Slip and Fall Injuries

November 21, 2011

Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal Punishes For Duplicitous Suits

As part of our Constitutional right to due process, an individual is allowed to bring grievances before a court. However, certain judicial policies may be enacted to deny plaintiffs from bringing suits that have already been litigated, are being brought with the intent to harass, or are frivolous. The purpose behind such policies is to make courts as efficient as possible by deterring such actions. A recent case out of the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal shines a light on several of these deterrents.

In Mendonca v. Tidewater, Inc., the plaintiff sought to nullify several final judgments made by the district court. Mendonca’s list of suits stretched over four years, with multiple appeals and pleas for annulment. However, none of Mendonca’s nullity claims or his appeals were successful. In his final appeal for anulment, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down three restrictions that laid Mendonca’s long line of cases to rest.

The first of these restrictions was the court’s upholding of the defendent’s plea of res judicata and failure to state a claim. When res judicata is enacted, the court declares one of two denials. First, that the claim has been subject to a final judgment and thus no longer qualifies for an appeal, or second, that the litigant cannot bring a claim against the same party in a second claim because all claims should have been brought against that party in the initial suit. The policy considerations supporting res judicata is to preserve court resources and protect defendants from being subject to litigation multiple times, with the possibility of having to pay damages more than once. A defendant’s plea that a plaintiff has failed to state a claim goes hand-in-hand with res judicata. If res judicata is applicable, then all duplicitous claims cancelled. In Mendonca’s case, this means that there were no new claims. Since there were no such claims, the court held that Mendonca’s nu

November 15, 2011

Baton Rouge Plaintiff Loses Defamation Claim Due to Prescription

by Berniard Law Firm

The following case highlights the importance of waiting no time in bringing a cause of action that is available. In 2008, Debra Goulas worked as a bookkeeper for Sunbelt Air Conditioning Supply in Baton Rouge. Jessie Touchet, owner of Sunbelt, and Diane Jones, Goulas’s manager, accused her of stealing over $500 from the company during February and April that year. This serious accusation resulted in Goulas being tried for felony theft. The crime of theft is committed when one is involved in a trespassory taking and carrying away of the property of another with the intent to permanently deprive the true owner of that property. Goulas was subsequently acquitted of this particular theft.

Following the criminal trial and Goulas’s ultimate accquital, she filed a lawsuit against Touchet and Jones in July, 2010 alleging defamation. Specifically, Goulas argued that Touchet and Jones “intentionally and negligently inflicted emotional distress” upon her, and that their accusations were “founded in malice to damage her person and reputation.” The complaint sought damages for medical expenses, physical and mental pain and suffering, and loss of wages. The defendants filed an exception of prescription. The basis of the exception was that Goulas’s claims were based on the defendants’ actions that allegedly occurred during February and April of 2008. By the time Goulas filed suit in 2010, more than one year had passed, thereby prescribing the claims. In October, 2010, the trial judge granted the defendants’ exception of prescription and dismissed Goulas’s claims with prejudice.

Goulas appealed, alleging error on the trial court’s ruling that her defamation claim was prescribed. Goula’s reasoned that she could not initiate her defamation action until her criminal trial was concluded in March, 2010; accordingly, she argued that prescription did not begin to run until Frederick Jones publicly accused her of theft when testifying at her trial. The First Circuit noted that Louisiana recognizes a qualified privilege that protects parties from charges of defamation related to statements they make during a trial. “It necessarily follows that, during this time, the one-year period that applies to the filing of a defamation action is suspended.” However, the court explained, the suspension of prescription applies “only to allegedly defamatory statements made by parties to a lawsuit.” In this situation, Frederick and Jones were not parties to Goulas’s criminal prosecution, so the prescription suspension did not apply. The court concluded that “since there has been no suspension of the 2008 alleged defamatory statements,” the trial court properly granted the defendants’ exception of prescription.

November 5, 2011

Failure to Properly Serve a Personal Injury Lawsuit Does Not Require Dismissal, Louisiana First Circuit Court Rules

by Berniard Law Firm

In a recent Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals ruling, a plaintiff successfully appealed an earlier dismissal of his case for failure to properly serve all of the correct parties.

