Articles Posted in Civil Matter

paper-family-1186206-1024x676Summary judgment is a legal standard many courts use when there are not enough facts in dispute to even proceed with a lawsuit. When applicable, this is a good strategy for a defense attorney to use because it purges claims that have no merit, saving time and money. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal demonstrated this principle within the context of an employment discrimination lawsuit. The following case demonstrates how an employer can use the Courts to deny a Family Medical Leave Act Claim.

Michelle Calderone was an employee of TARC in Hammond, Louisiana. While she was employed, Calderone was involved in a car accident where she was initially diagnosed with a chip fracture to her ankle. Nine days after the accident, she returned to work. About a month later, Calderone was further diagnosed with a crack in her sternum and was instructed to remain on bed rest. TARC’s CEO, Kathleen Abels, gave Calderone permission to work from home. A month later, Calderone proposed splitting up her time equally at home and at work, and Abels agreed. Calderone submitted a doctor’s note allowing her to work the split schedule, which specified no lifting, climbing, or travel and warned of the injury’s existence for 6 months or more. After the split schedule began, Abels gave Calderone a document that characterized her split schedule as temporary and only in effect until March 31, 2012. She did not sign the document, but she submitted a written response opposing some aspects of the document, such as her disability characterization, the revocation of the split schedule, and the failure to inform her of FMLA rights. Abels denied Calderone request.

After Calderone’s doctor gave the release, Calderone returned to a full-time schedule. Calderone did not request any leave thereafter or object to resuming her split schedule. Seven months after returning to a full-time schedule, Calderone resigned stating that she cannot successfully complete her duties under Abels’ management but failed to mention any issues regarding her leave, injuries from the car accident, or timing of her return to work from those injuries.

to-sign-a-contract-2-1236630-1-1024x683Final judgments are usually final. However, not all civil judgments are actually final. In a legal malpractice lawsuit, the plaintiff can attempt to seek relief from a final judgment. However, this remedy is only available under a narrow set of circumstances where the losing party may request the court to reopen an otherwise final judgment.

Ms. Narissa Bradford hired certain attorneys (collectively as “GHW”) to represent her in an Italian civil suit. After the suit was unsuccessful, Bradford sued GHW alleging legal malpractice during the course of their representation. The Eastern District Court of Louisiana granted GHW’s motion for summary judgment. A motion for summary judgment asks the district court to decide a case prior to it going to trial if no material facts are in dispute La. C.C.P. art. 966. Bradford’s claims were dismissed with prejudice, meaning she was prohibited from suing under the same claims in the future. On May 15, 2015, Bradford filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion seeking relief from an earlier judgment, but the district court denied the motion. Bradford, disagreeing with the district court’s ruling, timely appealed. 

The district court has the discretion to grant or deny relief under FRCP 60(b) and will only be reversed for abuse of discretion. Bradford argued that the district court abused its discretion by denying her relief on the grounds of newly discovered evidence, fraud, and other reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2)-(3), (6) On the ground of newly discovered evidence, Bradford must show that she exercised due diligence in obtaining the information at the time of trial and that evidence is controlling enough to have clearly produced a different result if presented before the original judgment. Johnson Waste Materials v. Marshall, 611 F.2d 593, 597 (5th Cir. 1980). Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 639 (5th Cir. 2005). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s granting of summary judgment, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion on three grounds.

school-yard-1550938-1024x682When someone reports misconduct, they might expect the wrongdoer to be reprimanded. They don’t generally expect to be punished themselves. That’s why Ronald Bias at Amite High School was not happy when he was retaliated against after reporting a colleague’s misconduct.  

Mr. Bias was a senior Marine Corps instructor for the Tangipahoa Parish School Board’s junior ROTC program. When he overheard that fellow ROTC instructor Carl Foster was misusing funds to pay for a non-ROTC cross-country team trip in September 2009, he promptly reported it to the school’s principal. The principal approved the funding anyway. Mr. Bias reported a second misappropriation of funds in April 2010, which also had the principal’s stamp of approval.

