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handicap-parking-1444248-1024x606Accidents in the workplace can rob one of the ability to work or even do simple daily tasks. The system of workers’ compensation exists to ensure that injured workers are compensated for their injuries. However, certain rules exist to ensure money is distributed efficiently.  In a recent case out of Opelousas, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal confronted the rules governing permanent or temporary disability status.   

Donald Stelly was an employee of Fresenius Medical Care NA (“Fresenius”). In September of 2005, Mr. Stelly fell from a ladder at work and was injured. At the time of his injury, Mr. Stelly was 67 years old and had suffered other medical conditions including heart disease and diabetes. As a result of his injury, Fresenius paid his medical expenses and workers’ compensation benefits.   In 2014, Mr. Stelly filed a claim against Fresenius disputing his disability status.  Mr. Stelly had a “Functional Capacity Evaluation” (FCE) test performed on him in 2009.  An FCE is a schedule of tests and evaluations to assess one’s abilities, especially in the workplace.  Based on the FCE doctors opined that he was totally disabled and would not be able to return to work.  Fresenius petitioned for another FCE to be performed and Mr. Stelly petitioned for a finding of permanent disability as shown by the earlier tests.

After a trial before the Office of Workers’ Compensation for the Parish of St. Landry, the Worker’s Compensation Judge (WCJ) found in favor of Fresenius, ruling that Mr. Stelly was only temporarily disabled, finding that there was not enough evidence to find him to be permanently disabled.  Mr. Stelly appealed his case to the Third Circuit.

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landcape-1394201-1024x768Desiring to be friendly, you may allow your neighbors to use a portion of your land in order to make their lives a little easier.  You allow your neighbors to continue to use your land for some time, but now you want privacy on your property.  At this point you would most likely ask your neighbor to stop using your land, but what do you do when they refuse?  What do you do when your new neighbor claims ownership of the portion of land that you allowed them to use?  Defending ownership rights against presumptuous neighbors was a recent issue in a case out of St. Landry Parish.  

In 1989, Emery and Hazel Scrantz divorced.  Prior to Mr. and Mrs. Scrantz’s divorce, they owned a single 119-acre tract of land.  After the divorce, a court ordered the land be separated into three separate tracts.  Emery received two tracts, a 20-acre tract, and an 80-acre tract.  Hazel received one 19-acre tract.  Hazel’s 19-acre tract was situated in-between both of Emery’s tracts of land.  In order to allow Emery access to both of his tracts, he was granted a servitude (i.e. easement) to run his cattle across Hazel’s land.  On July 7, 1993, Emery sold his 80-acre tract to his brother, the Plaintiff, Joseph Scrantz.  Emery maintained ownership of his 20-acre tract.   Emery and Joseph shared their land to raise cattle, and would often use the passage crossing over Hazel’s land to transfer the cattle between the two tracts.

In 1994, Hazel sold her 19-acre tract to the Defendants, Marvin and Dorothy Smith.  When the Smiths first purchased the tract of land from Hazel they were unaware of the servitude.   In 2013 Emery died, and his daughter, Tina Scrantz, inherited the 20-acre tract of land. At some point before his death, Emery and Marvin Smith had a disagreement concerning the use of the passage.  The disagreement was settled when Marvin agreed to let Emery’s cattle pass through his tract to access the land owned by the Scrantz brothers.  Marvin Smith also allowed Joseph and Emery to build a fence around the servitude. After Emery’s death, Joseph continued running cattle across the passage to the 20-acre tract now owned by Tina.

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hot-spicy-wings-1324961-1024x768Contractual relationships can advance or dissolve as time passes, often turning sour when promises are not kept.  One or both parties may attempt to break the relationship but the underlying contract is not so easily terminated.  As a result, the parties may find themselves in a court battle over seemingly small details.  In this recent Louisiana case before the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, the presumably costly break-up came down to one little word.   

