link-30-email-3-26-19-1024x683Slip and fall cases seem to go with grocery stores like peanut butter goes with jelly.  With all that slick inventory, it is surprising there are not more accidents. Who is responsible for injuries from these accidents?  As with many legal issues, it is complicated. For one man out of Slidell, a lack of evidence caused his case to fall flat and release the grocery store from all liability.        

 John Nash slipped on some rice and fell one August day while shopping at Rouse’s Market in Slidell.   Approximately five to ten minutes prior to the fall, a Rouse’s Market’s floor maintenance employee swept the aisle where Mr. Nash fell. A vendor stocking that same aisle verified the floor was swept at that time.  A floor manager’s inspection report confirms that the aisle was inspected minutes before the incident and no substances were discovered on the floor. Yet Mr. Nash filed a lawsuit against the supermarket. The lawsuit, however, was dismissed by the Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Tammany.   The District Court agreed with Rouse’s Market’s defense that the store did not have actual or constructive notice of the condition causing the fall. Mr. Nash appealed to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal.

In Louisiana, a merchant owes a duty to persons using their premises to keep the aisles, floors, passages, in a reasonably safe condition.  La. R.S. 9:2800.6(A).  In addition, an injured party must prove that the condition causing the injury posed a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm, and the merchant had actual or constructive notice of the danger and failed to exercise care in removing the danger.  See Mills v. Cyntreniks Plaza LLC, 182 So.3d 80 (La. Ct. App. 2015).   In the absence of actual notice of an unreasonably dangerous condition, an injured party must show the dangerous condition existed for some period of time before the fall and that such time was sufficient to place the merchant on notice of its existence. See Clark v. J-H-J., Inc.,  136 So.3d 815 (La. Ct. App. 2013).   There is not an explicit rule on how much time is a sufficient amount of time to have put the merchant on notice; instead, the facts of each case are weighed.  

architecture-2-1446689-1024x681It really does go without saying, but lawsuits tend to progress slowly.  Delays abound and the realities of finite court resources mean that lawsuits can take years to complete.  As an alternative to using this system, some parties will agree to arbitrate disputes. Arbitration takes place outside the court system before a contractually agreed upon third party who hears evidence and renders a final decision (much like a judge). Although it is sometimes successful, arbitration can often result in court litigation anyway. After a dispute arose over the quality of some condo construction in Biloxi, Mississippi, the New Orleans Glass Company attempted to litigate rather than arbitrate.  

The New Orleans Glass Company (“NOG”) was a subcontractor for the Roy Anderson Corporation (“RAC”) on a project building condos in Mississippi.  The parties executed a subcontract which required any subcontractors to participate in arbitration proceedings between RAC and a third-party when the subcontractor had claims against RAC arising out of the same general subject matter as the already-pending proceeding. NOG interpreted the contractual provisions to mean that arbitration was only required in regards to that third-party and not for disputes between NOG and RAC.      

Predictably, a dispute did arise between RAC, the condo developer, and the condo owner’s association over the quality of the construction. Developer and owners initiated arbitration proceedings.  RAC determined that many of the claims for damages involved work performed by subcontractors and subsequently filed a demand requiring NOG to participate in the arbitration proceedings. NOG filed a complaint before the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi requesting the District Court to issue a judgment stating that NOG and RAC did not agree to arbitrate but to litigate.  

elevator-1234161-1024x768When accidents happen, especially at work, it is natural for us to want to be made whole again: put back together as much as possible so our lives can return to normal. Sometimes, recovery for these accidents only covers the harm we can see. A worker injured on the job may appear healed physically but have more internal healing that needs treatment. This issue was examined in a workers’ compensation case appealed to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal in 2016.

Gary Thompson worked as a program monitor for the Department of Health and Hospitals, Office of Public Health. On February 15, 2011, Thompson left work at the end of the day and took the elevator as his office was on the eighth floor. When the elevator descended past the third floor, it suddenly fell and hit the ground level with a strong impact. Thompson’s post-incident MRIs showed serious injuries to his knees, hip, and upper and lower lumbar spine. Thompson had to undergo bilateral knee arthroscopy and other procedures, but no procedures performed relieved him of his back pain and other symptoms. Thompson’s orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Jorge Isaza, recommended a discogram to determine whether Thompson was a surgical candidate and Dr. Allen Johnston, appointed by the Office of Workers’ Compensation (OWC), reported that he agreed with the recommendation.

