damages against the city of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge alleging that the operation and maintenance of the North Wastewater Treatment Facility caused personal inconvenience, mental suffering, embarrassment, and personal injuries, threatening their health and safety, as well as damaged their land and property. The trial court awarded monetary damages to nineteen plaintiffs for stigma damages and added plaintiffs back who had been dismissed for no property interested, awarding damages for discomfort and inconvenience. However, in a 2009 decision (that can be found here: 2009CA1076), the Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed many of the damage awards based on errors of law.

On appeal, the Louisiana Court of Appeals considered whether the trial court erred because the prescriptive period had expired, erred in awarding damages out of the 1997 expansion of the plant, or erred calculating damage amounts. Under La.R.S.9:5624, the prescriptive period for public property damage claims like this one is two years. The court agreed with plaintiffs that the period did not lapse because the latest expansion of the sewage plant can be viewed as a new public work event - thus plaintiffs were only responsible to file suit within two years of the 1998 expansion, not within two years of the plant's original opening in 1960.

The trial court awarded damages under Article I Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution, which provides that "property shall not be taken or damages by the state or its political subdivisions except for public purposes and with just compensation paid to the owner." The Louisiana Supreme Court has addressed inverse condemnations like this one in the past (where the state is not taking other's property, but rather damaging it through their own property) and noted that "Despite the legislative failure to provide a procedure to seek redress when property is damaged or taken without the proper exercise of eminent domain this Court has held that a cause of action must arise out of the self-executing nature of the constitutional command to pay just compensation." As such, individuals whose land is damaged by the government have constitutional redress.

The Supreme Court has also provided five elements that must be proven in such a case: (1) that the property rights are at issue; (2) that the act alleged to have caused damages was undertaken for public purposes; (3) that the acts of the government violate Civil Code articles 667 through 669; (4) that the government has engaged in excessive or abusive conduct and (5) that their property has either been physically damaged or has suffered "special damage peculiar to their particular property." The Supreme Court has also found that as long as the activities on State land do not exceed the level of causing claimant some inconvenience there can be no taking or damaging of the property right.
Basically, in a case like this one, proof of personal injury, physical damage to property, or the presence of excessive or abusive conduct must be made. Here, the Court of Appeals found that it was unclear whether the trial court applied the correct legal criteria. Plaintiffs suffered inconvenience, but inconvenience alone is not compensable. The Court found that several errors were made at the trial court level:

First, plaintiffs can only be compensated for damages sustained by expansion of the treatment plant that occurred in 1997 and 1998 because earlier claims had prescribed, and as such, damage for odors existent in 1995 were awarded in error. Additionally, the court can only award stigma damages if they resulted from the expansion of the sewage treatment plant. However, plaintiff's real estate expert concluded that the proximity of the treatment plant generally resulted in property damage ranging from 13,000 to 30,000 per home. The expert did not consider the effect of the expansion in particular. The expert testified that only one home was actually damaged by the expansion itself due to the fact that post-expansion his home was no longer directly across the street from a BREC park. Other damages were awarded in error.

Finally, damages were also awarded to a number of plaintiffs for discomfort and inconvenience during the 17 months of expansion itself. However, the evidence did not establish absusive or excessive conduct or any physical damage or personal injury. Ill effects of construction are unavoidable and generally not compensable.
As this case demonstrates, sometimes litigation can be a rollercoaster with claimant's fighting for a favorable ruling only to have it reversed and damages rescinded. Competent representation is crucial to fight all of the battles in the court case, through trial, appeal, and beyond.

The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, as we have previously explored, occurs when the defendant purposefully engages in extreme or outrageous conduct with the goal of seriously upsetting the plaintiff. A different case is the scenario involving the plaintiff's mental distress that results from the defendant's negligent conduct. Commonly, a plaintiff can successfully recover for a claim of negligent infliction of mental distress when the distress arises out of a physical injury that is related to the defendant's negligence. Without physical injury, however, a plaintiff is far less likely to recover. The case of Taylor v. Novartis Crop Protection, Inc. provides an example.

On the evening of July 18, 1999, Novartis Crop Protection Corporation's facility in St. Gabriel released industrial ammonia into the air for approximately 15 minutes. Following the release, several hundred individuals who were present in or owned property around the St. Gabriel area filed a suit for damages against Novartis. The complaint alleged that as a result of the chemical release, the plaintiffs suffered "burning eyes, itching, burning skin, breathing difficulties, dizziness, nausea, diarrhea, headaches, anxiety, and fear for their physical well being." The complaint also stated that the incident caused considerable fear, anguish, discomfort, and inconvenience to the people in the communities" surrounding the Novartis facility. Novartis filed a motion for dismissal for those plaintiffs who were located outside of the "zone of danger" agreed upon by experts from both sides and who therefore could not have been exposed to the ammonia. The affected plaintiffs responded that their claim was not for physical exposure but for "mental anguish, emotional distress, inconvenience, and fear and fright." The trial court entered a judgment dismissing all plaintiffs who were outside of the "zone of danger," and those plainitiffs appealed.

In its analysis, the First Circuit Court of Appeal reaffirmed that under Louisiana law "a defendant will not be held liable for [damages] where its conduct was merely negligent and caused only mental or emotional disturbance unaccompanied by physical injury." The narrow exception to this rule is where the plaintiff can demonstrate "special circumstances," which must be "more than minimal inconvenience worry." The court noted that the only special circumstances cited by the plaintiffs was a prior release of ammonia that occurred in 1999 and which required the evacuation of a school. But the court concluded that the prior incident did not rise to the level of "special circumstances" as required by Louisiana jurisprudence. (Examples of sufficient circumstances from case law include the negligent transmission of an erroneous message about a loved one's death; the mishandling of corpses; and damaging property while being observed by the plaintiff. See Moresi v. State for further discussion.) Further, the court noted that the plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence to show they had "suffered from genuine and serious mental distress." Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing the plaintiffs whose claims included only mental distress.

This case further reinforces the fact that courts generally look unfavorably upon claims for mental or emotional distress when there is no physical manifestation of the injury. This may be due to the fact that mental harm is difficult to measure, as well as the potential for false claims.

