worker-1-week-1501458-1024x681An accident at the workplace is never fun, not for the employer, and certainly not for the employee.  In addition to the difficulty of the injury itself, determining who pays for the medical treatment is often in dispute.  Whether there is enough evidence to show that the accident actually caused the injury helps a judge decide if the employer is required to pay.  This connection may also play into whether the payment will be limited to a $750 cap.

Ms. Mangiaracina, an employee with Avis Budget Group, injured her shoulder, back, and thumb, at her workplace when her office chair fell forward.  Ms. Mangiaracina had a pre-existing injury to her left shoulder for which she was receiving medical treatment.  This injury did not affect her ability to work, and after the accident, her doctors found that her shoulder worsened.  She had surgery a few months later.  An adjuster for Avis’ insurer determined that all of Ms. Mangiaracina injuries were considered pre-existing and did not make any payments for the medical expenses.   Avis’ insurer responded to requests for payment by stating the need for the surgery was not related to the workers’ compensation claim.

As a result, Ms. Mangiaracina filed a disputed claim for compensation.  The Office of Workers’ Compensation ruled for Ms. Mangiaracina and awarded her temporary total disability benefits on a weekly basis against Avis. The workers’ compensation judge decided that Ms. Mangiaracina did, in fact, sustain a work-related injury, that her pre-existing injury was actually aggravated by the accident and that the surgery was reasonable.  The judge determined that she was disabled for three months after the surgery, and as a result awarded her all the related medical and transportation expenses against Avis.

on-patrol-1565455-1-1024x683Over the last few years, we have all seen the videos of police arrest that seem to involve excessive methods. These videos stoke controversy and encourage a discussion on what constitutes “excessive force” during an arrest. Even with video evidence, the actions of the police and the arrestee are subject to multiple interpretations. The search for the truth becomes even harder when the arrest is not videoed and the participants all give different testimony on those events. The following case out of Shreveport Louisiana demonstrates how the Civil court system handles differing testimony on allegations of excessive force during an arrest.

In July of 2012, Bobby Byrd filed a lawsuit as a result of what he alleged was the use of excessive force during an arrest against Roy Shore of the Bossier Police Department and W.W. Lindsey and Robert Gordon of the Shreveport Police Department. Mr. Byrd’s excessive force claims revolve around a police chase of Mr. Byrd.  It all started when Detective Gordon, believing that the vehicle that Mr. Byrd drove at the time matched a vehicle tied to a string of burglaries, attempted to pull over Mr. Byrd.  Instead of stopping, Mr. Byrd drove away from the police officer, crossing from Shreveport to Bossier.  Eventually, Mr. Byrd abandoned his vehicle at the Red River and proceeded on foot into the Red River.  The police, with a police canine in hand, continued after Mr. Byrd.  During this pursuit, the riverbank caved in, causing the police canine to fall into the river.  The officer holding the canine, Officer Yarborough of the Shreveport Police Department, released the canine’s leash.  The police canine, instead of listening to the Officer Yarborough’s order to return to the riverbank, pursued Mr. Byrd and bit him.  Mr. Byrd fought back, disorienting the police canine and causing the canine to retreat back to the riverbank.  The officers eventually retrieved Mr. Byrd from the river.

It is at this point that the stories of Mr. Byrd and the police officers diverge.  Mr. Byrd claims that after returning to the riverbank he fully complied with the officers’ requests and that after the police officers handcuffed him they proceeded to strike him.  In contrast, the police officers claim that Mr. Byrd did not comply with their instructions and that Mr. Byrd reached towards his waistband which was submerged underwater.  The officers, believing that Mr. Byrd could have a weapon in his waistband, deployed “distraction strikes” in order to subdue Mr. Byrd. Regardless of the stories, Mr. Byrd suffered multiple injuries: “a dog bite wound, wounds to the forearms, a broken nose, a broken orbital floor requiring surgical reconstruction with a titanium plate, kidney trauma, and abrasions to his ribs” because of this incident.

feet-in-a-stream-1395322-1024x768Evidence in a trial can take almost any shape or form.  For murder trials, people think of weapons.  For fraud cases, perhaps incriminating documents comes to mind.  For a personal injury case, the options are almost limitless yet likely “flip flop” is not the first image that pops up; especially in a maritime case.  Yet in this case, Garrard Myers makes quite the fuss over the state of his sandals.

Mr. Myers was working aboard Hercules Offshore Services, L.L.C.’s (“Hercules”) drilling rig in 2013 when he injured his left ankle coming out of the shower.  Mr. Myers subsequently filed a lawsuit against Hercules pursuant under the Jones Act and general maritime law.  See 46 U.S.C. § 30104 et. seq.  Mr. Myers alleged that Hercules’ drilling rig was unseaworthy and that Hercules was negligent in failing to provide handrails or slip-resistant surfaces in the vessel’s showers.  