The OWC medical director approved the discogram and it revealed pain generators in Thompson’s back at Ll-2, L2-3, and L5-S1 levels. Dr. Isaza performed surgery on the L5-S1 level in April of 2013, but this did nothing to relieve Thompson of pain. Dr. Isaza recommended post-surgery diagnostic tests. At this point, OWC refused approval to conduct those tests. Dr. Isaza recommended another lumbar fusion on the L2-3 and Ll-2 levels, to treat the upper lumbar injury, which a May 14, 2012, MRI report confirmed the need for. The OWC also denied coverage of this procedure.

ship-at-las-palmas-bay-1449622-1024x683Long considered “wards of admiralty,” courts carefully scrutinize the treatment of seamen, particularly in cases where substantial legal rights are involved. One such case involves the execution of a release with a seaman, particularly when the seaman is unrepresented and in claims of personal injury. Generally, in a personal injury case, a release is a legal agreement that serves to settle the claims between the parties and terminates the injured party’s right to seek damages in court.

So, what is required to uphold such a release? The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal gave us an example in Buras v. Sea Supply. The plaintiff, Mr. Buras, was a seaman injured while working aboard the defendant’s vessel. A month later, Mr. Buras’ doctor cleared him to return to work where, without counsel present, he signed a release settling all claims against the defendants. In addition to the release itself, the evidence included a transcript of the conversation had between Mr. Buras and the defendant at the time of executing the release. This transcript showed that the defendant clearly advised Mr. Buras multiple times of both the consequences of signing the release and his right to have an attorney present. Nevertheless, Mr. Buras signed the release stating he understood he was giving up his legal rights in connection with this claim and declined to speak to an attorney. Nearly a year later, Mr. Buras filed a claim seeking to have the release declared unenforceable; however, the trial court found that because all of Mr. Buras’ claims against the defendants were covered by the release, there were no genuine issues of material fact and, therefore, granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the case without trial.

The law is well-settled that there is a heavy burden upon one who sets up a seaman’s release to show that it was executed freely, without deception or coercion, and that it was made by the seaman with full understanding of his rights and appreciation for the consequences. See, e.g., Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 240 (1942); Stipelcovich v. Sand Dollar Marine, Inc., 805 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1986);

the-last-drop-1306724-1024x768Louisiana, like most states, requires drivers to maintain liability insurance (or less commonly, a liability bond or certificate of self-insurance) to legally operate a motor vehicle. In 1992, an amendment to this law explicitly allowing insurance companies to offer “named driver” exclusions in their policies, which allowed an insured the option of paying a lower premium in exchange for insurance that provides no coverage while the specifically named driver operates a covered vehicle. The law was upheld by Louisiana courts, though it did create some disagreements in its interpretation, both among the appellate courts and between the Louisiana Supreme Court and the legislature. One of these disagreements concerned whether the owner of a vehicle could purchase liability insurance and then, through the named driver exclusion, exclude himself from coverage under the policy. Although the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that to allow such a maneuver would be violative of public policy, their interpretation was overruled by subsequent legislation explicitly allowing it.

In Bourg v. Southall, a motor vehicle accident occurred in Marrero, Louisiana where there was no question of fault: Plaintiffs were stopped at the intersection of LA-45 and Lapalco when they were hit from behind by an intoxicated driver. Although Plaintiffs were able to recover damages at trial, that ruling was overturned by the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal on the basis that the driver of the vehicle was listed in a named driver exclusion of the policy, despite the fact that he was both the owner of the vehicle and the named insured (he purchased the policy).

La. R.S. 32:900(L) clearly allows the owner of a vehicle to purchase liability insurance on a vehicle and to exclude himself from coverage under the policy. Sensebe v. Canal Indemnity Co., 58 So.3d 441, 451 (La. 2011). Furthermore, this provision does not set forth any specific requirements with respect to the form to exclude a named person from coverage; the only requirement is a written agreement. See Gilbert v. Reynoso, 917 So.2d 503, 505–06 (La. Ct. App. 2005).

take-your-time-1316969-1024x681No one wants to think about how to find a good lawyer or whether they should file a lawsuit after they’ve been injured. Most likely, they are preoccupied with trying to heal. But it is critical to keep in mind that many claims may be time-barred, and a lawsuit cannot be filed after a certain amount of time has passed. An injured party must get one’s affairs in order quickly and decide whether they should sue a potentially negligent party, because there may be a narrow time window in which to file a lawsuit.  

