Articles Posted in Wrongful Death

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23-Email-04-02-19-pictureA wrongful death action lawsuit can be difficult for an individual to have to deal with. But what happens when a clerk that stamps the lawsuit stamps a date that does not exist? What do you do when the Clerk makes this error? The Third Circuit Court of Appeal for Louisiana recently addressed the issue.

Linda Roberts (“Linda”) was diagnosed with bronchiolitis obliterans organizing pneumonia and passed away on July 28th, 2009. Linda’s son, Jeffrey Buelow, (“Jeffrey”) filed a wrongful death lawsuit on August 2nd, 2010, against his stepfather, Donald Roberts (“Donald”). The stamp on the lawsuit showed “10 JUL 33 A:40” and the Clerk wrote “Aug 2” above the stamp. Jeffrey alleged in his lawsuit that Donald wrongfully signed a consent form to withdraw Linda’s life support while under the influence of alcohol because BOOP could have still been cured. In response to the wrongful death suit, Donald filed a peremptory exception of prescription and a document that provided when Linda passed away. A peremptory exception of prescription is a defense by the defendant that the plaintiff’s lawsuit is barred by not being filed within the prescribed period of time. The provided that Linda passed away on July 28th, 2009, and not July 28th, 2010, as Jeffrey stated in his lawsuit. Jeffrey confirmed in his testimony that Linda did in fact pass away on July 28th, 2009, and evidence in form of a certificate of death verified such. Jeffrey then opted to represent himself at trial and argued that the wrongful death lawsuit should have been carried out because tort lawsuits are subject to a prescription of one year from the day that injury or damage occurs. La. C.C. art. 3492. Jeffrey alleged that the wrongful death lawsuit was faxed by his former attorney before July 28th, 2010 but failed to provide any evidence that demonstrated such. The Ninth Judicial District Court granted Donald’s peremptory exception of prescription because Jeffrey failed to file his lawsuit within one year from when Linda passed away. Jeffrey appealed the decision of the District Court.

On appeal, Jeffrey argued that the District Court erred in dismissing his claim his claim based on the evidence that was presented. For prescriptive periods that are one year or more, expiration of the prescription accrues on the day of the last year in which the date of the alleged wrongful death occurred. La. C.C. art. 3456. The Court of Appeal determined that the prescriptive date was July 29th, 2010, pursuant to La. C.C. art. 3456. The Court of Appeal noted that an employee from the clerk’s office obviously had failed to change the date on the stamp, as the non-existing date of July 33rd would have correctly been August 2nd. The Court of Appeal affirmed the District Court’s decision to dismiss Jeffrey’s claim due to the basis of prescription. The Court of Appeal came to this decision because the record from the District Court showed that the date of the filing was August 2nd, 2010 and Jeffrey failed to produce any letter from his previous counsel or a check paid for the filing fee that would have shown that the wrongful death lawsuit was filed within one year from the date that Linda passed away. This case demonstrates the importance of filing lawsuits in a timely manner.

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39-Email-04-02-19-picture-1024x683The death of a loved one is always a traumatic experience for family and friends, especially if the death could have been prevented or is at the fault of the hospital. When someone feels as if medical malpractice has occurred, Louisiana has strict guidelines regarding filing a medical malpractice lawsuit and someone unfamiliar with the legal process can easily be confused or frustrated by this complex process. For example, in Louisiana you have one year following a death to file a medical malpractice suit, however, is that filing due at by the close of business at the one year or is the filing due by midnight? The Louisiana Supreme Court recently consolidated two cases that answered such questions on when you have to file a medical malpractice lawsuit. 

The facts of these two cases are similar, which is exactly why the Louisiana Supreme Court decided to consolidate these cases. In the case of Rose Tillman, who sadly passed away on May 22, 2012, her surviving children’s request for a medical malpractice claim was sent to the Louisiana Division of Administration (DOA) on May 22, 2013 after 5 pm, after the DOA office had closed. As a result, the  DOA’s filing system received the request on the following business day, May 23. In the case of Peighton Miller she received a shoulder injury on April 4, 2012 while in the care of a hospital. Again, a malpractice claim was sent to the DOA on April 4, 2013 after the DOA’s 5pm closure. The facts in these cases are undisputed, and at trial, the 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson court ruled in favor of Tillman, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Peighton Miller.

