Articles Posted in Pain And Suffering Claims

The parties to a legal dispute, such as the payment of damages resulting from a car accident, can reach an agreement between themselves to resolve the matter and avoid litigation. This agreement, under which the parties “give and take” to arrive at a solution that is satisfactory to both, is called a compromise. Under Louisiana law, a compromise is considered a contract which must be made in writing, but there is no specific requirement as to the form. What is important is that a compromise resolves only those differences that the parties clearly intend to settle, which under general contract law requires a “meeting of the minds.”

Louisiana courts have recognized that a check can serve as a compromise if it recites that it is in full payment for all claims and the check is endorsed and deposited by the payee. But as the parties in the case American Century Casualty Company v. Sale, discovered, the courts will scrutinize a compromise based entirely on the endorsement and deposit of a check to ensure both parties’ objectives were in alignment.

On August 9, 2008, a car accident occurred between Dr. Charles F. Sale and Michelle Barett. Barrett, who was at fault, was driving a vehicle owned by her parents and insured by American Century Casualty Company (ACCC). A short time thereafter, an ACCC representative contacted Sale and discussed settlement. ACCC then mailed the following to Sale: a letter describing the steps that Sale would be required to take to resolve the claim; a settlement and release form; and a settlement check in the amount of $1,820. The enclosed letter directed Sale to sign the release and return it to ACCC, at which point ACCC would issue the settlement check. (Although the letter indicated that a settlement check would follow a “properly executed release,” ACCC erroneously mailed all three documents in the same envelope at the same time to Sale.) The front of the settlement check included the following text: “CHARLES SALE, ONLY: IN F/F SETTLMT/RELEASE OF ACCC/… BARRETT FROM ANY/ALL CLMS/LNS ON D/L 8/9/08, CLM 10995-9.” Sale, finding the amount of the settlement check insufficient, put the documents aside. Later, Sale’s wife discovered the check and deposited it without his knowledge. When Sale filed suit against Barrett and ACCC in August of 2009, ACCC filed a motion for summary judgment contending that Sale had previously compromised and released his claims against the company and Barrett by endorsing and depositing the settlement check issued to him. The trial judge granted summary judgment in ACCC’s favor and found that Sale had released all future personal injury claims. Sale appealed.

Time is of the essence when filing a claim; a person can essentially lose the case before it even begins if the claim is not filed “in time”. But the question is when is a claim “on time?” In the recent case holding of Casborn v. Curran and Northshore Regional Medical Center, the court explained that under Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5628, “no action for damages for injury or death arising out of patient care shall be brought unless filed within one year from the date of discovery of the alleged act.” What has become an issue for many to understand is from what point does the court consider a person to have “discovered” the injury or wrongful act? Exploring the cases’ analysis sheds some light on the issue and hopefully provides an answer to this dilemma.

Prescription is a legal term that is a powerful tool that many litigants utilize to dismiss a case. Specifically, prescription is defined as “the loss or forfeiture of a right, by the proprietor’s neglecting to exercise or prosecute it during the whole period, which the law hath declared to be sufficient to infer the loss of it.” The prescription clock starts ticking as soon as the person who feels they have been damaged discovers the alleged injury; if they wait too long, the time limit is up and the clock stops ticking, resulting in the loss of their claim.

In the case of Cosborn, prescription ultimately ended the case before it even began, causing the plaintiffs to be completely out of luck in obtaining any relief. Dates are extremely important when a court explores the issue of prescription, which is why the dates of the plaintiff’s alleged injury, eventual discovery, and final act of filing is vital in the analysis. The plaintiff, Mrs. Casborn, went to the Northshore Regional Medical Center on May 5, 2007, suffering from severe tongue swelling and difficulty breathing. The examining staff physician, Dr. Curran, administered the medication Benadryl —however, Mrs. Casborn continued to suffer and the symptoms actually began to grow worse. Eventually, she had to be taken into surgery and had a mechanical ventilator inserted, where it remained until May 18, 2007. In total, Mrs. Cosborn stayed in the hospital for almost an entire month, suffering from other complications including pneumonia, anemia, and acute renal problems.

Resuming where we last left off in this important case…

The court then turned to the deposition of Rigoberto Garcia, an employee of Maxum. Garcia had testified that while he was at work the day before the accident, all safety barricades were set up. He said that Maxum employees never removed the safety barricades when they worked around or passed through the holes. Instead, they would climb over or through the cables. Garcia finally stated that he left work every day at 5 p.m. The depositions of two other Maxum employees supported Garcia’s testimony. The combined testimony of these Maxum employees tended to show that the removal of the cables occurred when Maxum workers were not on site.

Finally, the court examined the testimony of Glenn Russo, an employee of Corrosion. Russo testified that his foreman, also an employee of Corrosion, had confirmed he’d been the one to place the plastic sheeting over the manhole. This admission effectively eliminated Maxum as the culprit behind the plastic sheeting that obscured the hole from Cotone’s view.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals for Louisiana released their decision in Cotone v. Corrosion Control Systems, Inc. The case highlights the importance of the plaintiff’s “divide and conquer” strategy when litigating against multiple defendants. Additionally, it illuminates the challenges defendants and plaintiffs may both face in lawsuits involving injuries occuring in settings controlled and occupied by multiple parties.