Continue reading "Court Turns Away Plaintiffs' Mental Distress Claims After Chemical Release in St. Gabriel" »

Many of Louisiana's woes are from recent disasters such as Hurricane Katrina and the Gulf oil spill. However, for Plaintiffs in David v. Velsicol Chemical Corporation, their woes began long before then. Plaintiffs were residents and property owners in the Cow Island area of Vermilion Parish when they discovered that their lands had high levels of arsenic in the ground water, in some instances eighty times the Environmental Protection Agency's acceptable levels. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants' product, Cooper's Cattle Dip, contaminated their land and drinking water with arsenic and other hazardous chemicals causing the high rate of cancer in the area.

Plaintiffs' story begins before 1970 when Cooper's Cattle Dip was used in dripping vats located on, or adjacent to, all of the Plaintiffs' properties. The dip solution contained high concentrations of arsenic and other poisonous chemicals. After being dipped in the solution, the cattle would stand as the dip slowly dripped its poison into the Plaintiffs' lands. Although this dip eradicated the ticks that were killing cattle across the United States, it was deadly to humans and animals. This poisonous dip was simply allowed to run off into the ground and, as Plaintiffs alleged, contaminate the ground and eventually the water.

Despite this, the trial court ruled that twenty-one of these Plaintiffs had no cause of action and no standing to proceed in the case. Just recently, the Third Circuit Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling allowing the twenty-one Plaintiffs a chance to prove their case under pre-Louisiana Product Liability Act (LPLA) strict liability law. As a side note, this case is governed by pre-LPLA strict liability law because the contamination occurred before enactment of the LPLA. For further discussion on the LPLA, please see an earlier entry on the blog.

In its ruling, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the fundamentals of Lousiana product liability law and strict liability law. Essentially Louisiana product liability law provides that:

A manufacturer of a product which involves a risk of injury to the user is liable to any person, whether the purchaser or a third person, who without fault on his part, sustains an injury caused by a defect in the design, composition, or manufacture of the article, if the injury might reasonably have been anticipated.

Under this rule, the plaintiff must prove

(1) harm resulted from the condition of the product;
(2) the condition of the product made the product unreasonably dangerous for normal use; and
(3) that the condition existed at the time that the product left the manufacturer's control.

However, strict product liability is different. As the Third Circuit explains, under the strict product liability:

Strict liability results form the conduct or defect of a person or thing which creates and 'unreasonable risk' of harm to others. Strict liability for injury suffered as the result of an unreasonably dangerous product attaches to a claim by any person injured by such product... Any person injured by the contaminated water or soil has a right of recovery and has standing to enforce that right.

In matters like this, the product itself is on trial and the plaintiff must provide proof that the product was unreasonably dangerous for normal use. The Court explains that the test to determine whether a product is dangerous per se is to weigh the danger-in-fact of the product versus the utility of the product. In addition, as part of this test, failure to warn or include warnings about the danger weighs heavily.

To show danger-in-fact, Plaintiffs in this case presented evidence demonstrating that there were no instructions from the manufacturer as to how to clean up the areas where the dip was allowed to runoff into the ground. Further, whatever warnings and instructions were provided would actually further contaminate the land. Defendant did not dispute any of this nor that the product was a toxic, hazardous substance designed to kill.

The Third Circuit ultimately decided that the Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence at the hearings to state a right of action for damages based on the product being unreasonably dangerous and manufacturer's failure to warn. The Court ruled to reinstate all Plaintiffs dismissed and to allow them to proceed with their case against Defendants.

In cases like this where the origin of the harm was a long time ago and the effect of the harm is happening now, proof is hard to get. If the Third Circuit did not reverse the ruling, those twenty-one. Plaintiffs would be out of luck. This kind of story can happen to anyone and if it has happened to you, it is essential that you get legal help.

Continue reading "Court of Appeals allows Plaintiffs to Continue Suit in Product Defect Matter" »

A Union Carbide Corporation plant facility in Taft, Louisiana, leaked a toxic chemical compound for at least seventeen hours on September 10th and 11th in 1998. Rainwater accumulation from Tropical Storm Frances caused partial collapse of the floating roof on a large tank storing liquid naphtha. Consequently, a tank seal broke allowing escape of liquid naphtha which volatilized and exposed workers and surrounding residential areas to naphtha fumes including the towns of Montz and Killona. An estimated 4.6 million pounds of naphtha vaporized before application of a chemical foam to the tank roof effectively stopped the volatilization hazard.

In the case of Howard v. Union Carbide Corporation, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reduced to negligible amounts the already decided damages awarded to plaintiffs exposed to the naphtha fumes. Specifically, original damages awarded were $3,500, $2,500, and $1,500. However, the Supreme Court reduced these damages to amounts of $500, $250, 150, and $100 based on proximity to the leak with higher awards to those within the plant and lower awards to those in the surrounding residential areas.

Exhibiting a controversial impression of the dangerous chemical involved, as well as defining exposure injuries, the Court concluded "simply no reasonable relationship" exists between the injuries and the original damages awarded. Assuming all fumes are equal regardless of the vastly different compounds which any given chemical leak may constitute, the Court cited other negligible awards in other cases despite the fact that the other cases involved unrelated chemicals.

In fact, the Court categorized exposure injuries to the vaporized naphtha as "mere annoyances." Acute naphtha exposure symptoms may include irritation of the eyes (stinging sensation in the eyes, tearful eyes), nose irritation (stinging sensation in membranes lining nasal passages), sore throat, and coughing. Notably, the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that immediate exposure symptoms are the only consequences of exposure to toxic chemicals. On the contrary to some specialists, forms of naphtha may be carcinogenic. In addition, naphtha has been determined to be a central nervous system depressant, which is the mechanism for the reported headaches, nausea, dizziness, and the sensation of being inebriated (drunk). Further, components within the naphtha often possess additional harmful qualities.

Finally, the Louisiana Supreme Court uses as support for reducing damage awards the lack of professional medical attention and evacuation, noting that, oftentimes, acute exposure symptoms were self-treated because plaintiffs were not provided with adequate nor accurate exposure details.

If you have faced a similar situation, it is important that you contact an attorney immediately to get the legal advice you deserve. When facing a situation like this, an individual who has been injured must be careful with the lawyer you select because it can mean the difference between recovering your losses and being left in the dark. Call our offices today for a free consultation on your legal rights.

The Berniard Law Firm is proud to announce the release of an innovative new iPhone application that can be considered a must-have for individuals in the Gulf Coast. With extensive versatility and options including multiple contact points for our attorneys, as well as consistent site updates that will keep you informed of legal developments as they become available. Released October 26, we recommend everyone download the application in order to stay abreast of a variety of issues that relate to them.