During the same time period, Mr. Bias claimed that his colleague, Mr. Foster, though subordinate to Bias, worked with the principal, Michael Stant, to undermine Bias in his ability to perform his job duties. Together, they harassed and spread rumors about him in retaliation for his reporting of misappropriation. After Bias reported the second misappropriation of funds, he alleges that the two men convinced the Marine Corps to transfer him to another high school an hour away. He claimed this would have a negative impact on his career and place a strain on his family, so he decided to retire from the Marine Corps.

retro-clock-1422611-1024x919Generally, citizens are not held to criminal standards that do not yet exist. When a citizen takes action, he or she is held to the criminal standards in place at the time of the act. To retroactively apply criminal laws is impermissible because that application tends to violate principles of fairness and due process.

In one case out of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana, the issue was whether the Sledge Jeansonne Louisiana Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (“Sledge Act”) and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act (“LUTPA”) could be applied retroactively to a defendant’s misconduct occurring before the statutes were effective.

The State of Louisiana argues that the principles of fairness and due process would not be violated here because Sledge does not target the underlying conduct but instead is triggered by the entering of a guilty plea. Further, the State argues that civil penalties sought under LUTPA were similarly permissible.

65-Email-3_13_19-1024x683A common litigation tactic for plaintiffs is to bring cases in federal court to obtain greater damage awards. However, a plaintiff must have a viable claim under federal law or their case will be dismissed by the federal district court for lack of jurisdiction.

Following a car accident in which Cheryl Price was hospitalized with injuries, she hired attorney ES to represent her. ES secured a settlement for approximately $4,000 from the at-fault driver’s insurance company, the check for which ES deposited into his firm’s trust account. A lien placed by the hospital prevented ES from immediate disbursement of the money to Price. ES stated that the check included “Medicaid Recovery” as a payee, and told Price that he could not release the money until the lien issue was resolved. Price filed a complaint against ES with the Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board who conducted an investigation and concluded that no disciplinary action was warranted. ES’s firm eventually endorsed the check and released the money to Price.

Price then filed a pro se motion against ES, the Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board, the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, and the Louisiana Office of Risk Management claiming violations of due process under the 14th Amendment, violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and violations of state law. Price sought compensatory and punitive damages. All defendants moved to dismiss her claims.

agreement-blur-business-261621-1024x768Louisiana citizens interact with contract law every day, in many cases without even realizing it. Whether buying groceries at a supermarket with a credit card or installing a new iPhone app, countless purchases are governed by consumer agreements. What may be even less known to purchasers is that many of these agreements include an arbitration clause, which provides that any disputes arising out of that agreement must be handled by an arbitrator rather than a court. Arbitration is a form of “alternative dispute resolution” in which an arbitrator — typically a certified attorney —  evaluates the parties’ claims and renders a binding decision as to who should prevail. In general, companies prefer arbitration because it costs less than litigation. But because the rules of arbitration can vary significantly from the rules of court, the consumer does not always benefit from being kept away from the courthouse. The validity of arbitration clauses is a common point of contention. Although Louisiana generally favors arbitration, the legislature has enacted the Louisiana Arbitration Act (“LLA”) (see La. R.S. 9:4201) to ensure that arbitration proceeds fairly.

Arbitration is also common in commercial agreements. In 2013, a sales representative of UniFirst Corporation (“UniFirst”) approached the shop foreman at the Homer, Louisiana location of Fluid Disposal Specialties, Inc. (“FDS”). The shop foreman’s job title was Manager of Transportation Logistics. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss FDS’s entering into a contract with UniFirst to provide uniforms to FDS employees. After nearly six months of negotiation, a price was agreed upon and the FDS shop foreman executed a contract with UniFirst. The contract contained an arbitration clause. Later, FDS attempted to void the contract, citing that the shop foreman did not have the authority to bind the company. Unifirst argued that, based on the arbitration clause in the agreement, the matter should be settled by an arbitrator. FDS, preferring to avail itself of the court, argued that because the contract itself was invalid, any clauses within it — including the arbitration clause — could not be valid either.