After Hurricane Gustav, Mr, Preston was working on the Southern University campus removing debris, including trimming tree branches, when he slipped and fell into a hole in the ground. He sustained injuries and sued Southern University for negligence, claiming that the campus allowed an unreasonably dangerous condition to exist and it failed to warn him of the dangerous condition.

Under a Louisiana statute (La. R.S. 13:5107), when a plaintiff sues the State of Louisiana or a state agency, he must serve the Louisiana attorney general and the head of the agency. Furthermore, if the suit is a personal injury lawsuit (tort lawsuit), the Office of Risk Management must be notified and served as well, according to La. R.S. 39:1538.

October 15, 2011

Second Circuit Second Guesses Trial Court’s Apportionment of Fault in Caddo Parish Car Wreck

by Berniard Law Firm

When apportioning fault between two or more parties in a negligence action, the finder of fact is given great deference on review. An appellate court may not set aside a trial court’s finding unless there is “manifest error” or it is “clearly wrong.” Cole v. Dept. of Public Safety & Corrections. In order

to reverse the trial court’s apportionment of fault, the appellate court must “find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court and that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong.” The Louisiana Supreme Court has provided extensive guidance on the trial court’s responsibility for allocating fault. The court is “bound to consider the nature of each party’s wrongful conduct and the extent of the causal relationship between that conduct and the damages claimed.” Watson v. State Farm. Furthermore, in assessing fault, the trial court can consider several factors related to a party’s conduct, including:

“(1) whether the conduct resulted from inadvertence or involved an awareness of the danger, (2) how great a risk was created by the conduct, (3) the significance of what was sought by the conduct, (4) the capacities of the actor, whether superior or inferior, and (5) any extenuating circumstances which might require the actor to proceed in haste, without proper thought.”Watson

October 13, 2011

Injury At Sea And Indemnification: Who Pays?

by Berniard Law Firm

Transferring from the deck of your boat to an offshore platform in the Gulf of Mexico to begin your day’s work should not be a terrifying experience. While the transfer involves getting into the personnel basket that transfers you onto the platform and little else, the process itself is not as simple as one plain act. Tragically, this simple transfer does not always occur as planned. A recent case highlights importnat legal principles associated with this scenario.

In Channette v. Neches Gulf Marine, Inc. and Seneca Resources Corporation, injured seaman Michael Channette was being transferred from the M/V GOLIAD, operated by Neches Gulf Marine, to an offshore platform operated and owned by Seneca Resources. When the transfer went wrong and Channette was injured, Neches Gulf Marine sought indemnity from Seneca Resources. Indemnification is “The act of making another “whole” by paying any loss another might suffer. This usually arises from a clause in a contract where a party agrees to pay for any losses which arise or have arisen.”

In this case, this is exactly what Neches Gulf Marine asserted – that Seneca Resources was contractually obligated to indemnify them. Unfortunately for Neches Gulf Marine, the district court granted a summary judgment motion for Seneca Resources, thus ruling they had no duty to indemnify Neches Gulf Marine.

October 11, 2011

Court of Appeals Upholds Trial Court Ruling Granting Longshoreman’s Workers Compensation Claim

by Berniard Law Firm

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently affirmed in principal part, the trial court’s ruling granting a longshoreman damages for a workers’ compensation claim. Benjamin McCuller and his wife, Miranda McCuller, sued Nautical Ventures, L.L.C., under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), after Benjamin, who was working as a longshoreman, was injured when he fell while descending a ladder on a ship owned by Nautical. Mr. McCuller was working for Halliburton Energy Services at a marine terminal in Fourchon, Louisiana when he was injured after one of the ladder rungs broke during his descent.

