In June, The Louisiana Court of Appeals published their opinion for Watts V. Scottsdale Ins. Co., a case involving a trip-and-fall that occurred at a restaurant in Minden, Louisiana. In the decision, the court articulated the plaintiff’s standard for prevailing in trip-and-fall cases that occur within the state.

The facts of the case are simple enough. In this case, 82 year old plaintiff Mildred Watts tripped over a metal strip located in the path between a restaurant parking lot and front entrance. Ms. Watts contended the metal strip, due to its dark coloration, was shaded by the shrubbery around it and therefore she couldn’t see it before her resulting fall. As a consequence of her trip-and-fall, Ms. Watts sustained serious injuries to her mouth and teeth. Accordingly, Watts sued the restaurant and its liability insurance carrier on a theory of negligence.

Before ruling on the matter, the court explained that trip-and-fall negligence cases brought against merchants in Louisiana are governed by La. R.S. 9:2800.6. This statute requires a plaintiff to prove, among other elements of her claim, that (1) a condition present on the defendant’s property presented an unreasonable risk of harm and that the harm was reasonably foreseeable; (2) the defendant created the condition, or had actual or constructive notice of the condition prior to the plaintiff’s trip-and-fall; and (3) the defendant failed to excercise reasonable care. In order to win her case, the court explained that Ms. Watts must prove all three of the La. R.S. 9:3800.6 elements by a preponderance of evidence.

West Monroe, a city of some fifteen thousand people, has seen an increase in the number of collisions between trains and cars over the last two years. One person has been killed and four injured in such accidents, three of which occurred in 2010 and two of which occurred at the Plum Street railroad crossing.

The City of West Monroe, the Department of Transportation and Development (DODT), and the Kansas City Southern Railroad Company are responsible for maintaining these railroad crossings. As a result of the increase in accidents, they have collectively decided to close two railroad crossings, at South Second and Plum Street. Although they initially planned to close the Trenton Street Underpass, the city decided to keep it open due to the inconvenience to traffic.

In addition to closing two intersections, the city and railroad company plan to upgrade all other railroad crossings within city limits. These upgrades will consist of adding new warning devices and cutting back any vegetation that might obscure drivers’ views. They might also involve lowering the speed of passing trains and increasing the trains’ use of their horns.

In Louisiana, a tort suit must be filed within a certain period of time after the incident occurs. This is called the “prescriptive period,” and serves several purposes. It puts the defendant on notice within a reasonable period of time that a plaintiff has a possible claim against him and thereby allows him to preserve evidence that may be required for trial. It also supports the state’s efforts to resolve legal disputes in a timely manner. The prescriptive period for a specific tort is set by statute. For product liability cases, the Louisiana Products Liability Act “establishes the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by their products” and creates a one-year prescriptive period for claims that “commences to run from the day injury or damage is sustained.” See LA. CIV. CODE Art. 3492.

Filing a lawsuit even one day past the expiration of the prescriptive period can prove fatal to a plaintiff’s effort. For example, Carter v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., No. 09-31134 (5th Cir. 2010) involved a plaintiff who filed her lawsuit just six days too late and was barred from recovering. On February 23, 2007, Ruth Carter of Livingston Parish used Zicam No Drip Liquid Nasal Gel Cold Remedy and immediately experienced excruciating burning pain in her nose. By the next day, she lost her sense of smell and sense of taste. The pain was so severe that Carter was unable to work and told her employer that she believed the Zicam had caused the burn when she called in sick. Carter sought medical treatment from her primary care physician who did not confirm the cause of her injury but referred her to a radiography center for further examination. During the imaging appointment on May 7, 2007, Carter told the technician about her suspicions about the Zicam. The technician responded that she had received an e-mail communication warning “to be on the lookout for [the same kind of] problem with Zicam.” Carter filed suit against Matrixx Initiatives, Inc, the maker of Zicam, on February 29, 2008 in Louisiana state court. The case was removed to federal court where the Louisiana Products Liability Act was to be applied by the court. Matrixx then filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a dismissal, arguing that because Carter’s suit was filed six days after the expiration of Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive period for product liability suits, Carter’s action should be barred. The district court granted Matrixx’s motion on this ground, and Carter appealed.

