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willow-1385791-1024x766The National Flood Insurance Program, or NFIP, was Congress’ approach to providing flood coverage at affordable rates. Generally, through the program homeowners can buy a Standard Flood Insurance Policy, or SFIP, from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or from private insurers. According to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the SFIP outlines the conditions and requirements under which federal funds may be distributed to eligible policyholders. See Marseilles Homeowners Condo. Ass’n, Icn. v. Fidelity Nat’l Ins. Co., 542 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 2008). It is these requirements, or rather not following them to the letter, that sometimes stop homeowners from receiving their coverage.

Ron and Patricia Ferraro own a house at 133 Somerset Road, in Laplace, Louisiana. They had an SFIP from Liberty Mutual. Unfortunately, Hurricane Isaac in 2012 caused extensive damage to their home; nonetheless, their insurance policy with Liberty Mutual was in effect.

The Ferraros filed a claim for benefits, and Liberty Mutual sent an independent adjuster. The adjuster recommended a payment of $103,826 and prepared a proof-of-loss form in this amount. The Ferraros signed and submitted this form along with a signed proof-of-loss form. Important to their case, they also included a handwritten note stating that they would send supplements later. Liberty Mutual paid the full amount of $103,826.

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whistle-1423801-1-1024x768Whistleblowers play a controversial role in the United States. Without Mark Felt, also known as Deep Throat, the world would have never known about the corruptions in the Nixon Administration and without Edward Snowden, the world would have never known the extent of the NSA’s surveillance on both U.S. citizens and foreign individuals. Congress recognized the importance of whistleblowers when it passed the False Claims Act. The False Claims Act allows individuals to bring lawsuits (called a qui tam action) on behalf of the United States when an individual or entity defrauds the United States Government. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2015). The purpose of the False Claims Act is to incentivize individuals to monitor and prevent fraud against the United States by enabling the individuals to get a portion of any damage award that the court gives.

Gregory D. Guth brought a qui tam action against a law firm (RP) arising from the firm’s representation of Louisiana State University (“LSU”) in an expropriation proceeding against him. An expropriation proceeding is an action by a governmental authority where the governmental authority takes property from its owner for public use or benefit.

This case arose after Hurricane Katrina. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development made federal funds available to the City of New Orleans (“the City”) in the form of Community Development Block Grants. The City set aside a portion of the block grants to build a medical center for the U.S. Department of Veteran’s Affairs and a teaching hospital for LSU. The City and the State of Louisiana entered an agreement assigning LSU the power and funds to acquire or expropriate property for the medical facilities. LSU then hired RP to acquire the necessary property.

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toes-1438916-1024x683As if having car troubles was not bad enough, imagine also losing your toe in the process. Well, that exact scenario happened to Valerie Babin. After her vehicle broke down in Gonzales, Louisiana, Ms. Babin called American Towing Enterprises to tow her vehicle. An American Towing Enterprises’s employee, Floyd Russo, arrived to help Ms. Babin. At this point, Ms. Babin’s day went from bad to worse. As Mr. Russo partially loaded the vehicle onto the truck’s flatbed, Ms. Babin went to turn off her vehicle’s emergency flashers. At the same time, Mr. Russo lowered the truck bed, which landed on Ms. Babin’s foot, crushing her big toe. Despite attempts to save her big toe, Ms. Babin eventually required surgery to remove it.

Ms. Babin filed a lawsuit against Mr. Russo and American Towing Enterprises. At trial, the court awarded $673,380.35 in damages, finding Mr. Russo and American Towing Enterprises 60% at fault and Ms. Babin 40% at fault. When the injured individual is found partially at fault for his or her injury, his or her damages are reduced by the amount he or she was at fault. In Ms. Babin’s case, her fault reduced the total amount of damages to $404,028.21. Ms. Babin appealed the trial court’s determination of damages, claiming that the awarded amount was insufficient. Conversely, Mr. Russo and American Towing Enterprises appealed the trial court’s determination claiming that the amount awarded was excessive.

