Articles Posted in Insurance Dispute

Anyone with experience in the court system knows that seeing a lawsuit through to completion takes time. While the wheels of justice may turn slowly, the plaintiff in certain cases may require urgent action to put a stop to the defendant’s behavior that gave rise to the litigation in the first place. In those situations, a plaintiff can turn to the courts for help in the form of a petition for an injunction.

Under Louisiana law, an “injunction shall be issued in cases where irreparable injury, loss, or damage may otherwise result” The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained that “injunctive relief” is designed “to prevent the occurrence of future acts that may result in irreparable injury, loss or damage to the applicant.” The issuance of a permanent injunction requires the court to assess the merits of the request, which may itself require time; the court can issue a preliminary injunction–which only requires a prima facie (on its face) showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief–to maintain the status quo while the permanent injunction is pending. Key to the success of a plaintiff’s petition is that the court’s compulsion or prohibition of some conduct is required to stave off harm. An injunction cannot be issued for monetary damages. In addition, there is an exception to the requirement that the plaintiff show irreparable harm. The courts disregard this element when the conduct at issue “constitutes a direct violation of a prohibitory law or a constitutional right.” In other words, if the defendant’s conduct is illegal, harm is implied.

The Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit provided a useful analysis of the requirements for an injunction in the recent case of Desselle v. Acadian Ambulance Service, Inc.. The trial court granted of a preliminary injunction against Acadian to prevent it from collecting any amount in excess of the reimbursement rate it had negotiated with Keisha Desselle’s health insurance provider. Desselle disputed that any amount was due to Acadian, and was in litigation with her health insurance company over the matter. The court reversed the issuance of the injunction, stating that the case “[ran] afoul of [Louisiana law] insofar as [Desselle] did not demonstrate that “irreparable injury, loss, or damage may otherwise result” to her. First, Desselle has “already been subjected to the complained-of billing procedure.” Further, “any alleged injury, loss, or damage is monetary is nature. It is unclear how the anticipated injury, loss, or damage is irreparable insofar as “Desselle’s] suit is one for monetary damages.”

Late in the afternoon of April 15, 2001, Geraldine Fruge and her eight-year-old granddaughter, Hannah Lejeune, were involved in an auto accident on US Highway 171 in Beauregard Parish. Fruge, who was driving southbound, lost control of her Pontiac and veered into oncoming traffic. Tragically, both she and Lejeune were killed when their car struck a Ford pickup truck heading northbound. It had been raining on and off throughout the day and Highway 171 was wet at the time of the crash. The victims’ family brought a wrongful death action against Louisiana’s Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD). The plaintiffs alleged that due to the highway’s construction, water was allowed to collect and pond on the roadway. They alleged that this condition amounted to a defect that caused Fruge’s car to hydroplane. After jury returned a verdict in favor of DOTD, the plaintiffs appealed.

The primary duty of Louisiana’s DOTD is to maintain the public roadways in a condition that is reasonably safe and which does not present an unreasonable risk of harm to motorists who exercise ordinary care. As discussed in this prior blog post, a plaintiff must prove the following elements in a tort action against DOTD arising from accident on the roadway: (1) that the condition that caused the damage was in DOTD’s control; (2) that the condition amounted to a defect that presented an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) that the DOTD was aware or should have been aware that the defect existed; and (4) that the defect was the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Upon review, the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit began “with the second element: whether Highway 171 contained a condition that created an unreasonable risk of harm.”