Mary Beauchamp claims that she was injured by a piece of merchandise which fell from the shelf of a local Salvation Army thrift store on April 26, 2010. Unfortunately, she did not file her lawsuit for damages until November of 2013, over two and a half years after the incident. Louisiana acknowledges that some actions are subject to liberative prescription, which means a claim is barred because of the amount of time that has passed since the incident occurred. La. C.C. art. 3447. Other states refer to this as a statute of limitations. In actions such as Ms. Beauchamp’s, the liberative prescription period is one year. She clearly exceeded that by over a year and a half. However, there is case law which provides the plaintiff with an opportunity to show why a lawsuit wasn’t filed in time, and the prescriptive period will be interrupted or suspended. See LaForte v. Gulf Island Fabrication, Inc., 65 So. 3d 182, 185 (La. Ct. App. 2011). This is a means of stopping the clock, sometimes called “tolling.” The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal heard Ms. Beauchamp’s appeal after the trial court found her complaint to be prescribed, or foreclosed from continuing.

The Court of Appeal mentioned that Ms. Beauchamp had filed a complaint on April 25, 2011, just under a year from the incident and an event which could potentially aid her in suspending the prescriptive period. But neither Ms. Beauchamp nor the Salvation Army requested the court to take judicial notice of the prior lawsuit so it could not consider this factor in its decision. Also, Ms. Beauchamp refers to exhibits in her appeal, but no exhibits were offered into evidence at the trial level. The Court of Appeal is unable to review any evidence, not in the record at the trial level. If Ms. Beauchamp had a case for interrupting the prescriptive period, she did not make it visible to the appellate court. This mistake turned out to be costly.

handcuffs-1484704-1024x768A police pursuit of a suspect can be a dangerous scenario for all individuals in the vicinity of the pursuit. But what happens when the officer collides with a party while in pursuit, and your car is then struck due to the first accident? The First Circuit Court of Appeal for Louisiana recently addressed the issue.

On February 22nd, 2014, Slidell Police Officer Justin Lee Stokes (“Stokes”) was traveling at a high rate of speed, northbound on Highway 11. Lee’s patrol vehicle was in pursuit with both the emergency lights and siren activated. Lee approached the intersection of Highway 11 and Gause Boulevard, when a car traveling south on Highway 11 driven by Ian Jurkiewicz (“Jurkiewicz”), made a left hand turn directly in the path of Stokes’ pursuit. Stokes’ patrol vehicle collided with Jurkiewicz’s vehicle, which then struck a second vehicle, driven by Jennifer Bullock (“Bullock”).

Bullock filed a lawsuit for damages against the City of Slidell, Stokes, Jurkiewicz, and United Services Automobile Association (“USAA”) for damages stemming from the accident. The lawsuit was filed in the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Tammany, Louisiana. Bullock made a motion for the partial dismissal of Jurkiewicz and USAA, which was granted by the District Court. Stokes and the City of Slidell made a motion for summary judgment because police officers are immune from liability when the acts of the officer are within the scope of the power and duties vested in a police officer. La. R.S.9:2798.1 (2014). When an officer is in pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, the officer may exceed maximum speeds limits so long as the officer does not put life or property in danger. La. R.S.32:24 (2014). The district court granted the motion for summary judgment. Bullock then filed an instant appeal in regard to the decision of the district to grant the summary judgement motion, arguing that it was incorrect to determine that there was not a genuine issue of material fact and that La. R.S.9:2798.1 and La. R.S.32:24 were not applicable to the facts in this case, because she Bullock believed that speed was not the cause of the accident.

machine-2-1426327-662x1024The majority of banking regulations are in place to protect you and your privacy. But some regulations are created to make it easier for law enforcement to obtain information about suspicious banking activity. For the most part, this is a good thing; it enables law enforcement to more effectively combat social ills such as terrorism and the drug trade. At times, however, a bank’s attempt to cooperate with law enforcement could put your personal information, or even your property, in jeopardy. Here, an inaccurate tip to the police lead to the confiscation of a Metairie couple’s belongings, namely the contents of their safety deposit box. And they soon discovered that they had no viable legal recourse.  

In December 2015, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for the state of Louisiana upheld a ruling which absolved Gulf Coast Bank of liability after the bank surrendered a safe deposit box and its contents to police, even though the box was erroneously identified as the property of a different party. The laws at issue were two federal laws which regulate the bank’s action in reference to customers’ accounts: the Right to Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”) 12 U.S.C. §3401, et seq. and the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act (“the Act”). 31 U.S.C. §5318.