The Louisiana Court of Appeals (“the Court”) was tasked with determining whether the damages were insufficient or excessive. The Court examined two types of damages, general damages, and special damages. General damages often include mental or physical pain, suffering, inconvenience, loss of gratification or intellectual or physical enjoyment, or other losses of lifestyle. McGee v. A C And S, Inc., 933 So. 2d 770, 774 (La. 2006). The goal of general damages is to make the injured party whole. In other words, put the injured party in the same position he or she was at prior to the injury. Special damages are damages that the injured person will experience in the future. Ms. Babin argued that at minimum she should have received $400,000 for general damages and $557,028 in special damages for future medical care. The Court found that the trial court’s determination of general and special damages was reasonable. When addressing the amount of special damages for future medical care, the Court noted that the trial court awarded Ms. Babin $223,77.00 based on the testimony of two doctors at trial. When seeking future medical expenses, “the appellate record must establish that future medical expenses will be necessary and inevitable.” Bass v. State, 167 So. 3d 711, 716 (La. 2014). In addition, future medical expenses will not be supported when there is not medical testimony. The Court found the trial court’s determination of special damages was reasonable and disregarded the defendants’ argument that the awarded amount was unsupported by evidence. Lastly, the Court examined the loss of future wages. The loss of future wages requires the trial court to determine how much work the injured party will miss in the future because of his or her injury. For Ms. Babin, the trial court determined that Ms. Babin will lose $81,735.00 in future wages. The Court also found this amount reasonable.

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pillow-and-sheet-1499969-1024x769Is it cruel and unusual punishment for a prison to not provide an extra pillow and mattress to an injured prisoner?  According to Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, it is not.  It is unsurprising that inmates often complain about mistreatment from prison officials. But what is required for a prison official’s conduct to be considered cruel and unusual punishment?

Amongst other things, the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Prisoners have a very high standard of proof when claiming that prison officials are guilty of such conduct.  The prisoner must show that the prison official acted with “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs, constituting an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006).

In this case, Mr. Davis, an inmate at Avoyelles Bunkie Detention Center, was involved in an accident while traveling in an Avoyelles Parish Sheriff’s Office transport vehicle. The driver of the transport vehicle hit another vehicle while in reverse. Mr. Davis and the other inmates involved in the accident were taken to the hospital two hours after the accident occurred.

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big-oli-rig-1239227-1024x769Decisiveness can be an excellent quality, especially in a judge.  Court dockets are usually quite full and it can take a very long time for cases to be resolved. Whenever there is a confusion over which law to apply, however, patience is the greater virtue.  In a lawsuit, lawyers will often request relief under various laws in hopes that one will bring success.   In a recent case out of Venice, Louisiana, the  Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal reminded an Office of Workers’ Compensation Judge (“WCJ”)  just how important patience is when issuing an order in a case with competing theories of recovery.   

Shawn Johnson was a mechanic for The Wood Group working on its oil production platforms when he was injured in a boat collision on Grand Pass on March 12, 2014.  Grand Pass is a fishing channel, known as “the jump”, which is located close to Venice, Louisiana, in St. Bernard Parish.  After the accident, Mr. Johnson filed claims for compensation under both the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act (“LWCA”) and the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”).  At a December 19, 2014, hearing, the WCJ dismissed Mr. Johnson’s LWCA claim with prejudice asserting the WCJ lacked jurisdiction because the claim did not fall under the LWCA. The dismissal with prejudice would prohibit Mr. Johnson from refiling his LWCA claim.  Mr. Johnson’s LHWCA claim before a federal court was still pending at the time of the dismissal.

In the judgment, the WCJ did not explicitly find that Mr. Johnson’s claim was covered by the LHWCA.  Instead, she found that his claim did not fall under the LWCA. In her reasoning, the WCJ said that there is no longer concurrent jurisdiction so if a claim falls under any federal statute, that would preclude a state claim. The WCJ did not wait however for a definitive determination by the federal court on whether Mr. Johnson’s claim fell under the LHWCA.  If both claims were dismissed with prejudice Mr. Johnson would be completely deprived of relief.  Mr. Johnson appealed the case to the Fourth Circuit only requesting that the case is dismissed without prejudice (meaning it could be refiled) just in case the LHWCA claim did not survive.

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handicap-parking-1444248-1024x606Accidents in the workplace can rob one of the ability to work or even do simple daily tasks. The system of workers’ compensation exists to ensure that injured workers are compensated for their injuries. However, certain rules exist to ensure money is distributed efficiently.  In a recent case out of Opelousas, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal confronted the rules governing permanent or temporary disability status.   