In response, Tulane Lakeside Hospital and Durga Ram Sure (the plaintiffs) appealed the decision. Per  La. C.C. art. 3492, defendants have one year to file a malpractice claim and that is one-year prescription begins the day the injury was received. In addition, La. R.S. 9:5628 describes how actions against healthcare providers must commence within 1 year of the sustainment or the discovery of the injury. Moreover, Section 1231.8(a)(2)(b) of the Medical Malpractice Act states how the request for a malpractice review “shall be deemed filed on the date of receipt of the request stamped and certified by the division of administration.” On appeal, the plaintiffs insisted the statute was too vague because it was the DOA’s understanding that a malpractice claim has not been received until it had been “stamped and certified,” which happens during the business day meaning any documents received after 5pm have technically not been received by the DOA until the following business day. However, according to La. C.C. art. 12 when the words of a law are ambiguous or confusing, the words should be evaluated to fit the purpose of the law.

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new-orleans-park-2-1501957-1024x768Essential to winning any legal case is having a good lawyer. However, it is even more essential to have a good lawyer when dealing with tricky cases of negligence against the local government. An oversight caused Kenneth Rivarde’s lawyer to submit an incomplete affidavit from a key witness resulting in a lost lawsuit against the city of New Orleans. Mr. Rivarde’s wife, Channelda Rivarde, perished in a motor vehicle accident at the intersection of North Rocheblave Street and A.P. Tureaud Boulevard in New Orleans, Louisiana. Her husband, Kenneth Rivarde (“Mr. Rivarde”) sued the City of New Orleans (“City”) claiming that the accident was a result of a high-speed chase when the New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) was pursuing a fleeing felon. The accident occurred when the felon ran a stop sign and struck the car Channelda Rivarde was a passenger in. So, what happens if your lawyer submits an incomplete affidavit in a fatal car accident case?

The City filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the case on the basis that there was no genuine dispute of material fact three days before the discovery cutoff date. The District Court granted the City’s motion.

Mr. Rivarde appealed and argued that the granting of summary judgment and dismissing the case was improper because it was prior to the completion of adequate discovery pursuant to LA C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3), and there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the NOPD breached its duty by engaging in the high-speed chase resulting in the accident that ended Mrs. Rivarde’s life.

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akira-hojo-502567-unsplash-1024x683Most Louisiana residents understand the liability they may incur if they do not properly fence a backyard pool. But what about other, less obvious drowning hazards, such as a church’s baptismal pool? Who is held accountable for the failure to protect children from falling in? Typically, a church is part of a diocese and must meet the general guidelines established by the diocese in order to maintain its affiliation. For instance, the First Assembly Church of God (“First Assembly”) in Ruston, Louisiana is affiliated with the  Louisiana District Council of the Assemblies of God (the “DC”) and the General Council of the Assemblies of God (the “GC”). After a tragic accident involving the toddler of a First Assembly family, Louisiana’s Second Circuit Court of Appeal was called upon to determine whether the DC and the GC had sufficient control over First Assembly to be liable for the church’s negligence.

In 2013, Irene Che and her 22-month-old daughter attended services at First Assembly. At some point during the service, the child was found submerged in the church’s baptismal pool. Although she survived, Che’s daughter suffered brain damage that left her unable to walk, talk, or feed herself. In her lawsuit, Che alleged that First Assembly was negligent in leaving the baptismal pool unguarded, and named the church, the DC, and the GC as defendants. Che argued that the DC and the GC were liable under the theory of respondeat superior, which establishes that a person or business is responsible for the damages caused by the acts or omissions of persons over whom it exercises control. La. C.C. art. 2317. The rule has been extended by the Louisiana Civil Code to include employers, who are responsible for the damage caused by their employees in the exercise of the functions within the scope of their employment. La. C.C. art. 2320, The DC and the GC filed a motion for summary judgment contesting the application of respondeat superior to the relationship between themselves and First Assembly. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the DC and the GC as defendants; Che appealed.