At trial, conflicting facts were presented on the cause of Mr. Myers injury.  Mr. Myers stated that he simply slipped on the shower floor.  Hercules representative Randall O’Brien testified however that Mr. Myers stated his flip flop broke and then he fell in the shower.  Mr. O’Brien also testified that an incident report stated that Mr. Myer’s shoe broke and Mr. Myers signed this report.  Moreover, Mr. Myers admits to signing the report yet denies having read the portion of the report about his broken flip flop.  Mr. Myers at trial denied that his flip-flop was ever broken or that he communicated about his flip flops to anyone.  Mr. Myers even brought the supposed shower shoes to trial to show they were intact.

pipes-1446925-1024x683In the world of workers’ compensation, being injured while on the job is an obvious requirement.  Things tend to get muddled however in these cases over accident dates, pre-existing injuries, and the actual cause of the injury.  In the following case, Carlos Harvey had all these things working against him in his claim for workers’ compensation benefits against his employer Sol’s Pipe & Steel (“Sol’s”).  

Mr. Harvey allegedly suffered a shoulder injury while pulling steel weighing between five and 550 pounds.  Initially, Mr. Harvey stated the injury occurred on August 8, 2011.  Mr. Harvey testified he reported the accident to his supervisors, T.J. Anderson and Mark Price, then reported to LSU E.A. Conway Memorial Hospital for treatment.  Mr. Harvey went to the hospital several more times and an MRI confirmed a shoulder injury.

To receive workers’ compensation benefits, an employee must show he suffered a personal injury by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.  La. R.S. 23:1031(A).  The employee shows an on the job injury by proving that before the accident he was in good health and his symptoms of the disabling condition appeared after the accident.  See Dow v. United Parcel Service, 124 So.3d 36 (La. Ct. App. 2013).   Additionally, the employee must bring the claim within two years of the accident.

highway-14-junction-1628439-768x1024Underinsurance policies provide drivers an extra layer of protection. These policies compensate drivers for injuries suffered in accidents with uninsured or underinsured drivers, but the process of claiming under these policies can be problematic. Ted Luquette encountered this difficulty after he was injured in a car accident in Abbeville.

Luquette was driving home from church in Abbeville, Louisiana when he was hit by a car driven by Chad Mowbray, who through the owner of the vehicle, Billie Borga, was insured with Allstate. After the accident, Luquette settled for his injuries with Allstate for $100,000, which was the policy limit. Luquette then brought a lawsuit against his own insurance, Farmers Bureau. Luquette claimed he required surgeries resulting in damages in excess of $100,000 as a result of the accident, which entitled Luquette to a payout under his policy.

To demonstrate that Allstate was the only insurance that the Mowbray and Borga had, Luquette primarily relied on a discovery answer by Allstate, which stated that Allstate was not aware of Mowbray or Borga being covered by any other insurance policy. At trial, the jury was asked whether Luquette sufficiently proved that Mowbray and Borga were underinsured. Luquette did not object to this question, and the jury resolved that he had not shown that Mowbray and Borga were underinsured.

highway-perspective-1508300-1024x768Lawsuits that are rooted in car accidents are typically cut and dry; it is easy to determine the party at fault and to determine the party that should pay for the costs of damage. However, a case arising out of Monroe proves that this is not always the case. This perplexing lawsuit involves a situation in which the at-fault party was not covered under the vehicle’s insurance.

After a car accident occurred on September 29, 2010, at the intersection of Louisville Avenue and North 18th Street, Shanedra Reed and Jasine Hubbard brought claims against one of the car’s insurers, Safeway, alleging that they were passengers in the car driven by Naiman Carroll when they became injured by the accident. Safeway was Carroll’s insurer, so under these claims, this company would be liable for their injuries. However, Safeway affirmatively argued that Carroll and Reed were passengers in the car, while Hubbard, who is not covered by Safeway under Carroll’s insurance, was driving. Hubbard’s claim was eventually dismissed because she failed to answer discovery before trial.

At trial on January 30, 2014, the Trial Court determined that Hubbard had been negligent in failing to properly look for traffic while making a left turn at a stoplight. As a result, the trial court found that Safeway was liable to Reed for general damages of $10,000, as well as for special damages caused as a result of the accident.

a4-highway-1368417-1024x768It is often the case that although technically legal, certain lawsuits will not be popular amongst the general public because the court’s reasons for its decision just will not make sense at an emotional level.  Despite this fact, people should take notice of the fact that courts rule based on what the law deems to be just and fair. This sort of a fact may only be small comfort to the Toups, who lost their son and want the party or parties responsible to be held accountable for the loss they suffered.    

This was an appeal from a summary judgment granted in favor of Adele Dantin, wife of Mr. Dantin, the driver of the car that hit the pickup truck driven by Dr. Toups that resulted in the death of the Toups’ son.  The Toups’ alleged Adele was negligent because it was her car that Mr. Dantin was driving at the time of the accident.  The accident occurred on Louisiana Highway 1 in Lafourche Parish.  Adele filed a motion for summary judgment which asserted she was not legally responsible for the accident because there was no evidence that she gave Mr. Dantin permission to drive the car at the time of the accident.  The motion was granted and the Toups’ appealed.  The First Circuit affirmed which meant that Adele did not share in the negligence of her husband for the accident that resulted in the death of the Toups’ son.