The court reviewed the record and examined the testimony presented by eyewitnesses, experts, and accident investigators, much of which centered around the ridges or ruts in the travel lane that on the day of the accident held water on the road. The court noted that “it is clear that the jury could not have come to any conclusion other than the fact that the travel ruts on both lanes of Highway 171 were holding some water at the time of the accident. Thus, the pivotal question is whether this retention of water was a defect in the highway that created an unreasonable risk of harm.” After an exhaustive review of matters such as rut depth, roadway gradient, tire tread depth, and the physics of hydroplaning, the jury found that the condition of the road did not present an unreasonable risk of harm. “The issue to be resolved by a reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the factfinder’s conclusion was a reasonable one.” Accordingly, the court held that “the evidence in the record provides a reasonable factual basis for the jury to have concluded that Highway 171 was not defective,” and affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

As you may know, different states have sometimes very different laws. Laws are overall somewhat similar, but small discrepancies between state laws will matter a great deal in a lawsuit. The most common example of this type of conflict occurs when an individual has been injured in one state, usually while traveling, and actually lives in another state. Whose law applies in that situation? Naturally, the states have come up with a generalized test for the court to consider.

The test is usually referred to as the “significant relationship” test. The court will determine which state has the strongest connection to the lawsuit. It will consider factors such as where the injured party lives, where the injury occurred, who caused the injury, and where the causing party lives. Where the injury actually occurred is important because witnesses and evidence will be gathered from the scene. If those witnesses and evidence have to be transferred to another state, then the trial may become a lot more time consuming and expensive for both parties. In order to maintain efficiency, the court will weigh the location of the incident heavily.

In February of this year, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a case where choice of law was a major issue. In this case, an individual was killed as he was being transported in a helicopter to an oilrig in international waters off the coast of Louisiana for employment purposes. The helicopter hit a bird and went down, killing eight of the nine people that were in it. The crash was attributed to a product defect.

When a court award damages, the judges commonly look to whether or not that pain and suffering can be attributed to the defending party, the amount of time a victim suffered, and how much pain and suffering occurred. The cause is perhaps the most important aspect of whether or not a party will be awarded damages. It makes little sense for a defendant to have to pay for pain and suffering to the plaintiff if the defendant’s actions did not cause that pain and suffering. Then, the length and intensity of the suffering will help determine how much money will be awarded.

In a recent case, the plaintiff appealed from the Parish of Lafayette to the State of Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit based on the issue of damages. In this case, the plaintiff was in a car accident where she suffered significant damage to her back. As a result of this injury, she spent approximately twenty-eight months with the chiropractor attempting to correct the damage sustained to her lower back.

Although the victim visited the chiropractor before the accident occurred, the doctor recorded the services rendered before and after the accident. The doctor stated that the victim’s injuries worsened and the accident definitely caused the worsened condition. The lower court awarded general damages and medical fees, but it only ordered enough general damages that would cover seven months after the accident. It explained that the victim was already seeing the chiropractor; therefore, the services she received after the accident were only relating to a condition that was already present before the accident.

Damages are awarded in successful civil instances in order to put the injured party back into a position that they would have been in had the events in the case unfolded as planned or if the transaction had not taken place at all. For example, in a contracts case, if one party ordered and paid for widgets, and does not receive those widgets, then he should be able to get his money back or the court could force the other party to provide the widgets as promised. Sometimes, however, the position that you were in before the deal is not easy to quantify into a dollar amount. In cases where the injury is either physical or emotional, damages are very difficult to estimate.

In cases where the injury is either physical, emotional, or both, the court uses a variety of methods to attempt to determine the appropriate amount of damages. For example, if someone has been harmed physically and needs to go to the hospital, then part of the compensation will often include money to cover the hospital bills. If an individual has been troubled emotionally and needs to see a therapist, then the bills for that service will often be considered to figure damages. In addition, the court will often look at past cases to determine what type of monetary award that juries have given to the victim under similar circumstances. If the award that the jury gives is significantly smaller or larger than past awards then the court may intervene to adjust the damages granted.

A 2011 Delaware Supreme Court case illustrates this concept very well. In this case, a son and mother were exposed to asbestos while operating a car repair business for over forty years in Louisiana. They died after contracting mesothelioma; the mother died two years prior to her son’s death. Several issues came up in this case regarding the payment of damages. The lower court declared that two businesses were partially liable for the death of these individuals. Therefore, those businesses were ordered to pay $500,000 to the four remaining family members for the loss of their mother, $0 to the son for the loss of his mother, $80,000 to the mother’s estate for pain and suffering, and $1.6 million to the son’s estate for his pain and suffering. All of these funds were given to the four remaining family members.