The Second Circuit analyzed the relationship created by First Assembly’s contracting with the DC and the GC to gain the right to affiliate with the Church of God.  The Court, noting that the single most important factor when determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists — a step necessary to invoke respondeat superior — is whether the “employer” has the right to control the work or actions of the “employee,” found that there was no evidence that the DC and GC maintained such right over First Assembly and its employees. The Court further analyzed the DC’s and the GC’s Constitutions and By-laws, concluding that those operating documents failed to establish a relationship between the two bodies and First Assembly that could support the invocation of respondeat superior. As a result, the Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the DC and the GC as defendants in the case, leaving Che to pursue her negligence claim against First Assembly alone.

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thinking-out-of-the-box-3-1237519-1024x1024Accidents involving children are difficult for everyone involved. When the accident results in extensive, life-changing injuries, the situation becomes even more tragic and often results in multiple lawsuits. A person cannot recover damages unless he or she has a recognized claim to do so under law. This concept is known as “standing.” Calvernia Reed, maternal aunt to an injured minor child, Geneva Marie Fils, got a glimpse into how strictly Louisiana courts construe that standing requirement.

On January 2, 2006, Geneva Marie Fils (“Geneva”) was born to John and Demitria Fils. She was almost immediately taken out of the biological parents’ care by the Department of Children and Family Services and placed in the foster home of Mayola Calais. On March 22, 2006, Geneva was involved in an automobile accident and suffered multiple injuries, including a fractured skull, an intracerebral hematoma (brain bleeding), and other traumatic brain injuries. Geneva’s biological parents first filed suit against multiple parties involved in the incident, their insurance companies, and the Department of Children and Family Services itself. Calvernia Reed was not named in the petition, but she was included as a plaintiff in the body of the petition as Geneva’s then-current guardian. The biological parents of Geneva sought damages both on behalf of Geneva, and for their own loss of consortium. In early 2011, Demitria Fils passed away. In February of 2011, Ms. Reed was substituted as the proper plaintiff in the proceedings after being granted custody of Geneva, as well as judicially appointed as Geneva’s “tutor.” Tutorship is the legal status of guardianship under Louisiana law. In late 2013, Ms. Reed amended the petition to include her own claim for loss of consortium with Geneva as a result of her injuries. The trial court dismissed Ms. Reed’s claim for loss of consortium because Ms. Reed was not the parent or guardian of Geneva at the time of the accident. Ms. Reed appealed.

Under Louisiana law, a person may recover loss of consortium, service, and society if the person could recover under “a cause of action for the wrongful death of an injured person.” La. C.C. art. 2315(B). The wrongful death statute allows for a cause of action by “[t]he surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them if he left no spouse or child surviving.” La. C.C. art. 2315.2. The statute also includes adoptive kin as named in the statute.  La. C.C. art. 2315.2. It does not, however, specifically include a maternal aunt. The list is considered exclusive under Louisiana law, meaning that if the kin is not mentioned in the statute, then the kin cannot recover damages for the claim. Leckelt v. Eunice Superette, 555 So.2d 11 (La. App. 1989). Outside of including adoptive kin under the statute, the terms “mother” and “father” are not defined in La. C.C. art. 2315.2. The Louisiana Children’s Code currently defines “parent” as “any living person who is presumed to be a parent under the Civil Code or a biological or adoptive mother or father of a child.” La. Ch. C. art. 116(17). Notably, the Children’s Code does not give tutorship, custody, or a guardian the legal status of a parent.

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empty-hall-2-1545642-1-1024x607For a plaintiff to prove a negligence case, he or she must prove, among other things, that the defendant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff. See La. C.C. art. 2315 (2016). Often, this element of negligence is overlooked and taken for granted which can lead to dismissal of the plaintiff’s case. A recent Louisiana Court of Appeal case out of the Third Circuit illustrates the importance of proving duty in a negligence case.