In the works for some time, and with an update already planned, the Berniard Law Firm iPhone app puts law matters that are important to Louisiana residents in the palm of their hands. Constantly refreshing, with updates relating to our website, this application is an effort by our firm to allow our friends and clients quick access and up-to-date information for their daily lives. Whether using the application to send our firm a legal question or to call our offices, we strongly encourage anyone that wants an attorney and a wealth of legal information at your fingertips.

Specifically, the Berniard Law Firm Injury Attorney iPhone App provides users
- Entry page to record important details in the event of an accident
- Minimal size installed (only 3.1 MBs)
- Practice area explanations
- Quick jumps to consistently updated blogs
- Fast contact information to speak with an attorney

One feature that is extremely important and valuable in the Berniard Injury Attorney App is the entry page. Composed of data input fields that target inherently important details of an accident, using this portion of the application can help you make sure you record all of the necessary information at a time in which it maybe be difficult to remember. Providing an easy, step-by-step accident guide, this application can even include a picture with the information report with a simple tap.

For more information on how to download this application, or to discuss your legal rights regarding an issue that you are facing currently, contact our offices today. The Berniard Law Firm would happily discuss with you what opportunities you may have within the realm of the law, as well as give you a free consultation in regards to how we can best get you the justice you deserve.

To download the application, click here.

In Louisiana, actions in tort must be brought within a certain period of time after the incident occurs. This is called the "prescriptive period," and reflects the state's position that "a plaintiff is responsible to seek out those whom he believes may be responsible for a specific injury," Jordan v. Employee Transfer Corporation, 509 So.2d 420, 423 (La. 1987), and to file suit within a reasonable period of time. The specific prescriptive period for a given tort is set by statute. For example, the prescriptive period for damage to immovable, or real, property is one year. LSA C.C. Art. 3493. The one-year period "commences to run from the day the owner of the [land] acquired, or should have acquired, knowledge of the damage." LSA C.C. Art. 3493. A plaintiff's knowledge of damage is often closely connected with the concept of "constructive notice," which has been defined by Louisiana courts as "whatever notice is enough to excite attention and put the injured party on guard or call for inquiry." Campo v. Correa, 828 So.2d 502, 510-511 (La. 2002).

The expiration of the prescriptive period for property damage was central to the case of Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 2009-CC-2632 (La. 2010). The Hogg family owned property in Ruston that was located next to Burt's Chevron Station. In 1997, it was discovered that the gas station's underground storage tanks were leaking. The tanks were replaced, after which the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) investigated for soil and groundwater contamination. In December 2001 and April 2002, the LDEQ sent the owners of property around Burt's Chevron, including the Hoggs, letters informing them of the environmental contamination. The first letter, dated December 20, 2001, reported that environmental contamination had been detected in the vicinity of Burt's Chevron as a result of a leaking underground storage tank system. The letter explained that the contamination had been detected in the subsurface soil and groundwater, and appeared to be migrating in a "west-northwesterly direction," toward an unnamed stream on the Hoggs' property. The letter further reported that water samples collected from the stream indicated "the presence of chemicals commonly found in gasoline (i.e., benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, xylene)." The letter specifically warned the Hoggs: "Due to the direction of groundwater flow, there is a possibility that gasoline may have migrated underground from the Burt's Chevron site to your property or that such migration may occur in the future." The second letter, dated April 26, 2002, contained the results of ambient air sampling which revealed the presence of petrochemicals in the area of the stream. A map enclosed with the letter showed that the tests were actually conducted on the Hoggs' property. The LDEQ also recommended that the Hoggs "limit the time spent in the area immediately adjacent to the stream."

The Hogg family did not file suit against E. Lee Young, the owner of Burt's Chevron, until September 6, 2007--shortly after they were contacted by the LDEQ to request permission to enter their property to conduct clean-up. In the district court, Young filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the one-year prescriptive period for filing the tort action had expired. Young's theory was that the period began to run when the Hoggs received the letters from the LDEQ in 2001 and 2002, as the letters provided them with notice of the presence of gasoline on their property. The Hoggs countered that the LDEQ's letters were subject to more than one interpretation, thereby rendering the reasonableness of the Hoggs' lack of response a question of fact that should go to a jury. The district court denied Young's motion, finding issues of fact about whether the LDEQ's letters provided knowledge of damage sufficient to start the running of the prescriptive period.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Louisiana essentially reframed the nature of the dispute. The court stated:

"the dispute in this case centers around whether the information conveyed in the letters was sufficient to commence the running of prescription. Thus, while the question of subjective knowledge is ordinarily inappropriate for resolution by summary judgment, such a question is not presented here. In this case, there is no question as to what the plaintiffs knew and when. Plaintiffs' knowledge is contained in the letters. The question presented is whether this knowledge constitutes actual or constructive knowledge sufficient to commence the running of prescription."

The court found that "a plain reading of the LDEQ letters reveals that while it is arguable that the letters do not, as the district court concluded, specifically inform plaintiffs that the soil and groundwater on their property is contaminated, it is beyond peradventure that they provide sufficient information to excite attention and put plaintiffs on guard and call for inquiry." In conclusion, the court held that the Hoggs had "acquired constructive knowledge of the damage to their ... property sufficient to commence the running of prescription no later than 2002." Thus, their suit filed in 2007, well beyond the one-year period, was barred by prescription.

The decision in this case reveals the serious approach that the Louisiana courts take in enforcing the prescriptive period. Plaintiffs must always keep in mind that state law limits the amount of time they can wait before filing a suit. Although, in the words of the Hogg court, the prescription period "should not be used to force a person who believes he may have been damaged in some way to rush to file suit," it is clear that the courts are not sympathetic to a plaintiff who does not act even when given a reasonably good indication that he has suffered a loss due to someone else's conduct. For this reason, anyone who feels he may have been injured should seek the advice of counsel immediately to ensure that an expired prescription period does not ruin his day in court.

A power failure at Chalmette Refining LLC has led to a thin layer of white powder descending upon Southeast Louisiana, raising concerns about the toxicity and potential harm that could emerge from exposure. Citing a power failure for the reason that up to one ton of catalyst were released into the air and falling down atop cars, homes, businesses and other property, the company has attempted to assure the public that safety is not a concern. However, the care that the refinery recommends during clean-up tells a much different story.