The case eventually made its way to Louisiana’s Second Circuit Court of Appeal, which applied a two-step analysis commonly relied upon by the courts. The first step is to determine whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties; the second is to determine whether the dispute in question falls within the scope of that arbitration agreement. In applying the first step, the Court determined that the agreement was invalid because the FDS shop foreman lacked the authority to enter into a contract with UniFirst. In response to UniFirst’s argument that the foreman had apparent authority, a doctrine in which an innocent third party (Unifirst) could rely on the representations of an agent (the FDS shop foreman) when entering an agreement (see American Zurich Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 850 So. 1112 (La. Ct. App. 2003)), the Court found that both the shop foreman’s job title and the six-month negotiation period should have indicated to UniFirst that the foreman was not in a position to enter into a contract for uniform services. For these reasons, the Court found that no agreement existed between the parties and therefore there was no need to apply the second step of the analysis. Arbitration cannot be compelled under an agreement that never came into being. The Court went on to note, however, that UniFirst could still proceed against FDS for any obligation or damages arising from FDS’s use of the uniforms that UniFirst provided the shop.

competition-1024x683A non-compete clause is a common feature in many employment agreements in Louisiana. The clause is a way for an employer to restrict an employee from going to work for a competitor and thus potentially harming the original employer. Most non-compete clauses, in order to be enforceable, must contain some limitation as to time and geographical location.

Katie Urban-Kingston was hired by Billedeaux Hearing Center (“Billedeaux”) in Lafayette in May of 2014. Urban-Kingston and Billedeaux entered into an employment agreement containing a non-compete clause that applied to certain areas of Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, and Mississippi, and allowed for the collection of any costs incurred by Billedeaux for legal enforcement of the clause. Less than a year later, Urban-Kingston left Billedeaux and became employed by Williamson Hearing Center (“Williamson”), just outside of Baton Rouge. Billedeaux sought and was granted a temporary restraining order in February 2015 to enjoin Urban-Kingston from working for Williamson, and a show-cause hearing for a preliminary injunction was set for early March.

At the hearing, the parties stipulated that Urban-Kingston was trained by Billedeaux, that she left Billedeaux’s employ and worked for Williamson at the time of the trial, and that Williamson is in direct competition with Billedeaux. Urban-Kingston claimed as a defense against the issuance of a preliminary injunction, however, that the non-compete clause in her employment agreement with Billedeaux was too broad. The trial court determined that the only issue to decide based on Urban-Kingston’s defense was whether the two hearing centers were actually in competition. But since the parties had already stipulated that point, the court rejected the defense, issued the preliminary injunction in Billedeaux’s favor, and ordered Urban-Kingston to pay Billedeaux’s attorney fees of approximately $6,000.

back-to-school-1416942-1024x681People seek assistance from the courts for a number of reasons. Some may demand a monetary payment after suffering a loss due to another’s wrongful conduct. Others may aim to prevent harm resulting from the wrongful conduct of another by petitioning the court for protective action. In Louisiana, a court has several ways to prevent harm. One way is the injunction, a court order requiring a person or entity to act in a certain way or to avoid specified conduct. This is generally in the form of a permanent injunction, issued after a formal trial. However, before or during such a trial, the court may hold a hearing to consider a preliminary injunction, which acts to achieve the petitioner’s objective temporarily, until a full judgment can be made. Another way is a temporary restraining order. This order is similar to a preliminary injunction but is utilized in emergency situations where the delay due to a hearing could result in irreparable harm to the petitioner.      

Michael Delesdernier and Cedric Floyd were both elected to membership of the Jefferson Parish School Board in 2014. At a meeting of the board in July of 2014, the school board’s attorney offered a legal opinion on a matter before the board. Apparently disagreeing with the attorney’s statement, Floyd responded in an aggressive manner using strong words. Delesdernier advised Floyd to calm down, which suggestion Floyd did not well. Floyd began yelling and shoved Delesdernier against the wall. Multiple board members intervened to separate Floyd from Delesdernier, who did not fight back. Following this altercation, Delesdernier filed a petition for an injunction and temporary restraining order from the Jefferson district court.  He asked the court to prevent Floyd from coming within three feet of him and to order him not to threaten or intimidate him. In the interval before the preliminary injunction hearing, the district court issued multiple temporary restraining orders, which Floyd opposed. In October of 2014, the district court conducted a hearing to consider issuing a preliminary injunction. After considering the testimony of eyewitnesses to the altercation, the court dismissed Floyd’s motion opposing the temporary restraining order and issued the preliminary injunction. Floyd appealed this decision to Louisiana’s Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal.