The case centers around the suicide of Lelia Shelvin while in Lafayette Parish County Sheriff custody. Sheriff Mike Neustrom arrested Ms. Shelvin for aggravated battery with a dangerous weapon. Sheriff Neustrom then took Ms. Shelvin to Lafayette Parish Correctional Center. While at the center, Ms. Shelvin committed suicide. Ms. Shelvin’s estate filed a lawsuit against Sheriff Neustrom, alleging that Sheriff Neustrom was at fault for Ms. Shelvin’s suicide.

At trial, Sheriff Neustrom filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that he had no duty to Ms. Shelvin because her suicide was a “sudden and completely unpredictable event.” A motion for summary judgment asks the court to decide a case before going to trial, so long as all material facts are agreed upon by the parties. The trial court granted Sheriff Neustrom’s motion for summary judgment, ruling in favor of Sheriff Neustrom. Ms. Shelvin’s estate, disagreeing with the trial court, appealed the decision.

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healthcare-upclose-1322372-1024x768Because of the highly technical aspect of seeking relief from the court system, someone unfamiliar with the legal process can be confused and frustrated by the litigation process. This circumstance can be intensified by the harm done and the matter being litigated. Mr. William Matthews, the surviving husband of Mrs. Geranda Matthews, faced this exact problem when filing a medical malpractice claim against two of his wife’s physicians and Louisiana State University Health Systems.

In 2009, Mrs. Matthews went to the hospital complaining of pain. Unbeknownst to the Matthews at the time, the pain was caused by lung cancer. Allegedly, two physicians at Moss Regional Medical Center failed to properly diagnose and treat her cancer until April 2010. The plaintiff also alleged that, because of the physicians’ failure to properly diagnose and treat her, cancer attached to her spinal cord, which caused intense pain, eventually paralysis, and she later passed away.

A claim was submitted to a medical review board, which found that the physician breached the standard of care.  Subsequently, a medical malpractice lawsuit was filed with the Judicial District Court for the Parish of Calcasieu. Mr. Matthews also filed a motion for summary judgment on liability, causation, and damages. Louisiana State University Health Systems, the Defendant, opposed the motion asserting that there was a factual dispute over whether Ms. Matthews pre-existing condition contributed to her damages.  After a hearing, the District Court granted the motion for summary judgment on the issues of liability and causation, leaving calculating damages for another motion for summary judgment or trial. Louisiana State University Health Systems appealed the judgment to the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal.   

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old-country-red-barn-1633768-1024x683When someone dies because of another person’s negligence certain individuals can bring a wrongful death lawsuit against the negligent party. Normally, those who may recover under a claim for wrongful death and survival are limited to a certain class of persons. In such cases, the plaintiff can be the surviving spouse, a surviving child, the decedent’s parents, the decedent’s siblings, or the decedent’s grandparents. La. C.C. arts. 2315.1 (2016); La. C.C. arts. 2315.2 (2016). But what happens when there are multiple people who are entitled to bring the wrongful death suit? Can a biological father recover in his son’s wrongful death and survival suit when the son is presumed to be the child of another man? Recently, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal for the State of Louisiana addressed these issues when it decided a case involving a fatal car crash.

On March 8, 2013, Juan Joseph Hughes (“Mr. Hughes”) hit a parked car which caused his car to burst into flames. As a result of this accident, Mr. Hughes lost his life. Mr. Hughes’s parents, Joseph and Cherryn Burkette, filed a wrongful death claim, naming General Motor, LLC. and Banner Chevrolet as defendants. The Burkettes claimed that their son died as a result of the defendants’ negligence.

In response, the defendants argued that Mr. Burkette could not be part of the wrongful death suit. The defendants noted that the Burkettes and decedent did not share a last name. Ms. Burkette asserted that Mr. Burkette was Mr. Hughes’ biological father and that she was his biological mother. Ms. Burkette explained that she was in a relationship with Mr. Burkette while she was married to Jerome Hughes and that her son’s last name only reflected Ms. Burkette’s marital status at the time of Mr. Hughes’s birth.

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oil-refinery-1240489-1024x599Often, the facts of a lawsuit are unclear. One strategy that lawyers often use to prove their version of events is to use an expert witness to corroborate their side’s story. Expert witnesses are individuals who possess knowledge in a field or area that the average person knows little to nothing about. Frequently, both sides in a lawsuit end up utilizing experts who often times have differing opinions about the facts surrounding the lawsuit. But how does a judge or jury determine which expert is correct? Recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal for the State of Louisiana addressed these questions in a workers’ compensation case.