Spreading across the communities of Arabi and New Orleans' lower ninth ward, the powder used for refinery processes resembled simple dust or powdered sugar and alarmed many during a time in which little to no information can cause significant panic. Taking place on September 6th, many in these communities are left wondering just why chemical releases keep happening and what is being done to prevent them from happening.

Louisiana's Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), already investigating the unapproved release of catalyst, has notified the public that, after photographic any and all damage the powder has caused to their property, they can move forward with clean-up. Yet, in their required notice to the DEQ, the Chalmette refinery warned that gloves and safety glasses should be used when cleaning up the material. St. Bernard Parish Fire Chief Thomas Stone warned that the powder could be an irritant to individuals with respiratory problems and that the powder should be cleaned in order to prevent extended exposure.

This is not the first time that Southeast Louisiana has found itself on the receiving end of chemical releases. Aside from the BP oil spill that released hundreds of thousands of gallons of oil into the Gulf, the July 7th, 2009, release of ethyl acrylate by Dow in Hahnville led to hundreds of complaints related to health problems of individuals living or working in the area. While no legal outcome has come from this matter, it is important that people in Louisiana understand the unacceptable nature, both legally and in terms of common responsibility, for these incidences to be occurring and requires significant action on the part of the Department of Environmental Quality.

As was already noted, individuals who find the powder on their homes or property should photograph this in order to preserve record of the event. What's more, any individual who has suffered health problems related to exposure should contact a legal expert immediately to find out their rights due to this incident.

Residents of Monroe, Louisiana, and the surrounding area are fortunate that a train derailment appears benign. The train derailed the evening of Saturday, February 20th, in the vicinity of Highway 165. Fortunately, other than the damage sustained by the derailed cars and the train tracks, the accident seems to have caused little harm.

According to a report by Zack Southwell that appeared on thenewsstar.com, the cause of the accident was initially unclear and under investigation. But Caldwell Parish deputies have assured the public that the accident poses no danger to the surrounding area. The report quoted Chief Deputy Glen Gilmore as saying, "We had (hazardous materials) crews out here also, making sure the wreck caused no danger. They declared the area safe shortly after midnight [on Sunday]." A representative of Union Pacific indicated that "most of the cars that derailed were empty," but she added that some were carrying a non-hazardous fuel oil additive.

The folks living near the accident site are indeed lucky that the derailed cars were not carrying more hazardous substances. Train derailments are not always so harmless. For example, during a 2008 derailment near Lafayette, the damaged BNSF cars leaked 11,000 gallons of toxic hydrochloric acid onto the ground surrounding the accident site. As reported by newsinferno.com, the acid gathered in yellow pools and emitted vapors that formed a toxic cloud around over Lafayette. The spill forced the evacuation of 3,000 local residents, shut down businesses and closed roads until officials could neutralize the acid and remove all contaminated soil. In addition to lost business and property damage resulting from the accident, several folks required treatment for medical ailments related to the spilled acid.

Large-scale accidents like trail derailments have the potential to cause significant damage and harm, if not handled properly. As illustrated by the 2008 BNSF derailment in Lafayette, chemicals spilled during such accidents can be responsible for many types of injuries – to persons, to property, to business. Hopefully those affected by the Lafayette incident were able to recoup financial compensation for any injury they sustained as a result of the accident. Fortunately, it appears at this time that no chemicals or other hazardous substances leaked from the Union Pacific cars that derailed near Monroe. However, those in close proximity to the site should still keep a close eye on anything out of the ordinary on their property or with their health.

For all of our readers who are on Facebook, our firm has unveiled a new Page dedicated to the BP oil spill as a means to keep abreast of the latest news and more.

Click here to add us!

According to an AP report, BP yesterday admitted that more oil than it originally estimated is leaking into the Gulf. This news, coming roughly one month after the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded and sank, is heightening Gulf Coast residents' worries about the amount of damage likely to occur. A spokesman for BP, Mark Proegler, said that efforts over the weekend to insert a tube into the leaking pipe were successful, and that the tube is now siphoning off 210,000 gallons of oil per day. That figure is more than the total amount of oil BP and the U.S. Coast Guard originally estimated was leaking from the well, and it is clear that the tube is not capturing all the escaping oil. Mr. Proegler declined to estimate how much oil is still spewing into the Gulf, but some scientists who have viewed the underwater videos of the leak have suggested it could be as much as ten times the official estimate.

Meanwhile, crude oil began washing into the marshes on the state's southeastern tip and the Breton National Wildlife Refuge, where scientists believe oil has killed some rare birds that reside there. "This is the heavy oil that everyone's been fearing that is here now," Gov. Bobby Jindal said during a boat tour of the wetlands. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, as of May 17, 29 miles of Louisiana's coastline had already seen oil.

Adding to concerns over BP's handling of the disaster are reports of the company's efforts to limit the public's view of fouled beaches in Louisiana. CBS news reports when journalists attempted on Tuesday to visit an oil-covered beach in South Pass, they were turned away by BP contractors and two U.S. Coast Guard officers aboard a boat. The officers threatened to arrest the reporters, even though the government had not closed the beach to the public. The reporters captured video of one of the officers saying, "This is [sic] BP's rules, not ours."

According to the Times-Picayune, other beach areas impacted by the oil sludge include Trinity Island, Whiskey Island, the Chandeleur Islands, Fourchon Beach, Raccoon Island, and Grand Isle.

Finally, in an effort to help those looking to make claims against BP, Louisiana Senator Mary Landrieu initiated the process of making funds available for the assistance of filers. The legislation, which would authorize $20 million in EDA grants to help businesses and individuals prepare claims with BP over the Deepwater Horizon spill, also provides funding for the establishment of an oversight panel. This advisory board would, in conjunction with technical experts, monitor the claims process.

In a press release the Senator placed online, the Louisiana politician noted

"Filing claims can be an extremely technical and complicated process," Sen. Landrieu said. "This legislation would help ensure our fishermen, shrimpers, oystermen and other businesses can cut through red tape and file accurate claims. The transparency and oversight created by this bill is an important step in fairly and fully compensating Gulf Coast businesses for their losses from this unprecedented disaster."

Please return to this blog often for further updates.