Jurisdiction and appeals are both complicated subjects that law students spend an entire year studying in law school. The intricacies of jurisdiction and the appeals process are also learned from years of practice in the legal field. One victim discovered this notion out the hard way when he brought suit after a medical incident in Alexandria, Louisiana. Some general background information is helpful before the case is discussed.

In order for a court to hear a case, that court must have jurisdiction over it. Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear a case and it is granted by the United State Constitution or by statute. Jurisdiction needs to be determined at each level as it goes through the either the federal or state court system.

The District Court hears most federal claims first because it is usually considered the lowest federal court. After a case goes through the lower court then the defendant typically has the right to appeal if the judgment that was rendered at the District Court was not favorable to his case. The Court of Appeals then needs to determine whether it has jurisdiction over that particular appeal.

Southern Louisiana is known for its historic buildings, easy going attitude and humid climate. Though these ingredients mix well for a great place to live or vacation, they can wreak havoc on the health and safety of residents’ homes and work places. This was the case recently in Belle Chasse. There, an individual who rented an office for her business discovered the building contained toxic mold that posed serious health risks. The problem needed immediate remediation. After being contacted, the property owners began removal of the mold. However, the mold, according to the tenant, was so exacerbated that she was forced to abandon the office. The tenant then filed suit against the landlords and their insurance company seeking compensation for business and health related damages.

The importance of this case lies in its examination of expert testimony. In this instance, the tenant sought to have her doctor testify that her chronic fatigue syndrome and other health conditions were directly related to the toxic mold in her office. The landlords claimed it would be erroneous for the court to classify the doctor as an expert and asked that the lawsuit be excused. The court agreed with the landlords and, on appeal, so did the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit.

Expert testimony is governed by the Daubert rule. According to this rule, in order for expert testimony to be heard it must be deemed to be relevant and reliable. The Supreme Court in Daubert provided that relevancy and reliability are determined by a set of factors: (1) testability of the scientific theory; (2) whether the theory has been subject to peer review; (3) knowledge of the theory’s rate of error; and (4) whether the theory has gained general acceptance within the scientific community. These factors are non-exclusive, but provide a solid framework for courts when determining whether to allow an “expert’s” testimony.

Doyle, a resident of Eunice, Louisiana, lost his appeal of the summary judgment verdict denying him damages resulting from injuries he received in an automobile-train accident. On March 5, 2009, Doyle finished up an evening of cards with friends and a half pint of whiskey before getting in his car to drive home. While he was crossing the train tracks, a train owned by Union Pacific Railroad Co. collided with his car. When Doyle’s blood alcohol level (BAC) was tested at the hospital, it measured .108% – the legal limit in Louisiana is .08%. A toxicologist testifying for the defense argues that his BAC at the time of the accident would have been well above a level associated with mental and physical impairment. This impairment significantly increased his risk of ending up in a car accident.

As a result of this intoxication, unfortunately Louisiana Statute § 9:2798.4 bars Doyle’s claim. The statute does not permit recovery to a driver if the driver was (a) legally intoxicated, (b) more than twenty-fiver percent negligent, and (c) his or her negligence was a contributing factor in the accident. Many states have similar laws on their books due to the public policy concerns of allowing an intoxicated person to recover for injuries that resulted from his own voluntary intoxication. If someone chose to drive while intoxicated, why should the other party have to pay for the drunk driver’s negligent behavior? However, in order to prevent injustice, most of these laws have a requirement that the intoxicated person’s actions be somewhat negligent and that that negligence be a relevant factor of the accident.