The Toups alleged that Mr. Dantin had a history of drug and alcohol related charges for more than 30 years, that since his release from jail in August 2009, Mr. Dantin was prohibited from operating a vehicle that did not have an ignition interlock device, and that the Maxima that Mr. Dantin had been driving at the time of the accident did not have an ignition interlock device.

offroad-1499557-1024x768A person may seek help from the federal court system when that person feels that they have been cheated or wronged.  However, one needs to make sure that the federal court can actually help the situation. Personal jurisdiction is the ability of a court to exercise power over a person or a specific case.  Subject matter jurisdiction is the court’s authority to hear cases that revolve around the certain subject matter. Generally, lawsuits end up in the federal courts in one of two ways. The first occurs when the parties are from different states and the amount of the claim is over $75,000, regardless of the type of claim. The second occurs when the nature of the claim is specific to a federal statute or law. This is usually an attempt to get a federal court to enforce a right granted by federal law. A claim that would get in court under one of these two theories must be stated in the plaintiff’s complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal recently demonstrated the need to properly establish a federal claim.  In 2012, Landry Dixon sued Lakeside Toyota and the Toyota Motor Credit Corporation (TMCC).  Mr. Dixon believed that the Sales Manager of the dealership had lied to him by allowing him to assume that since he was leasing an automobile on behalf of the nonprofit organization of which he was the CEO, the lease would be tax-exempt, leading to a lower monthly payment. Mr. Dixon paid the lower amount stated on the lease agreement, which ultimately turned out to be almost thirty dollars below what he should have been paying as a nontax-exempt customer.  His lower payments added up, causing the Toyota Motor Credit Corporation to make collections and damage his credit rating.  Mr. Dixon brought this lawsuit in federal district court on a claim of common law fraud, which is a state law claim.

Since he did not claim anything about what states the parties were from nor did he bring a claim under federal law, the District Court dismissed it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Mr. Dixon attempted to file various motions to fight this dismissal.  He also made a separate lawsuit against the TMCC only, stating a claim under the Consumer Leasing Act (CLA), which is a federal law that governs certain leases. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667–1667f.  However, even this was not enough to establish a claim in federal court and the District Court dismissed the case once again.

supply-vessel-1449728-698x1024Contract disputes can often be complicated when multiple parties and corporations are involved. Courts are forced to sort out multiple claims and counterclaims and figure out who is accountable for what. Even after a decision is made, there can be multiple appeals and judgments that a higher court is asked to review. In complicated cases, it’s common for mistakes to happen, as a case that landed in the Fifth Circuit will demonstrate, and the appeal process is available for parties to have their case double checked.

In this case, a contract dispute arose between Comar Marine, LLC (Comar) and four LLCs that owned vessels (Owners) that Comar managed on their behalf after the Owners decided to stop this management arrangement before the specified end date in the contracts. In response, Comar sued the Owners for breach of contract and secured the vessels under arrest, which means they took possession of the vessels, on the grounds that Comar was allowed termination fees under the agreement which provided them with a lien on the vessels. The Owners countersued, alleging that Comar wrongfully arrested the vessels.

JPMorgan Chase Bank (JPMorgan) and Allegiance Bank Texas (Allegiance) held the mortgages for the vessels and entered this dispute to defend their ownership interests. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the banks. According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56(a) the court should grant summary judgment if the person asking for the judgment shows that there is no genuine question over the material facts and they are entitled to a judgment under the law. The District Court held that the four LLCs materially breached the agreements by terminating early, that the termination fee in the agreement was unenforceable, that Comar did not have a valid lien on the vessels, and that Comar wrongfully arrested the vessels. Both Comar and the Owners appealed the judgment from the court and Comar appealed the grant of the summary judgment.

do-not-park-1445020-1024x766The difficulties of certifying a class for a class action lawsuit were highlighted in a case in which an Orleans Parish resident, Michelle Albe, disputed a speeding ticket imposed by the City of New Orleans Automated Traffic Enforcement System (“ATES”). Ms. Albe’s challenge was based on the wording of a delinquency notice she received, which contained the threat of ‘possible jail time’. Ms. Albe sought to include all recipients of the delinquency notice in a class action.

Ms. Albe received a citation after she was recorded speeding on October 12, 2008, in the Parish of Orleans. She challenged the ticket, but despite her timely appeal, she received a delinquent notice for non-payment of the citation. The notice contained the threat of “possible jail time” if it wasn’t paid, even though the citation was civil and not criminal.

Ms. Albe amended her challenge to the citation, arguing that the emotional distress she suffered due to the inclusion of the threat of possible jail time in the delinquency notice amounted to the negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ms. Albe then sought to include all other recipients of the delinquency notice, estimated at 40,000 people, in a class action.

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