Continue reading "BP's Estimates for Oil Leak Significantly Lower than Real Amount" »

In the face of the looming oil slick many estuaries and fishing grounds are being closed, leaving hundreds of Louisiana fishermen out of work. As the oil pours into the Gulf, many fishermen are wondering what's next. While many questions are still up in the air there are a number of issues that fishermen need to be aware of.

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
The Oil Pollution Act is a federal law that, among other things, allows an affected fisherman to file a claim against BP for his lost profits caused by the oil spill in addition to any other claims he has (i.e. property damage).

For example, if you are a shrimper, and your grounds have been closed off because of the oil spill, you can submit a claim for profits that you lost during the time the grounds were closed. To be clear, this remedy is only for profits and not total revenue. When trying to figure out how much you have lost subtract what you normally bring in during this season minus whatever costs you normally have.

In order to recover for your wages the spill must be the reason why you haven't worked. If this is the case then you can complete a claim. The claim will have to include a specific sum (your lost profits during the time the estuaries were closed), it must be presented to BP, and it must be submitted within three years.

In order to best ensure recovery you will need documentation. The Act requires that parties: document damaged property, make a showing of lost profits, show the amount of earnings in similar seasons, list any alternative employment, and list any savings to overhead as a result of the spill.

The best methods of doing all of this are:
- photographs
- tax returns, income statements, balance sheets, and cash flow statements from the past three years
- your expected profits from this year
- Newspaper reports that describe the spill
- Reports from emergency respondersópolice, fire department, etc

Submitting your claims involves three steps:
1) Write the claim. You can develop your own document, utilize the appropriate form at http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/Claims/claims_docs.asp#claim_guide, or contact a lawyer.
2) When the claim is complete attach proof of your losses to it (the photographs, tax returns, etc from the list above).
3) Mail it all to the National Pollutions Funds Center, Suite 1000, 4200 Wilson Blvd, Arlington, VA 20598-7100.

A successful claim will grant a fishermen his expected revenue substracted from his typical costs during the time in which he is unable to work due to the oil spill.

The $75 million cap
The OPA seems like a blessing, but it also limits liability in lost profits situations. While there is no limit to what BP will have to pay regarding oil clean-up, the current state of the Act caps economic damage pay outs at $75 million. The expected impact is likely to be far greater than $75 million given how many people are going to be affected by the spill. Anyone who lost profits or income because of the spill will qualify under the OPA, which means an almost unlimited number of hands reaching into a limited fund. While the OPA also created the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund in anticipation of such an event, it is unclear how the Fund will be utilized in this spill.

Congress and the White House noticed this cap problem and, as of Monday of last week, are working on legislation that will increase the cap to $10 billion; however, it is unclear if the new proposed bill will act retroactively.

Your Legal Rights
It is important that people making claims to BP be careful and not sign or agree to anything until speaking with an attorney. It is possible that, by accepting money from the oil conglomerate, individuals affected by the spill may be signing off their right to pursue more damages in the future. Further, by speaking with an attorney, you may find out you are entitled to more than you had previously assessed. If you have any questions regarding the spill please contact the oil spill experts at Berniard Law Firm.

Recently, we discussed the availability of funds under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) and the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) for compensating Louisiana residents who suffer property damage as the result of an oil spill. Claims for oil damage to boats are treated as a separate category from other types of personal property under the OPA.

According to the U.S. Coast Guard's National Pollution Funds Center web site, the owner of a boat can submit a claim for the cost of removing oil stains from his vessel (including its interior furnishings like upholstery and carpeting) so that the boat is restored to its pre-fouled condition. Claims can also be filed for damage to mechanical parts of the boat, such as an outboard motor, rudder, anchor winch, etc.

As with other property claims under the OPA, claimants must meet a series of specific requirements in order for their claims to be accepted by the National Pollution Funds Center. The claimant must prove that he owned or leased the boat at the time of the oil spill and must show that the vessel was damaged or destroyed by the oil and not some other event. The claimant must substantiate the value of the boat both before and after the oil spill as well as the costs to repair or replace the boat. The claim must contain evidence to support the value sought, which can include photographs of damage, the boat's name and the date of the boat's last hull painting, the year the boat was built or overhauled, the boat's length, its hull material, a copy of boat's title or other ownership documentation, the Vessel Identification Number, the location where boat was damaged by the oil, or the date and location that the boat was cleaned and/or repaired.

As with personal property and real property, boat owners have only three years to gather the necessary documentation and submit a claim under the OPA. If your boat has been damaged or destroyed by the Deep Horizon oil spill, you should not delay in contacting an attorney who is an expert in filing boat claims. An attorney can assist in all aspects of the claims process, including locating boat appraisal professionals who can substantiate the dollar value of your loss.

Continue reading "What You Should Know About Boat Damage Claims Under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA)" »

In a previous post, we explored the role of the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) and the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) in compensating Louisiana residents who incur oil removal and clean-up costs. These funds are also available for coastal residents who suffer property damage as a result of an oil spill.

According to the U.S. Coast Guard's National Pollution Funds Center web site, the OPA permits filings for oil-related losses to real and personal property. Real property damage is defined as "injury to or economic losses resulting from destruction of land or buildings." For example, the owner of oil-fouled waterfront property can file for reimbursement of the costs to restore the property to its pre-spill condition. Or, if the owner decides to sell the property without restoring it, he can submit a claim for the difference between its pre-spill assessed value and the reduced price he receives for the fouled property after the spill.

Personal property damage is "injury to or economic losses resulting from damages to other types property you own or lease besides real property." For instance, a fisherman can submit a claim for the cost of cleaning or replacing a shrimp net, fishing tackle, or clothing that is fouled by oil.

The OPA requires that property damage claims meet a number of specific requirements. The first is that the claimant must prove ownership of the damaged property. This primarily pertains to real property claims and can be accomplished by titles, deeds, or other public records. The claimant must show that the damage complained of was actually caused by oil and not some other factor. Further, the claimant must show that the amount of damage claimed is "appropriate." This can be achieved by citing the cost to repair or replace the property, the appraised value of the property before and after the spill, or, in the case of real property, the amount of loss suffered when selling the fouled property. Documentation is essential and can take the form of photographs, reports from governmental agencies, invoices, receipts, witness statements, professional property appraisals, lease or rental agreements for substitute property, or any other documentation the claimant feels will help support the amount claimed.

