Articles Posted in Car Accident

In certain situations, car owners and their insurance companies may be liable for a death caused by a non-owner driving the car. However, that liability only arises when the car owner expressly or implicitly grants permission to the driver. A common fear for car owners is that someone borrows their car and is involved in some horrible situation. 

The Leger family found themselves in just such a nightmare situation when their car was taken from their driveway in Scott, Louisiana after midnight one summer night and involved in a fatal accident. Sanchez Walters was one of three people in that car during its fateful ride and was killed when the car was involved in a one-car accident. The Legers knew they needed the assistance of an excellent attorney when they were notified of a wrongful death lawsuit brought against them, one of the other people present in the car during the accident, and their insurance company, on behalf of Mr. Walters. Fortunately for the Legers and the other passenger, the wrongful death suit against them was dismissed before trial. The suit was maintained, however, against the insurance company, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, for insurance coverage. KC brought the lawsuit on behalf of her minor daughter, AW, contending that the car was taken that night with express or implied permission, giving rise to insurance liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm due to a lack of evidence supporting Ms. C’s claim. Ms. C subsequently appealed to the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment, similarly finding that Ms. C was unable to provide sufficient evidence to establish a factual question as to whether express or implied permission to use the car was granted.

The facts of this case are pretty sparse and that lack of concrete factual certainty led directly to Ms. Cs inability to provide enough evidence that showed that the car was taken with the owners’ express or implied consent. All that is known is that sometime in the early morning hours the Legers’ car was taken by Kylor Broussard, Nicholas Ledet, and Mr. Walters. The Legers each provided affidavits stating that they did not give express or implied permission to the three occupants to take the car. After the car was taken, it was involved in a single car accident that caused fatal injuries to Mr. Walters. Evidence could not even be supplied establishing who was driving the car at the time of the accident. Ms. C argued that Mr. Walters was a passenger in the car. She alleged that negligent entrustment by the Legers led to his death. Ms. C originally brought lawsuits against Broussard, Mr. and Mrs. Ledet on behalf of their minor son, Mr. Leger, and State Farm. Ms. C dismissed the lawsuit against Broussard and the Ledets on her own, and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Leger, dismissing all of the claims against him with prejudice due to the lack of evidence supporting negligent entrustment. That left the lawsuit against State Farm as the only remaining portion of the original lawsuit. State Farm responded by motioning for summary judgment, arguing that all of the evidence pointed to a lack of express or implied consent from the Legers allowing use of the car.  Ms. C failed to provide any exhibits of evidence to challenge the motion for summary judgment. She instead argued that Broussard’s deposition testimony and a police statement raised a genuine issue of material fact as to who the driver was at the time of the accident and whether they had permission to drive the car. The trial court agreed with State Farm that the evidence was severely lacking and granted summary judgment. Ms. C subsequently appealed only the lawsuit against State Farm to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal, however, affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of State Farm.

Is uninsured/underinsured (“UM”) coverage an automatic component of commercial auto insurance policies?  Are there instances when an insured can reject UM coverage in its entirety or select lower limits of UM coverage for a commercial auto insurance policy?  Although La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(a)(i) indicates that all auto insurance policies issued within Louisiana must include UM coverage, subsection 1295(1)(a)(iii) allows for a named insured to either reject UM coverage in its entirety or select UM coverage with lower limits.  In a recent case out of Calctsieu Parish, Louisiana, an employee learned that while his employer carried a valid commercial auto insurance policy with at the time of his accident, the employer executed a valid UM rejection form prior to the accident that remained in full effect.  

On June 21, 2013, Lonny Hayes, an employee of O’Neal’s Feeder Supply, Inc., sustained severe injuries in an automobile accident after Diana Gonzales failed to adhere to a traffic sign and collided with Mr. Hayes’ work vehicle.  Following insufficient recovery for damages from Ms. Gonzales’ insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Mr. Hayes and his wife, Melissa Hayes sued their insurer, Progressive Security Insurance Company, and O’Neal’s insurer, Penn Millers Insurance Company.  Mr. and Mrs. Hayes claimed that both policies from Progressive and Penn Millers provided UM coverage from which they could secure additional funds from to cover their damages. Penn Millers denied Mr. and Mrs. Hayes’ claims, indicating that O’Neal’s executed a UM rejection form for the commercial auto insurance policy that was in full effect on the date of Mr. Hayes’ accident.  Therefore, Penn Millers argued that there was no UM coverage available for recovery. Shortly thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Hayes filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of whether Penn Millers’ commercial auto insurance policy provided UM coverage. On January 21, 2016, the trial court granted Mr. and Mrs. Hayes’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, finding no valid UM rejection form existed for O’Neal’s commercial auto insurance policy in full effect on the date of Mr. Hayes’ accident and therefore, UM coverage was available for recovery.  

On appeal, Penn Millers asserted that the trial court erred in finding no valid UM rejection form existed for O’Neal’s commercial auto insurance policy in full effect on the date of Mr. Hayes’ accident.  Penn Millers argued that the UM rejection form executed by O’Neal’s on June 5, 2007, remained in full effect on June 21, 2013, because the same policy had been renewed annually from 2007 thru to 2013. Pursuant to La. R. S. 22:1295(1)(a)(ii), a UM rejection form that is executed by the insured or the insured’s legal representative and initially rejects UM coverage in its entirety or selects UM coverage with lower limits remains in full effective for the life of a policy, regardless of whether the policy is renewed, reinstated, substituted, or amended.  In support of this argument, Penn Millers produced seven declaration pages that corresponded to the commercial auto insurance policy initially issued to O’Neal’s in 2007 and subsequently renewed thru to 2013. Specifically, each declaration page after 2007 included the same identification number with an exception of changing the last two digits to signify the year the policy was in effect.    

It is undisputed that it is always important to obtain a good lawyer to fight for you in court. But when exactly should that representation begin?

For Bobby Clay, the answer to that question was the moment her Jeep collided with Jefferia Washington’s Mercury Grand Marquis. In the city of Monroe on November 19, 2015, Ms. Clay was backing out of her driveway and hit the passenger door of Ms. Washington’s car. In order to avoid the headache of dealing with police reports and insurance claims, Ms. Clay offered to pay for the damage to Washington’s Mercury Grand Marquis. The next day, the repairs were estimated at $2,061.32. Although Ms. Clay believed this was a very high amount for the damages, she paid the full amount just three days after the accident. 

Ms. Clay proceeded to file a lawsuit for fraud, per La. C.C. art. 1953. Ms. Washington countered with a suit of her own for defamation and harassment. Both parties appeared without lawyers and both cases were dismissed. Ms. Clay appealed, this time with representation.