In her appeal, Carter argued that the doctrine of contra non valentem should apply. Under this doctrine, the running of the prescriptive period is suspended “until the facts necessary to state a cause of action are known or reasonably knowable to the plaintiff.” The idea is that the plaintiff is not penalized for failing to act until she has “actual or constructive notice of the [tort], the resulting injury, and the causal connection between the two or that the plaintiff’s lack of such knowledge was willful, negligent or unreasonable.” See Sharkey v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 600 So. 2d 7013 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992). In effect, Carter’s position was that not until her conversation with the radiography technician on May 7, 2007 did she become aware that the Zicam caused her injury and, accordingly, the prescriptive period should not have begun running until that date. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument. The court found that it was “apparent that Carter first sustained the injury that allegedly resulted from her use of Zicam on February 23, 2007 and that she had actual knowledge of pain and sensory loss on that same day.” The court noted that “from the very outset, Carter suspected and attributed her injury to Zicam, and she never wavered in that belief.” In the court’s view, Carter “indisputably” had both the belief that Zicam caused her injury and a reasonable basis for seeking to hold its manufacturer responsible “on February 24 at the latest.” Therefore, the prescriptive period “began running on February 23 (February 24 at the latest),” and so Carter’s filing of her lawsuit “was at least five days late.” The court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of Carter’s claims.

The legal concept of a statute of limitations is a fixed period of time within which a lawsuit must be commenced. Under Louisiana law, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action is one year. Thus, the injured victim must commence a lawsuit within one year from the date of injury. Once the one year period runs out, the opposing party could raises it as a defense to dismiss the case unless a legal exception applies.

Typically in a personal injury case involving joint tortfeasors, filing suit against one alleged tortfeasor is a way to interrupt the statute of limitation against all other joint tortfeasors. However, per the ruling in Galling, “where no liability is found on the part

of a timely sued alleged tortfeasor, then prescription is not interrupted as to untimely sued torfeasors, as no joint or solidary obligation exists.” Moreover, according

On May 22, 2006, Patricia Case was driving on Oday Road following a tractor driven by Barry Frederick, an employee of Burt Oubre of Burt Oubre Farms. She then decided to pass the tractor at the same time that Barry Frederick was turning left across Mrs. Case’s path. The two vehicles collided.

Following the collision, Mrs. Case “experienced back pain radiating into her legs.” Utimately, Mrs. Case received lumbar microdiskoctomy and laminectomy from Dr. Louis Blanda in 2007. Dr. Blanda testified that Mrs. Case would have some permanent restrictions on her activity level. For example, Mrs. Case was determined to not be able to participate in lifting involving objects over 50 pounds. Dr. Blanda also testified that the surgery was a minimally invasive procedure; in his opinion, Mrs. Case should be

able to return to work within limitations.

The Environmental Protection Agency can attempt to phase out chemicals which are “unsafe” under the Toxic Substances Control Act (abbreviated TSCA and pronounced “ToSCA”). TSCA is a complete failure of a statute and hardly regulates anything. Unlike its counterpart in the European Union, TSCA does not require every chemical manufacturer to report on its chemicals before being granted market access. Rather, TSCA blacklists a handful of chemicals and companies have to report anything that is chemically similar. If a company makes something that is tremendously dangerous but not chemically similar to something already on a TSCA blacklist, TSCA does not apply.

TSCA may be supplemented soon with Senator Lautenberg’s Safe Chemicals Act. Doing so would no doubt be a great victory for environmentalists as it would replace TSCA with something which might actually work. The Safe Chemicals Act is taking aim at a number of problems that TSCA has been unable to address, foremost above them, asbesdos. The question, however, of what is and is not reasonably “safe” remains.

Historically asbestos was considered to be useful material in its day. Its strength makes it a great cement additive; what’s more, its resistance to heat makes it excellent for brake pads, building insulation, and flame retardant.

Faulty Jury Instructions in Iberville Parish Accident Result in De Novo Review by Appellate Court

On the afternoon of June 20, 2005, Jesse Brooks, an operating engineer who worked for Industrial Plant Maintenance in St. Gabriel, was driving a backhoe along the shoulder of La. Highway 30. Brooks was followed by his coworker, Steve Harris, in another vehicle. As Brooks approached a driveway that connected with the highway, the backhoe hit a depression and rolled over on its right side. Harris immediately approached the backhoe, where he found Brooks unconscious in the cab. Brooks died shortly thereafter. Brooks’s widow, Lola, filed a wrongful death action against the State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD). At trial, the jury found the DOTD negligent in maintaining the shoulder of the highway, returned a verdict for Mrs. Brooks, and awarded her approximately $812,000 in damages.