Property owners have only three years to gather the necessary documentation and submit a claim under the OPA. Claims must be for a specific amount of money, which means it is imperative that property owners take the necessary steps to determine the true value of their losses.

An attorney who is an expert in the OPA claims process can ensure that your claim is properly prepared, adequately substantiated, and timely filed.

Continue reading "What You Should Know About Property Damage Claims Under the Oil Pollution Act " »

In the aftermath of the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon and the disastrous oil spill that now encroaches on Louisiana's coastline, many individuals and business will be looking for a way to handle the massive financial burden associated with clean up and recovery. Luckily, the law provides a way for them to collect some damages.

The Oil Pollution Act

In 1989 the Exxon Valdez spilled over 11 million gallons of oil into Prince William Sound in Alaska. At the time, the U.S. did not have adequate funds to respond to the spill and only very narrow compensable damages could be recovered. The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) was passed by Congress in 1990 (33 U.S.C. 2701-2761) to address these shortcomings. The OPA created a comprehensive regime to prevent, respond to, and compensate for vessel and facility caused oil pollution. The law also provided for federal oversight of maritime oil transportation through increased environmental safeguards.

Title I of the OPA broadened the scope of damages for which polluters are liable and authorized up to $1 billion for the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF). The OSTLF can be used to pay for oil removal and damages that are left uncompensated after claims are made against the parties responsible for the spill (the limit of the fund was raised to $2.7 billion with the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005) and is funded by an oil tax. The U.S. Coast Guard administers the OSLTF through the National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC).

It is interesting to note that the OSTLF was actually created four years before the passage of the OPA in 1986. However, Congress did not authorize the use of the money in the fund or the collection of revenue necessary to maintain the OSTLF until the OPA was signed into law.

As mentioned above, under the OPA, the OSTLF can be used to pay claims for uncompensated removal cost and damages after an oil spill. In the current situation, British Petroleum (BP was leasing the Deepwater Horizon when the explosion occurred and has been deemed the responsible party) is currently accepting claims. However, if any party is not satisfied with the resolution of their claim by BP, they may make a claim under the OPA and submit a claim to the NPFC. Several different types of claims are recoverable, many of which may apply to individuals or businesses whose lives have been negatively affected.

The OSTLF can be used to make claims under a variety of parameters:
Compensate the public for the lost use of the affected natural resources.
This could entail compensation for the lost use of public lands that have been contaminated by the spill.

Pay the cost to remove, minimize, mitigate, or clean up an oil spill.
This means that if BP is unable to fully clean up the spill, the federal government has funds available to use to ensure areas are returned to pre-spill condition.

Pay the cost of economic loss that resulted from the destruction of real or personal property (although not personal injury).
Real property includes real estate and personal property includes any other property that may have been damaged in the spill.

Pay for injury or economic loss that resulted from damage to a boat.
If you own a boat that was in an affected area and is now damaged, you may be able to recover damages to repair or replace your boat.

Pay damages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of property or natural resources.
If you own a business in an affected area and the business was forced to close temporarily or permanently you may be able to recover damages for the profits that would have been earned if the oil spill did not occur.

Pay damages to anyone who has lost profits or income, regardless of whether or not they owned the damaged property.
This may apply to someone that operates a business in an affected area but does not own property (maybe the business property is leased or the business does not involve the use of property). Owning damaged property is not a prerequisite for recovering damages.

It is important for potential clients to make a claim as soon as they can so that the legal process can begin. By hiring an attorney that is advanced in matters relating to liability for industrial accidents, an affected party may have their best chance in court to get the justice they deserve.

The massive oil slick drifting ominously in the Gulf of Mexico has state officials worried for the health of Louisiana residents who live along the coast. Since April 20, when the oil rig Deepwater Horizon exploded and subsequently sank, oil has been flowing into the Gulf at a rate of up to 200,000 gallons per day. The fact that the oil has not yet reached land is largely the result of favorable winds and currents, both of which are subject to change at any moment. As of Friday afternoon, underwater robots had begun positioning a four-story tall, 100-ton box made of concrete and steel over the gushing well on the sea floor. The device will permit crews to recover most of the oil from the well, but it will not entirely stem the flow. It will also do nothing to address the oil that has already escaped and looms ever closer to the coast.

According to an AP story carried by Yahoo News on May 7, state and federal authorities are gearing up to deal with the many hazards to human health that will result if and when the oil reaches land. Officials are advising coastal residents to take precautions now. "We don't know how long this spill will last or how much oil we'll be dealing with, so there's a lot of unknowns," Dr. Jimmy Guidry, Louisiana's state health director, said. "But we're going to make things as safe as humanly possible."

Last week, in what many saw as a preview of things to come, a foul stench drifted over parts of lower Louisiana. According to Alan Levine, secretary of the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, the oil was likely to blame. Levine's office received numerous complaints, some from state legislators in New Orleans, who were more than 130 miles from the epicenter of the disaster.

According to the AP report, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has begun 24-hour air quality monitoring in coastal areas and is now posting the readings online for ozone and airborne particles like soot. These materials are irritants that can cause respiratory distress in humans, particularly those with chronic conditions such as asthma or emphysema. Also, fires being set deliberately by the Coast Guard to burn off oil on the water are producing acrid smoke that could cause problems for those who come into contact with it.

The health symptoms for exposure to the oil leak are simple and simple actions can prevent problems caused. Public health agencies are advising residents near the coast who experience nausea, headaches, burning eyes or other discomfort to remain indoors, close windows, and turn on air conditioners. People who must be outside should take care to avoid exerting themselves.

Clean drinking water and a safe seafood supply are also a concern. The Louisiana Health Department has ordered testing of municipal water systems near the Gulf for signs of oil. Some coastal cities, including New Orleans, source drinking water from the Mississippi River, which so far has shown no signs of oil contamination. Nevertheless, the Coast Guard is inspecting boat traffic on the river and will order any ships with oil-coated hulls to be scrubbed down. Health officials have pronounced fish, shrimp, oysters, and other Gulf seafood that have already made it to market safe to eat. "If we see increases in hydrocarbons or other contaminants, we'd stop the flow of seafood," Levine said. The major immediate risk from eating contaminated seafood is gastrointestinal sickness. However, given that oil contains carcinogenic compounds, officials are concerned about fish from oily waters reaching consumers.

Please return to this blog often for further health updates from state officials.