Spencer Franchise Services of Georgia, Incorporated (“Spencer”) and WOW Café and Wingery Franchising Account, L.L.C. (“WOW”) contracted to develop restaurants in Georgia.  Spencer agreed to open, manage, and provide for WOW restaurants in Georgia as well as to provide reports to WOW regarding the franchise locations.  WOW granted Spencer the exclusive right to open WOW restaurants in Georgia (excepting two counties) and the right to receive royalty and other fees associated with franchise operations.  The parties’ relationship began to deteriorate with Spencer failing to inspect franchise locations and furnish WOW with reports.  Spencer claimed that WOW also breached the contract by failing to sell a minimum number of franchise agreements as arguably required by the contract.  The legal dispute centered on the contract language which stated the “Franchisor” was required to sell franchise agreements.  WOW asserted “Franchisor” was a typographical error meant to read “Developer” which would obligate Spencer to franchise sales.  Spencer argued that obviously the contract’s wording of “Franchisor”  was accurate since it obligated WOW to open franchises.  Spencer reasoned that language to the contrary would not have been worth its investment.

Spencer and WOW filed numerous lawsuits against each other asking the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana for summary judgment. A court may award a party summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute about any material fact.  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).  When the court grants summary judgment, the judge is deciding the case according to the law, no fact-finders (usually a jury) are required.  The District Court found “Franchisor” as written was a clear mutual error and determined there were no facts remaining in dispute. The District Court granted summary judgment in WOW’s favor and rescinded the contract.  Spencer appealed arguing summary judgment was not proper in this case as it was not clear from all the evidence that “Franchisor” was a mistake and thus there were still questions requiring resolution by a jury.  

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hard-hat-area-1455626-1-1024x732Getting seriously injured on the job is always a terrible experience, but what if it is unclear for purposes of a lawsuit who you even work for? You know that someone owes you compensation for your injuries, but in this recent case out of Natchitoches Parish that “someone” may not be where your employment application was filed.  

International Paper Company (“IPCO”) hired Turner Industries Group, LLC (“Turner”) to perform maintenance work on IPCO’s recovery boiler.  Garred Whotte, an employee of Turner, was sent to IPCO to construct scaffolding necessary to the maintenance work. While on the job, his feet started burning, resulting in chemical burns to his feet and ankles. Mr. Whotte brought a personal injury lawsuit against IPCO. IPCO filed a successful motion for summary judgment arguing that it was immune from a personal injury lawsuit under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act (“Act”) which limits recovery to the provisions of the Act. The Tenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Natchitoches specifically found that Mr. Whotte was a “statutory employee” of IPCO at the time of the injury limiting Mr. Whotte to workers’ compensation benefits. Mr. Whotte appealed to the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal.

The remedies provided to a worker under the Act are the exclusive remedy an employee can seek against his employer or principal pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1032(A)(1)(a).  A “principal” is a person who has contracted with another to perform work as part of the business at the time of worker’s injury.  The principal, as the statutory employer, is protected from tort lawsuits and given the protections of the Act as the exclusive remedy for those injured on the job.  La. R.S. 23:1061.  In the event of a contract between the principal and employer, the contract must contain language recognizing the principal as the statutory employer.  Language to this effect creates the presumption of a statutory employer, however, this presumption can be overcome only by showing that the work is not an integral part of or essential to the ability of the principal to generate their goods, products, or services.  

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money-1537576-1-768x1024What if you are injured, hire a lawyer, and that lawyer fails to sufficiently work on your case? Outrage ensues and you may choose to fire that lawyer and hire a second.  But is that first lawyer entitled to payment if you happen to win and receive an award in your case? In a recent Louisiana case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the answer can be in the affirmative.  

After David Corey was the injured, he hired Salvador Brocato and Lionel Hutton to handle his personal injury lawsuit. In the two years that Mr. Brocato and Mr. Hutton handled Mr. Corey’s case, the attorneys did little work on his case: failing to hire an investigator,  failing to adequately prepare Mr. Corey for his deposition, and failing to hire experts as well as other faults. Mr. Corey fired Mr. Brocato and Mr. Hutton and subsequently hired Arnold & Itkin, LLP, to handle his case.  Arnold & Itkin worked on Mr. Corey’s case, and eventually secured a settlement of $2,187,500, with $875,000 awarded in attorneys’ fees. Mr. Brocato and Mr. Hutton intervened seeking a share of the amount of the attorneys’ fees awarded for the work they had done on Mr. Corey’s case prior to termination. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana awarded Mr. Brocato and Mr. Hutton 20% of the awarded attorneys’ fees. The judge calculated the percentage based on the principles of quantum meruit: generally expressed as the actual value of the services performed. In this case, the amount of work completed before termination was calculated at 20%.  Contending that to award the 20% would be an improper and illegal award of a contingency fee to lawyers who did not have a contingency fee agreement, Arnold & Itkin appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  

