Usually when you hear the phrase “adverse employment action,” it brings to mind actions such as being demoted or fired. However, under certain circumstances, it can extend to more unique actions. This includes refusing to accept an employee’s rescission of resignation.
Tyrikia Porter worked at the Houma Terrebonne Housing Authority (“HTHA”) in Louisiana since 2001. In 2006, HTHA hired a new executive director, who made regular comments about her appearance, as well as other sexual comments. In June 2012, Porter resigned, intending for her resignation to take effect in August 2012. The Executive Director approved her request to extend her resignation by a month. During the period between when Porter offered her resignation and when she stopped working, she testified against the Executive Director, alleging sexual harassment. Other superiors urged Porter to rescind her resignation. When Porter notified HTHA that she was rescinding her resignation, the Executive Director rejected the rescission. Although Porter intended to leave when she submitted her resignation, she knew other employees had been allowed to rescind their resignations. Porter believed that her rescission was not accepted because she had testified against the Executive Director at the hearing.
Porter filed claims in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana under Title VII and state law for retaliatory discharge and sexual harassment/hostile work environment. In order to establish a prima facie retaliation case, Porter had to show the three relevant factors outlined in the following case: See Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir. 2012).Louisiana courts have generally not considered rescission as an adverse employment action in retaliation cases. However, in Burlington Northern, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that “adverse employment actions” could extend beyond workplace or employment related retaliatory acts. In determining whether an action is an adverse employment action, courts look at the circumstances and whether the act was harmful to the point that it might “dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” See Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006).