The bulk of the appeals court opinion discussed whether Halliburton, Nautical, or Mr. McCuller was at fault for the injuries suffered by Mr. McCuller. First, the appeals court agreed with the trial court that Nautical had breached its “turnover duty” when it deployed a defective ladder, which had been damaged during a sea deployment several weeks before Mr. McCuller’s fall. “The ‘turnover duty’ relates to the condition of the ship upon the commencement of stevedoring operations” and “requires a vessel to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances to turn over the ship and its equipment in such condition that an expert and experienced stevedoring contractor, mindful of the dangers he should reasonably expect to encounter will be able by the exercise of ordinary care to carry on cargo operations with reasonable safety to persons and property.” This specific duty is the statutory basis for the McCullers’ claim as codified in the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. In other words, this tort statute places upon the ship owner the duty to discover and fix potentially dangerous ship defects after a ship returns from sea. In the case at hand, the court found that an expert inspecting the ship should have discovered the crack in the ladder. Therefore, the appeals court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Nautical was at fault for Mr. McCuller’s injuries because it was negligent in breaching its turnover duty by providing a faulty ladder for his use. However, it should be pointed out that the damages were reduced because Mr. McCuller was found to be 30% at fault for carrying a clipboard down the ladder when he was injured. But, the appeals court made clear that Mr. McCuller in no way had a duty to discover and fix the defective ladder.

However, the appeals court also made clear that there are certain circumstances when Mr. McCuller and/or Halliburton (his employer) would have a duty to discover potentially dangerous ship defects. In other words, there is one significant exception to the “turnover duty.” That is, if the defect causing the injury is or should be “open and obvious” to a reasonable longshoreman or stevedore-employer, than the ship owner cannot be held liable for the resulting damages. However, in the instant case the trial court found, and the appeals court agreed, that the crack in the ladder was not, and should not have been “open and obvious” to a reasonable stevedore and/or longshoreman.

September 27, 2011

Knee Replacement Leads to Debate of Understanding the Difference Between Fact and Law

by Berniard Law Firm

Louisiana Woman’s

This latter part of the discussion regarding the McGlothlin v. Christus St. Patrick Hospital case is based upon the difference between issues of fact and law, and to who or whom such issues are to be determined. In this case, the issue gets blended with the difference between a lay person’s opinion and the opinion of an expert. This difference, though most commonly an issue during a jury trial, where the rules of evidence permit certain statements and opinions specific to either a lay person or an expert witness. A lay person may make statements as to observations based upon the common five senses (sight, sound, tough, taste, and smell) and may not make a statement as to one’s opinion regarding a material fact in question, that is the job of the jury. Similarly, an expert is permitted to make statements and observations based upon scientific, scholarly, or professional opinion regarding the facts, but as with lay person testimony, an expert may not make an opinion of the material fact in question, as it is the job of the jury. Thus, the job of the jury is to observe and digest the testimonies and facts presented, scrutinizing and determining whose is most credible, and thus determine, within the parameter of the law, the material fact or facts at issue.

Referencing back to the discussion in Part I regarding the medical review panel, the sole purpose of the medical review panel is to review all evidence and examinations of either party, and then “to express its expert opinion as to whether or not the evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant or defendants acted or failed to act within the appropriate standards of care.” Specifically, the doctors on the panel would determine whether, in their expert opinion as doctors in the field of medicine, and even more specifically orthopedics in this case, if the hospital, doctors, nurses, etc. failed to act according to the proper standard of care owed to patients. Here is where the blur between such an issue between fact and law arises. It appears that the doctors, in their expert opinions, are making a statement to the determination of a material issue of fact, which as discussed is reserved to the jury, however, statutorily, the medical review panel is given the purpose to determine this issue and make its opinion and give reasons, in short, according to whether the evidence supports or does not support the conclusion that the defendant(s) (hospital, etc.) failed to comply with or meet the applicable standard of care. This is very similar to the question a jury would be asked if determining whether a hospital or doctor, etc. committed medical malpractice.