Donald Stelly was an employee of Fresenius Medical Care NA (“Fresenius”). In September of 2005, Mr. Stelly fell from a ladder at work and was injured. At the time of his injury, Mr. Stelly was 67 years old and had suffered other medical conditions including heart disease and diabetes. As a result of his injury, Fresenius paid his medical expenses and workers’ compensation benefits.   In 2014, Mr. Stelly filed a claim against Fresenius disputing his disability status.  Mr. Stelly had a “Functional Capacity Evaluation” (FCE) test performed on him in 2009.  An FCE is a schedule of tests and evaluations to assess one’s abilities, especially in the workplace.  Based on the FCE doctors opined that he was totally disabled and would not be able to return to work.  Fresenius petitioned for another FCE to be performed and Mr. Stelly petitioned for a finding of permanent disability as shown by the earlier tests.

After a trial before the Office of Workers’ Compensation for the Parish of St. Landry, the Worker’s Compensation Judge (WCJ) found in favor of Fresenius, ruling that Mr. Stelly was only temporarily disabled, finding that there was not enough evidence to find him to be permanently disabled.  Mr. Stelly appealed his case to the Third Circuit.

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landcape-1394201-1024x768Desiring to be friendly, you may allow your neighbors to use a portion of your land in order to make their lives a little easier.  You allow your neighbors to continue to use your land for some time, but now you want privacy on your property.  At this point you would most likely ask your neighbor to stop using your land, but what do you do when they refuse?  What do you do when your new neighbor claims ownership of the portion of land that you allowed them to use?  Defending ownership rights against presumptuous neighbors was a recent issue in a case out of St. Landry Parish.  

In 1989, Emery and Hazel Scrantz divorced.  Prior to Mr. and Mrs. Scrantz’s divorce, they owned a single 119-acre tract of land.  After the divorce, a court ordered the land be separated into three separate tracts.  Emery received two tracts, a 20-acre tract, and an 80-acre tract.  Hazel received one 19-acre tract.  Hazel’s 19-acre tract was situated in-between both of Emery’s tracts of land.  In order to allow Emery access to both of his tracts, he was granted a servitude (i.e. easement) to run his cattle across Hazel’s land.  On July 7, 1993, Emery sold his 80-acre tract to his brother, the Plaintiff, Joseph Scrantz.  Emery maintained ownership of his 20-acre tract.   Emery and Joseph shared their land to raise cattle, and would often use the passage crossing over Hazel’s land to transfer the cattle between the two tracts.

In 1994, Hazel sold her 19-acre tract to the Defendants, Marvin and Dorothy Smith.  When the Smiths first purchased the tract of land from Hazel they were unaware of the servitude.   In 2013 Emery died, and his daughter, Tina Scrantz, inherited the 20-acre tract of land. At some point before his death, Emery and Marvin Smith had a disagreement concerning the use of the passage.  The disagreement was settled when Marvin agreed to let Emery’s cattle pass through his tract to access the land owned by the Scrantz brothers.  Marvin Smith also allowed Joseph and Emery to build a fence around the servitude. After Emery’s death, Joseph continued running cattle across the passage to the 20-acre tract now owned by Tina.

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hot-spicy-wings-1324961-1024x768Contractual relationships can advance or dissolve as time passes, often turning sour when promises are not kept.  One or both parties may attempt to break the relationship but the underlying contract is not so easily terminated.  As a result, the parties may find themselves in a court battle over seemingly small details.  In this recent Louisiana case before the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, the presumably costly break-up came down to one little word.   

Spencer Franchise Services of Georgia, Incorporated (“Spencer”) and WOW Café and Wingery Franchising Account, L.L.C. (“WOW”) contracted to develop restaurants in Georgia.  Spencer agreed to open, manage, and provide for WOW restaurants in Georgia as well as to provide reports to WOW regarding the franchise locations.  WOW granted Spencer the exclusive right to open WOW restaurants in Georgia (excepting two counties) and the right to receive royalty and other fees associated with franchise operations.  The parties’ relationship began to deteriorate with Spencer failing to inspect franchise locations and furnish WOW with reports.  Spencer claimed that WOW also breached the contract by failing to sell a minimum number of franchise agreements as arguably required by the contract.  The legal dispute centered on the contract language which stated the “Franchisor” was required to sell franchise agreements.  WOW asserted “Franchisor” was a typographical error meant to read “Developer” which would obligate Spencer to franchise sales.  Spencer argued that obviously the contract’s wording of “Franchisor”  was accurate since it obligated WOW to open franchises.  Spencer reasoned that language to the contrary would not have been worth its investment.