Salvadore Marino, owner of Toker’s, a head shop in Metairie, was arrested for drug charges and tax fraud. During the investigation of Toker’s bank holdings, an employee of the bank mistakenly told police a certain safe deposit box belonged to the business. In fact, the box in question, which contained over $127,000 in cash, was the personal property of Marino and his parents, Julia and Martin Marino. Mr. and Mrs. Marino sued the bank for damages arising from the seizure of the box, asserting Gulf Coast disclosed the information in violation of state and federal law, as well as negligent misrepresentation. The bank claimed protection from the lawsuit, asserting that the anti-money laundering laws gave them safe harbor from liability in such matters.

more-apartments-1451930-1024x672In contracts for the sale of land and property, parties typically execute a Purchase Agreement before the Contract of Sale. The purchase agreement may be incorporated with the contract of sale, or it may be a preliminary document that is not included in the final contract. It is important that a good attorney draft both of these documents, because issues may arise when the documents conflict or are not clear in intent.

In Woodlands Development v. Regions Bank & Johnson Property Group, Woodlands, a development company, bought land on Sandra Drive in New Orleans for the purpose of building an apartment complex. Woodlands fell on hard times and defaulted on the loan for the mortgage. After some extensions and agreements, Woodlands agreed to assign the property to a third party, Johnson Property Group (“JPG”). A Purchase Agreement, and then a Contract of Sale, between Woodlands and Johnson Property Group followed. When Hurricane Katrina caused extensive damage to the property in question, the insurance company paid the settlement to Regions Bank. Woodlands claimed it was entitled to receive these proceeds, while JPG claimed the proceeds should go toward its balance.  

After an epic battle which consisted of three appeals, and multiple motions, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of a partial summary judgment motion for Woodlands Development. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine issue of material fact,” meaning all the facts presented clearly show one party deserves to win. La. C.C.P. art. 966. Here, the party moving for summary judgment only had sufficient facts to convince a judge that some of the issues required dismissal, so a motion for partial summary judgment was put forth. JPG appealed the Trial Court’s finding in favor of Woodlands’ motion, which is the issue in the present case.

wire-fence-1221022-1024x768When our loved one is under the care of others, we expect him or her to be free from pain and neglect. Unfortunately, the authorities in charge of our loved one can make mistakes, and sometimes, the mistakes can be fatal. In such cases, we would likely blame the authorities in charge and desire some sort of punishment upon them. However, just because the fault may lie with the authorities does not mean that punishment is inevitable. The case of Jamie Zaunbrecher is an example.

Zaunbrecher was an inmate at the Ascension Parish Jail. Two nurses, Robyn Richard and Michelle Gaudin, were in charge of his medical care. When Zaunbrecher arrived at the jail, he told the medical staff that he had pre-existing medical conditions, but did not tell them of his diverticulitis, which ultimately contributed to his death. On February 18th, six days before his death, Zaunbrecher submitted a “Medical Request Form” (“Form”) in which he sought “emergency” care. More specifically, he wrote that he had severe pain in the right side of his back and that his pain medication was not being replenished. The day after Zaunbrecher’s submission, Nurse Richard gave Zaunbrecher Ibuprofen. On February 20th, Zaunbrecher submitted another Form complaining of back pain and constipation. Nurse Richard provided Tylenol and a laxative. Zaunbrecher also asked for a blood test, but this request could not be granted as only the nurse practitioner, who was not available, could grant it. From February 21st, Nurse Gaudin took care of Zaunbrecher and provided laxatives in order to aid his constipation. Though Nurse Gaudin thought Zaunbrecher was getting better, on February 24th, Zaunbrecher grew extremely ill. He was brought to a hospital, but by the time he arrived, he had passed away. Zaunbrecher’s representative sued Richard and Gaudin for not providing proper medical treatment and violating Zaunbrecher’s Eighth Amendment Right.

Nurses Richard and Gaudin responded to the lawsuit by invoking qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is a legal doctrine that protects government workers from being sued for acts done under the scope of their employment. The Trial Court refused to grant qualified immunity, but the Appeals Court stated that qualified immunity was appropriate. When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the plaintiff has to first show that the defendant violated a constitutional right. Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp., 430 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 2005). Here, the plaintiff’s argument was that Richard and Gaudin violated Zaunbrecher’s Eight Amendment Right by acting indifferently to his medical needs. To show this indifference, the plaintiff had to prove that Richard and Gaudin knew that Zaunbrecher “face[d] a substantial risk of serious bodily harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). The plaintiff also had to prove that Richard and Gaudin knew this risk and failed to mitigate this risk.

Contact Information