The DOTD appealed, alleging several errors on the trial court’s part. Among them was an improper jury instruction. Under Louisiana law, the trial judge is required to instruct jurors on the law applicable to the issues submitted to them to decide. La. C.C.P. Art. 1792(B). The jury charge “must correctly state the law and be based on evidence adduced at trial… Adequate jury instructions are those which fairly and reasonably point out the issues and which provide correct principles of law for the jury to apply to those issues.” LeBlanc v. Landry, 21 So.3d 353, 358-359 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2009). If the trial judge “omits an applicable, essential legal principle, [the] instruction does not adequately set forth the law applicable to the issues to be decided by the jury and may constitute reversible error” which is remedied by a de novo review of the jury’s findings by the appellate court. Leblanc, 21 So.3d at 358-359; see also Picou v. Ferrara, 483 So.2d 915 (La. 1986).

In a tort action for a car wreck, the court is authorized to award a successful plaintiff two types of damages. Special damages are intended to reimburse a plaintiff for the quantifiable costs and expenses he incurred as a result of his injuries. Medical expenses and car repair costs fall into this category. To recover special damages, the plaintiff is required to show the amounts he paid and show that they were the consequence of the accident. General damages, on the other hand,

“involve mental or physical pain and suffering, inconvenience, loss of intellectual or physical enjoyment, or other losses of lifestyle which cannot be measured exactly in monetary terms.” Robbins v. State ex rel. Dept. of Labor, 728 So. 2d 991 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1999).

Naturally, arriving at an amount for general damages is far less precise, and so Louisiana law leaves “much discretion … to the judge or jury” in setting the award amount. La. C.C.Art. 2324.1. In fact, in order for an appellate court to modify a general damages award, the trial record “must clearly reveal that the trial court abused its broad discretion in making the award, based on the facts and individual circumstances peculiar to the case under consideration.” Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So. 2d 1257 (La. 1993).

Louisiana Court Stresses Importance of Constructive Notice in Trip-And-Fall Cases

In Smithwick v. City of Farmerville, the Second Circuit Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s trip-and-fall case for failure to prove that the municipal defendant had actual or constructive notice of a shallow depression in the city-maintained right-of-way.

The plaintiff, Carol Smithwick, was waiting at a street corner in Farmerville, Louisiana for her child’s school bus to arrive. Smithwick was traversing a sidewalk, and as she stepped off the sidewalk and onto the street, she tripped on a depression in the street’s shoulder. The depression was shrouded by grasses growing around it, and the depression was not immediately visible to Ms. Smithwick at the time. Accordingly, she tripped, fell, and sustained immediate injuries that later caused reflex sympathetic dystrophy.

When hurt, many people begin stressing over who to hire to represent their interests. There are thousands of lawyers offering their services and one case, in particular, is a helpful guide to understanding how important picking the right one is. In Horton v. Beck Partners, L.L.C., the claims of a psychiatric patient, Denise Horton, were dismissed because she did not first submit her claims to a medical review panel. In fact, Horton did not characterize her claims as medical malpractice and thereby appealed the decision. Rather, Horton sued for general negligence which is a cause of action under general tort law.

However, the court determined the case did fall under the scope of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act, hereinafter ‘Malpractice Act’, which allowed the defendant physician to invoke an ‘exception of prematurity.’ This exception is a procedural mechanism utilized by healthcare providers in the event medical malpractice claims are not first presented to a medical review panel. To elaborate, if a healthcare provider is sued and an action commenced in a court of law, this exception will be maintained and the lawsuit dismissed if the plaintiff fails to first present the claims to a medical review panel.

This outcome is dictated by the Malpractice Act which states that a medical review panel must first review any and all claims against healthcare providers before any action is taken through a court of law.  Consequently, in Horton v. Beck Partners, L.L.C., both the trial court and the court of appeals maintained the physician’s exception of prematurity, since a medical review panel was not first consulted, and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims.

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