Spencer and WOW filed numerous lawsuits against each other asking the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana for summary judgment. A court may award a party summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute about any material fact.  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).  When the court grants summary judgment, the judge is deciding the case according to the law, no fact-finders (usually a jury) are required.  The District Court found “Franchisor” as written was a clear mutual error and determined there were no facts remaining in dispute. The District Court granted summary judgment in WOW’s favor and rescinded the contract.  Spencer appealed arguing summary judgment was not proper in this case as it was not clear from all the evidence that “Franchisor” was a mistake and thus there were still questions requiring resolution by a jury.  

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hard-hat-area-1455626-1-1024x732Getting seriously injured on the job is always a terrible experience, but what if it is unclear for purposes of a lawsuit who you even work for? You know that someone owes you compensation for your injuries, but in this recent case out of Natchitoches Parish that “someone” may not be where your employment application was filed.  

International Paper Company (“IPCO”) hired Turner Industries Group, LLC (“Turner”) to perform maintenance work on IPCO’s recovery boiler.  Garred Whotte, an employee of Turner, was sent to IPCO to construct scaffolding necessary to the maintenance work. While on the job, his feet started burning, resulting in chemical burns to his feet and ankles. Mr. Whotte brought a personal injury lawsuit against IPCO. IPCO filed a successful motion for summary judgment arguing that it was immune from a personal injury lawsuit under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act (“Act”) which limits recovery to the provisions of the Act. The Tenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Natchitoches specifically found that Mr. Whotte was a “statutory employee” of IPCO at the time of the injury limiting Mr. Whotte to workers’ compensation benefits. Mr. Whotte appealed to the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal.

The remedies provided to a worker under the Act are the exclusive remedy an employee can seek against his employer or principal pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1032(A)(1)(a).  A “principal” is a person who has contracted with another to perform work as part of the business at the time of worker’s injury.  The principal, as the statutory employer, is protected from tort lawsuits and given the protections of the Act as the exclusive remedy for those injured on the job.  La. R.S. 23:1061.  In the event of a contract between the principal and employer, the contract must contain language recognizing the principal as the statutory employer.  Language to this effect creates the presumption of a statutory employer, however, this presumption can be overcome only by showing that the work is not an integral part of or essential to the ability of the principal to generate their goods, products, or services.  

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money-1537576-1-768x1024What if you are injured, hire a lawyer, and that lawyer fails to sufficiently work on your case? Outrage ensues and you may choose to fire that lawyer and hire a second.  But is that first lawyer entitled to payment if you happen to win and receive an award in your case? In a recent Louisiana case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the answer can be in the affirmative.  

After David Corey was the injured, he hired Salvador Brocato and Lionel Hutton to handle his personal injury lawsuit. In the two years that Mr. Brocato and Mr. Hutton handled Mr. Corey’s case, the attorneys did little work on his case: failing to hire an investigator,  failing to adequately prepare Mr. Corey for his deposition, and failing to hire experts as well as other faults. Mr. Corey fired Mr. Brocato and Mr. Hutton and subsequently hired Arnold & Itkin, LLP, to handle his case.  Arnold & Itkin worked on Mr. Corey’s case, and eventually secured a settlement of $2,187,500, with $875,000 awarded in attorneys’ fees. Mr. Brocato and Mr. Hutton intervened seeking a share of the amount of the attorneys’ fees awarded for the work they had done on Mr. Corey’s case prior to termination. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana awarded Mr. Brocato and Mr. Hutton 20% of the awarded attorneys’ fees. The judge calculated the percentage based on the principles of quantum meruit: generally expressed as the actual value of the services performed. In this case, the amount of work completed before termination was calculated at 20%.  Contending that to award the 20% would be an improper and illegal award of a contingency fee to lawyers who did not have a contingency fee agreement, Arnold & Itkin appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  

Louisiana fee awards in quantum meruit are calculated by factors set out by the Louisiana Supreme Court. See State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v. Williamson, 597 So. 2d 439 (La. 1992). There are ten factors, including the ultimate result, obtained, the importance of litigation, the amount of money involved, the extent of the work performed, skill and diligence of the attorneys, the number of appearances made, intricacies of the facts, and the court’s own knowledge. Courts may consider these factors in the quantum meruit analysis when a contingency fee agreement has been discharged or when a contingency fee agreement was never involved. See City of Alexandria v. Brown, 740 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2014). The factors sometimes referred to as “Saucier Factors” are applied even when the attorney was discharged either with or without cause, although courts must reduce the award of an attorney discharged for cause according to the gravity of cause for discharge. Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Product, Inc., 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1978).

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