Louisiana fee awards in quantum meruit are calculated by factors set out by the Louisiana Supreme Court. See State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v. Williamson, 597 So. 2d 439 (La. 1992). There are ten factors, including the ultimate result, obtained, the importance of litigation, the amount of money involved, the extent of the work performed, skill and diligence of the attorneys, the number of appearances made, intricacies of the facts, and the court’s own knowledge. Courts may consider these factors in the quantum meruit analysis when a contingency fee agreement has been discharged or when a contingency fee agreement was never involved. See City of Alexandria v. Brown, 740 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2014). The factors sometimes referred to as “Saucier Factors” are applied even when the attorney was discharged either with or without cause, although courts must reduce the award of an attorney discharged for cause according to the gravity of cause for discharge. Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Product, Inc., 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1978).

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hand-with-money-1056938-1024x689It is not uncommon for a victorious party in a lawsuit to seek attorneys’ fees upon their win.  There is no guarantee however the judge will agree an award of attorneys’’ fees are warranted.   In some cases filed in state court, the defendant can remove the case be heard in federal court.  If the federal court lacks jurisdiction, however, the case will be sent back to state court.  Whether the attorneys’ fees associated with the removal process can be recouped by the winning party is the subject of a recent lawsuit out of New Orleans.

CamSoft Data Systems, Inc. (“CamSoft”)  teamed up with Active Solutions (“Active”) and Southern Electronics Supply (“Electronic”) to install video surveillance systems in New Orleans. Just before the trio submitted their proposal for their joint venture for the future sale of the video surveillance system, Dell, Inc. (“Dell”) used their existing contract concerning the sale of technology to the state of Louisiana to halt the proposal. Moreover, Dell then sought to oust CamSoft from its joint venture with Active and Southern, who both then sold proprietary information that belonged to CamSoft. Later, in another business dealing, Dell ousted Southern and Active and replaced them with NetMethods, and cut Southern and Active out of the agreed arrangement.

CamSoft filed a lawsuit against Dell in Louisiana State Court, seeking its rights in the video surveillance system recognized and a share of the proceeds of the suit Active and Southern had against Dell. Using state law instead of federal patent law, CamSoft alleged breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract.

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to-market-1510735-1024x768No legal case is without controversy, but some of the most controversial types of cases involve a slip and fall injury. For some, it is hard to believe that a “little fall” could actually cause substantial injury. Often times, those who bring a slip and fall action are seen as milking the situation to try to get money from a business. However, when a person is injured he or she must prove that the injury was the result of someone’s alleged negligence. This proof requires that the injured individual show that the facts surrounding the incident support his or her claim. When coupled with a stringent legal standard, a dispute of what occurred at the time of the injury complicates the matter. The following slip and fall lawsuit filed against the Albertsons in Shreveport, Louisiana, shows the difficulty in bringing such claims to trial.

Yvonne and Aristide Ton were visiting an Albertsons’s grocery store in 2013. Upon arriving at the store, Ms. Ton went straight to the display of pumpkins out front, while Mr. Ton went to get a cart. After looking at the pumpkin display, Ms. Ton looked around for her husband, took a step or two, and then fell injuring her shoulder. Ms. Ton could not identify exactly what happened when she fell, but she claimed in her lawsuit that the fall was caused by a “defect in the concrete.” Albertsons responded by claiming that the concrete area where Ms. Ton fell posed no reasonable risk of harm. Albertsons provided witness testimony stating that the area where Ms. Ton fell had no prior history of falls and that the store had received no complaints regarding the area around the pumpkin display.

Under Louisiana Law, a business must “keep aisles, passageways, and floors in a reasonably safe condition.” La. R.S. 9:2800.6. This duty imposes a reasonable effort on the business to keep its premise free of any unsafe conditions which may cause injury. To bring a slip and fall claim against a business, the injured person must prove three things: 1) the floor surface presented an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm 2) the business created or knew of the unsafe floor surface and 3) the business failed to use reasonable care.

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lawnmower-1219945-1024x680When a case goes to trial, there are many nuances that a lawyer might have to address, including a motion for a continuance or a dismissal. A continuance is the postponement of a hearing, trial or other scheduled court proceeding at the request of either party or by the judge. A dismissal occurs when the court ends a legal action before completing the trial process. This case out of the Parish of East Baton Rouge demonstrates Louisiana’s requirements for a continuance or a dismissal in the district courts.