Doyle admitted that he hadn’t looked for the train when he crossed. The crossing was marked with lights and there is evidence that the lights were flashing and the train honked its horn to warn of its approach, despite Doyle’s argument to the contrary. The first responder to the scene, a police officer, testified that the lights were working when he arrived and the event recorder on the train showed the engineer began blowing the horn 25 seconds before the collision. These two signals would have alerted a reasonable person to the train’s proximity. The trial court concluded and the appellate court affirmed that no reasonable juror could come to the conclusion that Doyle was less than 25% negligent in the cause of his own accident due to his intoxicated state and his failure to look properly for an incoming train while crossing the tracks. While the train company could be considered at fault in this case, Doyle was also at fault for driving while impaired under alcohol. Since no reasonable juror could find in Doyle’s favor in this case, summary judgment was appropriate.

Two former employees of a large loan business located in Bossier Parish, Louisiana, succeeded in their malicious prosecution against their former employer. Deborah LeBlanc and Teri Shirey left the Cash Back Loans company where they both had held management positions. After their employment terminated, Linda Mills, another employee began reorganizing the accounts of the store which had been in disarray for years. On her inspection she found nineteen loans in sixteen names that she suspected were fraudulent. She brought her suspicion to Ray Pynes, Sr., the owner of the company, and told him she thought it was likely that the Shirey and LeBlanc had stolen the money. Based on Mills’ statement and documentation, the two women were arrested for felony theft. The case was dropped nine months later.

A successful claim for malicious prosecution has several legal elements, all of them inherently important and core to successful litigation. In short, the terms require the case must have been terminated in favor of the present plaintiff, the plaintiff must show the absence of probable cause for arrest and that the defendant acted with malice in bringing the case forward anyway.

The court found that Mills’ investigation into the suspicious loans was lackluster. There was evidence that she had fabricated documents and her testimony varied significantly through the trial process. Mills told the police that employees were not allowed to take loans from the company like LeBlanc and Shirey did when this was patently false and many employees had loans with the company. She told the police that the required documentation for loans was never submitted for Shirey’s loan when the company had drivers’ licenses and several other documents to validate the loan. She also presented inconsistent testimony as to whether or not she actually tried to contact the bogus loan customers. She claimed at one point that she called each one but admitted later that she did not bother to contact any of the sixteen loan customers to try to verify their legitimacy. Three of the “bogus” loan customers came forward claiming they had legitimate loans with the company. One had made payments on the loan after Shirey and LeBlanc left the company. Several of the loans were approved after the two women had left the company. The arrests of Shirey and LeBlanc were made exclusively on Mills’ inaccurate statements. The company had no accounting discrepancies that they could find to support their theft claims. They didn’t even admit bank account records into evidence.

This case is a welcome reminder of how an attorney’s advice may sometimes lead to more harm than good. Brown brought suit against his former employer, Skagit, under Title VII claiming racial harassment and constructive discharge. In a deposition, Brown testified that his sole reason for quitting his job at Skagit was due to racial harassment. However, in a deposition four months earlier in an unrelated personal injury case, Brown testified that he left Skagit solely because of debilitating back pain suffered during a car accident. Skagit sought dismissal of Brown’s claims based on his conflicting testimony, which the district court allowed and dismissed with prejudice. The court also went one step further finding Brown committed perjury. Brown’s appeal is based on a matter of fairness, arguing that a less severe sanction is in order and that he was entitled to explain the discrepancy between the testimonies.

To emphasize the facts, in the first case, based on racial harassment and constructive discharge under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e, Brown testified as to how he felt endangered by his co-workers’ threatening behavior, which involved dropping heavy plates and pipes near him. He was also distraught by his co-workers flinging derogatory remarks at him on a daily basis. He felt compelled to quit his job, as his supervisors purportedly ignored this behavior. When asked why he quit his job, he testified that the only reason he quit was because of the racial harassment. He reiterated that there were no other reasons for his quitting.

In a completely unrelated deposition for a personal injury claim, Brown testified that the exclusive reason he left Skagit was due to his debilitating back pain, which prevented him from performing his job as a welder. He again emphasized and confirmed that this was his only reason for leaving his job.

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