September 25, 2011

Louisiana Woman’s Knee Replacement Leads to ‘He Said, She Said’ Confrontation (Part I)

by Berniard Law Firm

Most people’s fear of hospitals is usually justified in that one does not usually go to a hospital unless there is something wrong, or something negative has occurred. Everyone who seeks medical treatment, whether in a hospital or private doctor’s office, is seeking an expert’s diagnosis and treatment to prevent future, or cure current, ailments, or to have one’s body ‘fixed’ in some way, as in a broken bone. Unfortunately, problems arise and the treatment one seeks does not always fully help, or even makes the issue worse. But sometimes, whose fault it is, that the problem does not subside, or that the problem only gets worse, is up for debate. That is where a medical malpractice issue arises, and the topic that shall be explored here.

The factual and legal basis of this discussion comes from the Louisiana Supreme Court case McGlothlin v. Christus St. Patrick Hospital, decided July 1, 2011. The issue in this case is, “whether [the Louisiana statute in question] mandates the admission of a medical review panel opinion when the panel exceeds its statutory authority and renders an opinion based on its determination of plaintiffs’ credibility, not on the medical standard.” The following questions must be asked first to clarify the terms and substance of this discussion: What is ‘medical malpractice’? And what is a ‘medical review panel?’

The term ‘medical malpractice’ gets thrown around more than it should. It is a specific legal negligence term devised to describe a cause of action that may be brought by a patient of a doctor and/or hospital claiming that the doctors, nurses, and anyone involved with the care and safety of the patient was negligent, and through this negligence, that a harm came to the patient that otherwise would not have occurred. More specifically, 1) a duty of care exists in which those that are employed to care for a patient must maintain the proper diligence in their medical and professional duties, 2) a doctor or nurse, or other individual employed in a professional and medical sense has breached this duty of care through his or her actions, or in the case of a hospital’s negligence, through that actions of its employees (doctors, nurses, etc.), 3) that this breach of duty is the cause of the resulting harm to the patient, a harm that otherwise would not have happened and can be linked to the action(s) or inaction(s), of those who owe a duty of care to the patient, and 4) that a harm is the result of that breach that would otherwise not have occurred, and is something not reasonably foreseen so that there is no other cause than the breach of the proper duty of care owed to the patient.

September 13, 2011

Jones Act Lawsuit Fails Under Seaman Claim

by Berniard Law Firm

“Plaintiff Lost at Seaman Claim”

Robert Teaver may have fancied himself a man of the sea but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana that there was no way he could establish his status as a “seaman” for purposes of the Jones Act.

When dealing with litigation, especially when making a claim under a premise, words mean everything. To clarify, words mean specific things and those specific definitions are everything. Robert Teaver attempted to sue his employer under the Jones Act. The Jones Act was crafted to protect seamen who are injured in the course of their employment. This statute lays out the elements that must be met in order for a potential plaintiff to file a successful suit under it. Robert Teaver was a crane operator and installer for Seatrax of Louisiana, Inc. This company makes and installs cranes for offshore drilling platforms. Mr. Teaver’s work took him over water but he was not employed on a maritime vessel.

August 30, 2011

Service Crucial in Successful Court Cases

by Berniard Law Firm

In order for a court to have jurisdiction over a person, proper service of process must be employed, giving legal notice to the party of the suit and enabling them to timely prepare in anticipation of the suit. If proper service is not performed, a court may not have jurisdiction over such person. In a recent Louisiana Supreme Court case, the requirements of proper service were explored in order to determine whether the proper steps were employed. proper service of process is one of the most important parts of a law suit, without proper service, the defendant may not be forced to participate in the case. Thus, the importance of proper service cannot be emphasized enough.

The case at issue involves the plaintiff, who fax-filed suit against several defendants, including the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), seeking to recover damages arising from an automobile accident. In the plaintiffs petition, requested service on DOTD though the attorney general was made. The issue became whether the plaintiff’s service of process was insufficient based on the fact that he did not request service on the secretary of DOTD. Citing to Louisiana Revised Statute 13:5107(A) which provides in part:

“In all suits filed against the state of Louisiana or a state agency, citation and service may be obtained by citation and service on the attorney general of Louisiana, or on any employee in his office above the age of sixteen years, or any other proper officer or person, depending upon the identity of the named defendant and in accordance with the laws of this state, and on the department, board, commission, or agency head or person…”