In 2006, Timothy Cotone was employed by Superior Derrick Services as a shipyard supervisor on a Lousisiana river barge. Superior was tasked with converting the barge into a drilling rig. In order to accelerate the conversion, Superior subcontracted temporary workers supplied by Maxum Industries to perform welding and fitting services. Meanwhile, Corrosion Control Systems was hired separately by the barge owner to provide sandblasting and painting services. Superior and Corrosion were separate companies otherwise unaffiliated with one another.

On November 3, 2006, Cotone stepped into an open hole on the barge and suffered injuries. Typically, the hole was barricaded by safety cables. However, when Cotone stepped into the hole, no such safety cables were in place. Furthermore, plastic had been placed over the whole, preventing Cotone from noticing the opening. Naturally, Cotone concluded that one of the other barge workers must have negligently removed the safety cables and placed the plastic over the hole. Consequently, he sued to recover for his injuries.

In June, The Louisiana Court of Appeals published their opinion for Watts V. Scottsdale Ins. Co., a case involving a trip-and-fall that occurred at a restaurant in Minden, Louisiana. In the decision, the court articulated the plaintiff’s standard for prevailing in trip-and-fall cases that occur within the state.

The facts of the case are simple enough. In this case, 82 year old plaintiff Mildred Watts tripped over a metal strip located in the path between a restaurant parking lot and front entrance. Ms. Watts contended the metal strip, due to its dark coloration, was shaded by the shrubbery around it and therefore she couldn’t see it before her resulting fall. As a consequence of her trip-and-fall, Ms. Watts sustained serious injuries to her mouth and teeth. Accordingly, Watts sued the restaurant and its liability insurance carrier on a theory of negligence.

Before ruling on the matter, the court explained that trip-and-fall negligence cases brought against merchants in Louisiana are governed by La. R.S. 9:2800.6. This statute requires a plaintiff to prove, among other elements of her claim, that (1) a condition present on the defendant’s property presented an unreasonable risk of harm and that the harm was reasonably foreseeable; (2) the defendant created the condition, or had actual or constructive notice of the condition prior to the plaintiff’s trip-and-fall; and (3) the defendant failed to excercise reasonable care. In order to win her case, the court explained that Ms. Watts must prove all three of the La. R.S. 9:3800.6 elements by a preponderance of evidence.

In Louisiana, a tort suit must be filed within a certain period of time after the incident occurs. This is called the “prescriptive period,” and serves several purposes. It puts the defendant on notice within a reasonable period of time that a plaintiff has a possible claim against him and thereby allows him to preserve evidence that may be required for trial. It also supports the state’s efforts to resolve legal disputes in a timely manner. The prescriptive period for a specific tort is set by statute. For product liability cases, the Louisiana Products Liability Act “establishes the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by their products” and creates a one-year prescriptive period for claims that “commences to run from the day injury or damage is sustained.” See LA. CIV. CODE Art. 3492.

Filing a lawsuit even one day past the expiration of the prescriptive period can prove fatal to a plaintiff’s effort. For example, Carter v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., No. 09-31134 (5th Cir. 2010) involved a plaintiff who filed her lawsuit just six days too late and was barred from recovering. On February 23, 2007, Ruth Carter of Livingston Parish used Zicam No Drip Liquid Nasal Gel Cold Remedy and immediately experienced excruciating burning pain in her nose. By the next day, she lost her sense of smell and sense of taste. The pain was so severe that Carter was unable to work and told her employer that she believed the Zicam had caused the burn when she called in sick. Carter sought medical treatment from her primary care physician who did not confirm the cause of her injury but referred her to a radiography center for further examination. During the imaging appointment on May 7, 2007, Carter told the technician about her suspicions about the Zicam. The technician responded that she had received an e-mail communication warning “to be on the lookout for [the same kind of] problem with Zicam.” Carter filed suit against Matrixx Initiatives, Inc, the maker of Zicam, on February 29, 2008 in Louisiana state court. The case was removed to federal court where the Louisiana Products Liability Act was to be applied by the court. Matrixx then filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a dismissal, arguing that because Carter’s suit was filed six days after the expiration of Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive period for product liability suits, Carter’s action should be barred. The district court granted Matrixx’s motion on this ground, and Carter appealed.