David Allensworth worked for two different companies, Gulf South Systems (“GSS”) and Grand Isle Shipyard (“GIS”) as a cleaner, cleaning storage tanks containing gasoline, crude oil, diesel fuel, and condensate. One day, Mr. Allensworth visited an urgent care center with complaints of abdominal pain and weight loss. A CT scan revealed a large abdominal mass which was later diagnosed as non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. A cause of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma is toxic exposure to benzene with is contained in crude oil and gasoline. Mr. Allensworth filed a lawsuit against GSS and GIS for workers’ compensation benefits claiming that his exposure to benzene while working for the companies caused his non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. Workers’ compensation pays for an employee’s medical expenses and lost wages when an employee is injured on the job.

At trial, Mr. Allensworth submitted the sworn statement of Dr. Jack Saux as an expert oncologist. Dr. Saux concluded that Mr. Allensworth’s non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma was caused by toxic exposure to benzene, which most likely happened when Mr. Allensworth cleaned his employers’ storage tanks. GIS and GSS countered with its own medical expert, who testified that though there is some association between benzene and lymphoma, there is no evidence that benzene exposure caused Mr. Allensworth’s non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (“WCJ”) concluded that Mr. Allensworth did not prove that his disease was a result of his employment. In doing so, the WCJ noted that Dr. Saux based his opinion on Mr. Allensworth’s statement in which Mr. Allensworth claimed he only wore a regular shirt and overalls while cleaning the tank. It was based only on this statement, and not on an examination, that Dr. Saux concluded that exposure to benzene from Mr. Allensworth’s job likely caused Mr. Allensworth’s disease. The WCJ also noted that the testimony of GIS and GSS’s expert stated that Mr. Allensworth did wear protective equipment when cleaning the tanks.

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pollution-1-1235575-1024x851A common tactic of defendants is to attempt to remove a case from state court to Federal Court if there is the slightest indication that such removal might be proper.  Depending on the case, however, it may be more advantageous to a plaintiff to keep the case in state court.  Without even concerning the merits of the case, a battle ensues costing time and money.  In any case, where the Federal Government is even remotely involved, removal will likely be an issue.   How can a plaintiff successfully keep their lawsuit in state court when the Federal Government is involved?  Recent Louisiana asbestos litigation provides at least one way.   

Silas B. Bishop, Joseph L. Dennis, and Lawrence R. Craig worked for many years on different ships as merchant mariners. At least one of the ships that the Plaintiffs worked on was owned by the United States Navy.  United States Naval Ships are operated by civilian contractors who hire merchant mariners such as the Plaintiffs.  The Plaintiffs alleged that they were each exposed to asbestos while on board the various ships and suffered serious injuries and/or death as a result.   At the time of the lawsuit, Mr. Bishop and Mr. Dennis were deceased and their estates were represented by William E. Bartel, who is named as the Plaintiff-Appellee in the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in Louisiana State Court under the Jones Act and general maritime law.  Plaintiffs sued multiple parties, including “Federal Officer Defendants” who were companies operating the Navy Vessels where Plaintiffs worked.  The Plaintiffs claimed that the injuries they suffered were due to their employers’ failure to warn them about the dangers of asbestos; failure to provide training about using products that contained asbestos; and the failure of their employers to adopt procedures to safely install and remove asbestos.  The Defendants moved to remove the case to Federal Court based on the Federal Officer Removal Statute.   

Pursuant to Federal Officer Removal Statute at  28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), “a lawsuit against or directed to … any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, in an official or individual capacity, for or relating to any act under color of such office” may be removed to federal court.  Defendants must show that they are “persons” as defined in the statute; that they acted under the direction of a person working for the federal government; and that there is a relationship between the defendant’s actions and what the plaintiff claims. See Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 149 F.3d 387, 398-400 (5th Cir. 1998). The issue, in this case, was whether there was a causal nexus, or connection, between the Plaintiff’s claims and the Defendant’s actions.   

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