A February 1996 car accident led the First Circuit Court of Appeals of Louisiana to find that testimony indentifying an ample history of car accidents near a sharp curve in Addis, Louisiana, established that the curve had presented a problem for a significant period of time. The Court found that the testimony was sufficient to support a finding of constructive notice of a problem with the roadway to the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD). Constructive notice, one of the requirements necessary to find an entity responsible for a faulty element, is highly essential when trying to prove responsibility after an accident or incident involving injury.

Around 7:45 p.m. on the evening of the accident, Jerry Goza was traveling westbound on Louisiana Highway 989-1. While traveling, he came upon a sharp curve at the point where Highway 989-1 intersects with Highway 989-2. Goza's vehicle ran off the roadway into a cane field, eventually running into a ditch, striking a culvert, and flipping over. Goza sustained serious injuries requiring surgery and rehabilitative treatment.

Goza filed a suit for damages against the DOTD alleging that the design, construction, and signage of Highway 989-1 were defective. Following a four-day jury trial, a verdict was rendered in favor of Goza, and the DOTD was allocated twenty five percent fault. The DOTD filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The trial court granted the motion in part, amending the jury's award of damages, but maintaining the awards and fault allocations rendered by the jury. The DOTD appealed both the original jury verdict and the JNOV.

On appeal, the First Circuit provided that in order for the court to have found the DOTD liable, the plaintiff had to prove: (1) the DOTD had custody of the thing that caused the plaintiff's damages, (2) the thing was defective because it had a condition that created an unreasonable risk of harm, (3) the DOTD had actual or constructive notice of the defect and failed to take corrective measures within a reasonable time, and (4) the defect was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries. The two issues at the heart of the appeal were whether the DOTD had constructive notice of the alleged defect in the roadway and whether that alleged defect was the cause of the plaintiff's injuries.

The First Circuit provided that constructive notice is defined as the existence of facts which imply actual knowledge. This definition allows a person to infer actual knowledge on the part of a public entity when the facts demonstrate that the defective condition existed for such a period of time that the defect should have been discovered and repaired. While the DOTD cannot be required to be aware of every defect on its roadways and shoulders, neither can the DOTD escape liability by negligently failing to discover that which is easily discoverable. In this case, because the DOTD possesses records of traffic incidences and accidents, the department would have been aware that events kept happening at this intersection and should have taken action to prevent them from continuing.

Goza offered the testimony of Larry Straub, a resident who lived less than a mile from the curve. Straub testified that over the years he had seen several accidents at the intersection of the Highways and that people often asked Straub's grandfather to help pull their vehicles out of the nearby ditch. Straub also testified that he had often seen State Police investigating accidents at the intersection. In fact, he testified that despite his familiarity with the area, both he and his wife had had accidents while traveling on the sharp curve.

Goza also offered the testimony of Jason Campbell who testified that he was involved in an accident that was similar to that of the plaintiff.

The Court found that the testimony regarding the long history of accidents at the site of the curve was sufficient to support a finding of constructive notice of the roadway defect to the DOTD.

This second central issue was whether or not the alleged defect in the roadway was the cause of Goza's injuries.

As a result of the severity of the injuries sustained by Goza in the accident, he had no memory of the accident or how it occurred. However, at trial, Goza presented the testimony of John Bates, an expert in civil engineering, specializing in traffic accident reconstruction and the evaluation of highway design and maintenance, to establish that the roadway contained several defects that caused it to be unreasonably dangerous. The primary defect observed by Bates was the compound curvature of Highway 989-1 at the point where it connects with Highway 989-2, making the curve quite sharp. Bates testified that the danger presented by the curve, under the blanket of night, when Goza's accident occurred, was increased by the lack of lighting, inadequate signage altering motorists of the significant curve, an excessive speed limit, and failure to install protective barriers to keep the unwary motorist on the roadway.

The Court found that this evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defects in the roadway contributed to Goza's accident.

The Court also addressed the issue of fault comparison, and affirmed both the lower court's jury verdit, as amended by the JNOV, and its fault allocation. As a result, the DOTD was held responsible for failing to address the issue. This incident demonstrates the need not only for expert testimony in issues involving complex engineering and analysis but for careful research on the history of a locale when trying to determine culpability. Selecting attorneys with experience in these sort of incidences is essential in order to protect the injured party's interests, especially in suits against public entities like the DOTD was in this case.

A growing amount of national attention has begun to shift upon the oil spill disaster developing in the Gulf Coast. With some news sources declaring it "a disaster without precedent," the explosion and subsequent sinking of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig has led to an environmental nightmare. With thousands upon thousands of gallons of oil leaking into the Gulf, it will only be a few days before a more vivid, and scary, picture can be drawn of what Louisiana and other Gulf Coast states are facing.

The Portland Press Herald/Maine Sunday Telegraph reports

Eve, who lives on the water 20 miles east of New Orleans, said strong oil fumes were engulfing his neighborhood. "You can't breathe the air comfortably," he said. "It bites you right in the back of the throat and your eyeballs burn."

Obama administration officials fanned out across the Gulf of Mexico states pledging attention and assistance. In an already troubled economy, the oil slick threatened to damage the region's fishing and tourism industries as well as disrupt shipping along the Mississippi River.

On Friday, Louisiana's departments of Health and Hospitals and Wildlife and Fisheries announced severe restrictions on fishing and oyster harvesting east of the Mississippi River.

This synopsis accurately captures the situation New Orleans faces currently. Be it merely the fumes of spilled oil or a severe blow to the local fishing industry, the problem has finally reached the city and Louisiana at large. The longstanding effects aside, the current situation is not one any resident of the area would have ever expected a month ago and is yet another blow to a region that has faced chemical discharges and horrific hurricane damage.

More information on this issue will be posted as it becomes available.

The oil spill that occurred as a result of the explosion on the oil rig Deepwater Horizon is enormous. As oil continues to spew into the Gulf of Mexico and near the Louisiana coastline, estimates have begun that place the size of the spill at a stunning proportion.

According to the Associated Press,

A graphic posted by authorities fighting the slick shows it covering an area about 100 miles long and 45 miles across at its widest point.

And, thanks to NASA, the spill can be seen from space. As of the 27th, news reports had the spill at "48 miles long and 39 miles wide." Given that reports today have more than doubled that slick's length, it's appropriate for many to be concerned.