In her appeal, Carter argued that the doctrine of contra non valentem should apply. Under this doctrine, the running of the prescriptive period is suspended “until the facts necessary to state a cause of action are known or reasonably knowable to the plaintiff.” The idea is that the plaintiff is not penalized for failing to act until she has “actual or constructive notice of the [tort], the resulting injury, and the causal connection between the two or that the plaintiff’s lack of such knowledge was willful, negligent or unreasonable.” See Sharkey v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 600 So. 2d 7013 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992). In effect, Carter’s position was that not until her conversation with the radiography technician on May 7, 2007 did she become aware that the Zicam caused her injury and, accordingly, the prescriptive period should not have begun running until that date. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument. The court found that it was “apparent that Carter first sustained the injury that allegedly resulted from her use of Zicam on February 23, 2007 and that she had actual knowledge of pain and sensory loss on that same day.” The court noted that “from the very outset, Carter suspected and attributed her injury to Zicam, and she never wavered in that belief.” In the court’s view, Carter “indisputably” had both the belief that Zicam caused her injury and a reasonable basis for seeking to hold its manufacturer responsible “on February 24 at the latest.” Therefore, the prescriptive period “began running on February 23 (February 24 at the latest),” and so Carter’s filing of her lawsuit “was at least five days late.” The court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of Carter’s claims.

On May 22, 2006, Patricia Case was driving on Oday Road following a tractor driven by Barry Frederick, an employee of Burt Oubre of Burt Oubre Farms. She then decided to pass the tractor at the same time that Barry Frederick was turning left across Mrs. Case’s path. The two vehicles collided.

Following the collision, Mrs. Case “experienced back pain radiating into her legs.” Utimately, Mrs. Case received lumbar microdiskoctomy and laminectomy from Dr. Louis Blanda in 2007. Dr. Blanda testified that Mrs. Case would have some permanent restrictions on her activity level. For example, Mrs. Case was determined to not be able to participate in lifting involving objects over 50 pounds. Dr. Blanda also testified that the surgery was a minimally invasive procedure; in his opinion, Mrs. Case should be

able to return to work within limitations.

Faulty Jury Instructions in Iberville Parish Accident Result in De Novo Review by Appellate Court

On the afternoon of June 20, 2005, Jesse Brooks, an operating engineer who worked for Industrial Plant Maintenance in St. Gabriel, was driving a backhoe along the shoulder of La. Highway 30. Brooks was followed by his coworker, Steve Harris, in another vehicle. As Brooks approached a driveway that connected with the highway, the backhoe hit a depression and rolled over on its right side. Harris immediately approached the backhoe, where he found Brooks unconscious in the cab. Brooks died shortly thereafter. Brooks’s widow, Lola, filed a wrongful death action against the State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD). At trial, the jury found the DOTD negligent in maintaining the shoulder of the highway, returned a verdict for Mrs. Brooks, and awarded her approximately $812,000 in damages.

The DOTD appealed, alleging several errors on the trial court’s part. Among them was an improper jury instruction. Under Louisiana law, the trial judge is required to instruct jurors on the law applicable to the issues submitted to them to decide. La. C.C.P. Art. 1792(B). The jury charge “must correctly state the law and be based on evidence adduced at trial… Adequate jury instructions are those which fairly and reasonably point out the issues and which provide correct principles of law for the jury to apply to those issues.” LeBlanc v. Landry, 21 So.3d 353, 358-359 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2009). If the trial judge “omits an applicable, essential legal principle, [the] instruction does not adequately set forth the law applicable to the issues to be decided by the jury and may constitute reversible error” which is remedied by a de novo review of the jury’s findings by the appellate court. Leblanc, 21 So.3d at 358-359; see also Picou v. Ferrara, 483 So.2d 915 (La. 1986).

In a tort action for a car wreck, the court is authorized to award a successful plaintiff two types of damages. Special damages are intended to reimburse a plaintiff for the quantifiable costs and expenses he incurred as a result of his injuries. Medical expenses and car repair costs fall into this category. To recover special damages, the plaintiff is required to show the amounts he paid and show that they were the consequence of the accident. General damages, on the other hand,

“involve mental or physical pain and suffering, inconvenience, loss of intellectual or physical enjoyment, or other losses of lifestyle which cannot be measured exactly in monetary terms.” Robbins v. State ex rel. Dept. of Labor, 728 So. 2d 991 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1999).

Naturally, arriving at an amount for general damages is far less precise, and so Louisiana law leaves “much discretion … to the judge or jury” in setting the award amount. La. C.C.Art. 2324.1. In fact, in order for an appellate court to modify a general damages award, the trial record “must clearly reveal that the trial court abused its broad discretion in making the award, based on the facts and individual circumstances peculiar to the case under consideration.” Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So. 2d 1257 (La. 1993).

Louisiana Court Stresses Importance of Constructive Notice in Trip-And-Fall Cases

In Smithwick v. City of Farmerville, the Second Circuit Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s trip-and-fall case for failure to prove that the municipal defendant had actual or constructive notice of a shallow depression in the city-maintained right-of-way.

The plaintiff, Carol Smithwick, was waiting at a street corner in Farmerville, Louisiana for her child’s school bus to arrive. Smithwick was traversing a sidewalk, and as she stepped off the sidewalk and onto the street, she tripped on a depression in the street’s shoulder. The depression was shrouded by grasses growing around it, and the depression was not immediately visible to Ms. Smithwick at the time. Accordingly, she tripped, fell, and sustained immediate injuries that later caused reflex sympathetic dystrophy.

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