While Wayne Boyd was driving on Main Street at Regions Bank in Zachary, Louisiana, a rock was thrown from a lawnmower broke his window and struck his face, resulting in personal injury and property damage. Boyd filed a petition for damages against John Doe, who was operating the lawnmower, and Doe’s employer, BNL.

At the pre-trial conference on March 18, 2014, the District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge set a trial date of May 20, 2014. On the scheduled date for trial, Boyd was nervous, unstable and remained outside of the courtroom. Boyd’s attorney asked for a continuance of the trial because Boyd needed to think and discuss the problem with family. Boyd’s attorney also indicated that he could not proceed with trial because he had just taken the case over and did not have certified copies of records. BNL was present in the courtroom, with all exhibits and witnesses, and was ready to proceed with the trial. The District Court denied the motion to continue but stated that it would not entertain a motion to dismiss for at least 10 days. On July 9, 2014, BNL filed a motion to enforce the settlement, asserting that Boyd and BNL have reached settlement agreements. On August 28, 2014, the District Court granted BNL’s motion to dismiss. Boyd appealed the dismissal to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal.

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vertebrea-3-1559248-1024x768“My neck, my back, my neck and my back” is a cliche that has been used in television shows and movies when someone gets hurt in an accident and likely tends to file a lawsuit. Although Caddo Parish, Louisiana woman, Ruth Toliver, may not have used the exact phrase, she did fall on the job and filed for workers’ compensation benefits. After receiving a workers’ compensation settlement, she filed a lawsuit to recover for additional injuries.  But whether Ms. Toliver could recover twice proved another matter.   

While on the job working for Entergy Services, Inc (ESI), Ruth Toliver injured her neck and left shoulder when she fell from a three-foot high stepladder and hit the floor. She received workers’ compensation benefits shortly after the incident and continued to receive the benefits until they were terminated close to the end of 2010. Mrs. Toliver disputed the termination of benefits with the Office of Workers’ Compensation in January of 2011. Mrs. Toliver and ESI agreed to settle the matter for $58,909.93 that would be paid to Mrs. Toliver, plus all the related medical bills that she incurred prior to the date of settlement. The agreement provided that $43,909.93 of the settlement would be earmarked for a Medicare account for future medical bills. The total amount of workers’ compensation benefits that ESI paid Mrs. Toliver was $397,763.75.

The agreement released ESI from any and all liability for the work accident. About two years after signing the settlement agreement, Mrs. Toliver filed a lawsuit with the Louisiana Trial Court, claiming that in addition to her initial injuries, she also injured her head, right shoulder, and back in the fall. ESI objected to Mrs. Toliver’s lawsuit based on the settlement agreement. ESI argued that she was barred by claim preclusion because the settlement agreement was signed into a final order of approval and dismissal.  The Trial Court agreed and Mrs. Toliver appealed the decision.

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demolition-1575129-1024x666Imagine that you own several rental properties, and one day some of the properties get severely damaged by a hurricane. You slowly try to repair the damaged properties, but your local government decides to demolish it, without notifying you first. That is what happened to a St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana man named Glenn Sandrock.

Mr. Sandrock owned approximately forty rental properties in St. Bernard Parish. One of those properties was demolished by St. Bernard Parish Government (“SBPG”). Many properties within the Parish were damaged by Hurricane Katrina. In an effort to rebuild and restore the Parish, the St. Bernard Parish Council passed multiple ordinances which made it mandatory for owners to repair their hurricane-damaged properties. Ordinance #634-12-05 basically allowed SBPG to access private property to clean debris or even to demolish the property if the property didn’t meet reconstruction/maintenance specifications established by SBPG.

Mr. Sandrock received a condemnation notice during December 2006 which declared his property as a public health and safety hazard. The notice also stated that his property was scheduled for demolition. Mr. Sandrock applied for and was granted a demolition appeal in January 2007 which allowed Mr. Sandrock seven days to clean and properly secure the property. Ten days after Mr. Sandrock was given the appeal, SBPG sent an employee to the property to inspect, but without notifying Mr. Sandrock. The SPBG employee inspected the property and found that the property was not up to the standards required by the demolition appeal. Because Mr. Sandrock’s property was still covered with debris and had not been properly secured, SBPG revoked the appeal but did not notify Mr. Sandrock of the revocation.

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