To put this slick's size into perspective (100 miles long and 45 miles across), consider the following:

Rhode Island is 37 miles wide and 48 miles long. This would mean the conservative numbers of 48x39 used yesterday to describe the slick would place the oil disaster as the size of the smallest state in America.

The state of Vermont is approximately 161 miles long and 80 miles wide.

Massachusetts is 183 miles wide and 113 miles long.

Connecticut has a length of 110 miles and a width of 70 miles. The oil spill, as reported today, would be roughly half the size of the state of Connecticut, a state that has a population of 3,501,252.

It's terrifying for many whose livelihood is based on industries that require a healthy Gulf Coast that a slick half the size of Connecticut could be nearing this country's biggest river mouth. Only time will tell what the ramifications will be of this disaster but information will be posted on this blog as it becomes available.

In an effort to prevent the oil leaking from the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico from reaching the Louisiana shoreline, crews are discussing burning the slick. In a complicated process intended to keep the oil from reaching the sensitive marsh coastline, officials are discussing an idea that would shift the oil to a safer location where it would then be ignited in some way and allowed to burn.

The Associated Press reports

A 500-foot boom will be used to corral several thousand gallons of the thickest oil on the surface, which will then be towed to a more remote area, set on fire, and allowed to burn for about an hour, the Coast Guard said. Such burns will continue throughout the day if they are working.

It was unclear what would be used to set the oil on fire and how far from shore it would burn. The slick was about 20 miles east of the mouth of the Mississippi River.
About 42,000 gallons of oil a day are leaking into the Gulf from the blown-out well where the Deepwater Horizon exploded and sank last week. Eleven workers are missing and presumed dead. The cause of the explosion has not been determined.

Greg Pollock, head of the oil spill division of the Texas General Land Office, which is providing equipment for crews in the Gulf, said he is not aware of a similar burn ever being done off the U.S. coast. The last time crews with his agency used fire booms to burn oil was a 1995 spill on the San Jacinto River.

Preventing the oil from reaching the coast is inherently important because of the delicate ecosystem that exists along Louisiana's Gulf shore. As the article mentions, the oil is only twenty miles from the mouth of the Mississippi River and should that toxic material become integrated with the plant and wildlife that thrive in that area the results could be catastrophic.

The burn, on the other hand, appears to be a much safer option, according to Pollock

"I would say there is little threat to the environment because it won't coat an animal, and because all the volatiles have been consumed if it gets on a shore it can be simply picked up," he said.

Authorities also said they expect no impact on sea turtles and marine mammals in the burn area.

A graphic posted by authorities fighting the slick shows it covering an area about 100 miles long and 45 miles across at its widest point.

What happens if this burn does not work is unclear but the potential harm it could cause local fisherman and businesses that operate within a clean, healthy environment is serious. The relief well that is being worked on could take months to complete while oil continues to spew into the Gulf and increasingly endanger the Gulf Coast states.

We will continue to monitor this issue and post news as it becomes available.

As reported on our sister blog, Dow Chemical has experienced another chemical leak in Southeast Louisiana. This time involving the very dangerous titanium tetrachloride. The incident has led to the evacuation of two schools and various roads while local emergency experts assess the situation.

WWL reports Scott Whelchel, emergency operation director for St. Charles Parish, as stating the situation is under control and actions being taken are out of concern and precaution.

He says out of an abundance of caution they are evacuating some homes just north of the Shell Norco facility east of Spruce Street and south of 5th Street. He says the winds are now blowing any chemical cloud over the spillway and away from homes.

Whelchel says if anyone smells a chemical odor the should call 911.

"What they would smell is a hydrochloric acid smell because that's what it actually mixes with the air, this chemical it turns into hydrochloric acid," he explained.

Two schools are in the evacuation zone. They are Norco Elementary School and Sacred Heart. Whelchel says they have relocated students who arrived early and advise parents to await further information on where to take their children, but do not bring them to the school.

This incident is sure to draw the ire of various environmental groups, including the Louisiana Bucket Brigade, at a time where claims filed against the chemical manufacturer are moving forward in response to their chemical leak in Hahnville. That incident, which the Berniard Law Firm is , dealt with the release of ethyl acrylate into the air, leading to residents ranging from Hahnville to Kenner to New Orleans experiencing a myriad of medical symptoms. For more information on that incident, feel free to check out our website Dowleak.com or read up on the circumstances surrounding the incident on our blog section dedicated to the incident, located here.

More information will be posted as it becomes available.

In the morning hours of February 10th, a big rig trying to make a U-turn outside of Emmerson's Food Mart on State Highway 57 caused a potentially dangerous oil spill. The 18-wheeler snagged the awning above the gas pumps, knocking one over. The overall damage caused by this mere snag is staggering. Approximately 150 gallons of diesel fuel spilled out onto the parking lot and ditch area of the gas station. Almost 30 gallons of super unleaded gasoline also spilled from the pumps.

Haz-mat crews spent the morning cleaning up the mess. Although no drinking water was contaminated and no roads were obstructed, the gasoline traveled downhill into a drainage ditch and small fish were killed.

Unfortunately the driver did not stop after the accident but continued onto the highway. As reported by the Shreveport Times on their website:

Surveillance video gave detectives a clear view of the truck involved. It had a red cab with a white box trailer with the words "MegaTrux" on the side. The rig sustained damage to its driver’s side, the video showed. based on that, deputies contacted the company that owns the rig to track it down. The truck was located just outside of Birmingham, Ala., and should be returned to the area later today for crime scene analysis and the arrest of the driver, whose name has not yet been released.

The Hazardous Material and Explosives Control Unit (Haz Mat) of Louisiana is required by law to respond to and investigate all chemical emergencies that occur in the state. Even though no one was injured in this spill, the fact that Haz Mat was involved shows that it could have been a very dangerous situation. Chemicals like diesel fuel and unleaded gasoline can harm land, animal life, and people. The effects of exposure to some chemicals may not surface for years.

Should claimants come forward, a variety of defendants may be named as responsible for whatever harm was caused by this spill. These can include, but would not be limited to, the owner of the truck, the trucking line (should they be merely the licensed company hiring truckers), the driver himself and others. If the awning was sagging or was a known issue to the owner of the station, they may also be named though it is unclear if this is a factor in the case.

If a chemical substance has made you sick you may have a claim for damages.

Continue reading "Haz-Mat Spill in Bossier Parish Posed Dangerous Situation " »