Under Louisiana law, a party cannot appeal a decision involving a temporary restraining order. La. C.C.P. art. 3612.  However, a preliminary injunction is subject to appellate review. For an injunction to be issued by the court, the petitioner must prove that without it, he would be irreparably harmed. La. C.C.P. art. 3601(A).  Irreparable harm is an injury or loss that a money judgment would not remedy. However, there is an exception to the requirement of irreparable harm:  if the petitioner can show that the conduct he seeks to prevent is unlawful, then he no longer must prove irreparable harm. Jurisich v. Jenkins, 749 So.2d 597 (La. 1999). Here, Floyd’s threatening and violent conduct during the school board altercation would be considered unlawful assault under Louisiana law. La. R.S. 14:36. The same unlawful conduct is what Floyd sought to prevent through his petition. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court had acted properly in granting the preliminary injunction, and affirmed the judgment.

tax-1501475-1-1024x768The old saying goes:  nothing is certain but death and taxes. In the case of property taxes on real, or immovable, property, failure of payment can permit the sheriff of the parish in which the property is located to hold a “tax sale.” In a tax sale, the delinquent property taxes are paid out of the proceeds of the property’s sale. Removing a homeowner from his residence in order to pay overdue taxes is a very serious and potentially damaging action — both financially and emotionally — for the homeowner. For this reason, under Louisiana law, property owners who lose their homes due to a tax sale have options for reclaiming their property after a tax sale if they can obtain sufficient funds to make good on what they owe. This process is known as redemption of the property. If redemption is not feasible, a homeowner can still seek an annulment of the tax sale if certain conditions are met. A case that came before Louisiana’s Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal illustrates how these procedures operate.

Mark Manganello owned a condominium on Avant Garde Circle in Kenner, Louisiana. He failed to pay property taxes for the condo in 2009. In April 2010, the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office notified Manganello of his property tax delinquency by certified mail. Two months later, the Sheriff’s Office advertised a tax sale of the property, and the property was purchased by Virtocon Financial Services. A Tax Sale Certificate in favor of Virtocon was recorded in the immovable property records of Jefferson Parish. Virtocon subsequently assigned its rights to the Tax Sale Certificate to Philnola, LLC.

Four years later, Philnola filed a lawsuit against Manganello to confirm the tax title of the property. Philnola asserted that Manganello was properly notified of the tax sale, but that he neither paid the taxes due nor redeemed the property within the three year period provided by Louisiana law. Phinola’s motion for summary judgment was denied by the trial court, however, because the court found genuine issues of material fact existed in relation to whether Mangenello sought redemption of the property. Then Phinola filed a second motion for summary judgment, arguing that Manganello failed to begin a proceeding to annul the tax sale within the six-month service notice of sale as required by Article 7 of the State Constitution. Philnola argued that because Manganello failed to seek an annulment of the tax sale, the property should belong to Phinola. Manganello argued that because the 2009 taxes had either been paid or because he had begun the redemption process within the statutory redemption period, there was no reason to seek an annulment of the tax sale. The trial court granted the second motion for summary judgment and confirmed Philnola’s tax title to the property. Manganello appealed to the Fifth Circuit.

court-fez-morocco-1235115-1024x768In order to prevail in a lawsuit, the plaintiff must have a “cause of action,” which is a theory of law supported by facts that the court can recognize as a path to providing the plaintiff a remedy.  At trial, a defendant may raise a peremptory exception — essentially an argument that the court cannot help the plaintiff with his or her problem — if the plaintiff’s petition does not allege facts that support the cause of action.  

In March of 2005, John Rombach resigned from his position in Baton Rouge as fiscal officer for the State of Louisiana. Rombach’s job was to analyze the financial effects of proposed legislation on the government, including tax revenue. He claimed that he was so good at his work that he made enemies of some of the officials whose legislation he recommended be rejected due to their high cost. He further claimed that these opponents attempted to have him removed from office on the basis of supposed inappropriate payments he made to himself.

Rombach found himself before the Louisiana Board of Ethics in 2010. After the Board of Ethics ultimately dismissed all complaints against Rombach, he filed a lawsuit for defamation, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process against the “opponent” state officials who he believed filed the ethics complaints that led to the Board’s investigation. The defendants filed peremptory exceptions, claiming that the facts alleged by Rombach did not support a theory of law that would permit the court to award Rombach damages. Though the trial court denied these peremptory objections, it nevertheless dismissed the case. Rombach appealed to Louisiana’s First Circuit Court of Appeal.

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