Articles Posted in Civil Matter

oil-1441845-768x1024A recent case arising out of Tensas Parish, Louisiana, highlights the importance of checking on leases that burden any land before purchase. “Legacy lawsuits” are claims that oil and gas operations caused contamination on a property and generally name any operators who worked at the property and could have contributed to the contamination. In this aspect, the case out of Tensas Parish is no different. This case involves a legacy lawsuit where landowners purchased a property in 2002, but the property was subject to mineral leases/servitudes as early as the 1940s by different oil and gas companies.

In the case, the current landowners claim that their land was contaminated by the oil and gas exploration and production activities conducted or controlled by the oil companies.  The landowners sought to collect damages from the companies to restore the property to its pre-polluted state. They also asserted that the contamination was a result of the companies using the land for waste disposal and classified the pollution as a continuous tort. The appellate court disagreed with the position of the landowners, affirming the trial court, and cited Louisiana case law in support. See Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234 (La. 2010).  The Marin case states that a continuing tort is occasioned by unlawful acts, not the continuation of the ill effects of an original, wrongful act. The Court held that the alleged damage to the land occurred prior to the landowners purchasing the property.

Usually, the owners of land burdened by mineral rights and the owner of a mineral right must exercise their respective rights concurrently with reasonable regard for those of the other. See La. R.S. 31:11. One cannot exercise their rights to the exclusion of the other; however, if the mineral lessee has acted unreasonably, excessively, or without reasonable regard for the landowner’s concurrent right of use of the land under the lease, then the landowner of the servient estate may seek redress to restore their right of use.

paper-patriotism-1476481-1024x768It  costs money to file a lawsuit against a party who has wronged you, and it also costs money to defend yourself when another party brings a lawsuit against you. Imagine taking on those costs only to lose the case in the end — and then imagine having to also pay for the winner’s attorney’s fees.

The general rule in the United States, known as the American Rule, is that each party only pays their own attorney’s fees, regardless of who wins. This is unlike some other countries, such as England, where courts often require the losing party to pay the other side’s attorney’s fees. One leading policy behind the American Rule is to ensure that potential plaintiffs aren’t discouraged from bringing meritorious lawsuits out of fear that, if they lose, they will have to incur even more costs by having to pay the other side’s lawyer. There are exceptions to the American Rule, however. One common exception is where there is a statutory provision requiring the losing side to pay attorney’s fees to the winning party, as illustrated in a recent case in Baton Rouge.

In Heck v. Triche, the district court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the defendant, Wayne Triche, was liable under state law — not federal law — for securities fraud. After this finding, however, the plaintiffs requested an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Louisiana laws (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51.712 & 51.714; Local Rule 54.2). The plaintiffs eventually submitted the documents needed for the district court to determine the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees. The district awarded attorney’s fees pursuant to a federal statute, 15 USC § 78r, in the amount of $121,800.

poker-hand-1522811-1024x769Discrimination can come in many forms and if you are faced with a potential workplace discrimination issue it is important to take your concerns to a good lawyer because the contours of discrimination cases can be very complicated.  Esma Etienne, a waitress and bartender, found herself in just such a situation when she alleged that the general manager at the Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza in New Iberia, Louisiana refused to trust and promote qualified employees simply because their skin was of a darker shade.  According to Etienne, she was passed over for promotion to a managerial position at Spanish Lake because she was “too black.”  Based on this belief that she had faced discrimination in the workplace, Etienne filed a Title VII suit in the Western District for Louisiana Federal Court.    

In support of her claim, Etienne presented an affidavit from a former manager at Spanish Lake stating that the general manager did not trust darker skinned black people with certain responsibilities, such as handling money.  Further, the manager alleged that the general manager and his wife made several statements that Etienne was “too black to do various tasks at the casino.”  In response, Spanish Lake argued that it hired a more qualified candidate than Etienne and the decision was based purely on merit.  The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Spanish Lake.  The court based its decision on its finding that Etienne had merely supplied circumstantial evidence, shifting the burden away from Spanish Lake and on to Etienne, and pointed to the fact that a majority of the managers at Spanish Lake were black.  The court seemed to believe that the fact that so many managers were black was dispositive under Title VII and that the allegation that the discrimination was based on shade of skin was insufficient.  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did not agree.  It reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Spanish Lakes and remanded the case for consideration by a jury.

The Fifth Circuit pointed out that while there had never been an explicit ruling in the circuit that color was an unlawful basis for discrimination in the workplace, the text of Title VII is clear that employment discrimination is prohibited on the basis of an individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  It was improper for the district court to rely so heavily on the fact that Spanish Lake had hired numerous black managers when the issue at bar was discrimination based on skin shade.  Etienne was alleging that Spanish Lake discriminated based on the fact that she was too dark, not the fact that she was black.

truck-on-hwy-1615510-1-1024x682Renting a U-Haul truck can be a necessary burden when you are tasked with moving a lot of stuff from place to place. During the rental process you might be asked whether or not you want supplemental insurance policies.  But who do you sue when an accident happens?  In the following case out of New Orleans, Louisiana one plaintiff finds out who definitely cannot be sued when a U-Haul and Fedex truck collide.

JR was driving a rented commercial truck (U-Haul), when his truck crashed into a delivery truck (Fedex)  in New Orleans. JR filed a lawsuit against the delivery truck and also named the insurer of the company he rented the truck from as a Defendant as well. JR named the company from whom he rented a truck as a Defendant because he claimed to have purchased “risk protection” from that company in the course of his rental agreement with the company.  JR believed that the risk protection insurance would provide him with uninsured motorist coverage. The plaintiffs went on to add RW Insurance Company as another defendant, apparently believing that RW was the commercial company’s insurer.

However, RW insurance apparently is only a claims administrator for the commercial company and not an insurance company.  Upon receipt of the lawsuit RW wanted out as soon as possible.  To do so they filed a motion for summary judgment (MSJ).  If RW could prove that there was no genuine issue as to the material fact that they were not an insurer for the commercial company and thus owed no coverage to JR they could be dismissed from the case.  See Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966.  They did just that and the trial court granted their motion.

law-series-3-1467437-1024x769When attempting to bring a lawsuit in court, timing is everything. If a potential claim is brought too late your day in court may never come. However, Louisiana courts of law are generous in extending the deadline to file a lawsuit in instances of fraud.  In the following case out of Jefferson Parish Louisiana, a Plaintiff learned that the deadline to file a legal malpractice lawsuit can be relaxed when fraud is employed to hide negligent representation.

Ms. Michelle Myer-Bennett was primarily a divorce attorney, but represented clients in related matters: division of property, custody, and other family law matters. Ms. Myer- Bennett was hired by Tracy Lomont to represent her in her divorce. Ms. Lomont wished to receive her home in Jefferson Parish as a result of the divorce. Ms. Myer- Bennett followed standard protocol to draft this documentation, but failed to record this information in the mortgage or property records.

Sometime later in 2010, Ms. Lomont attempted to refinance her house, but was denied. After reviewing her application, Ms. Lomont discovered that her application was denied due to a lien on her property. Ms. Lomont found out that her attorney had not completed the proper paperwork. According to Ms. Lomont, she contacted her former attorney, Ms. Myer-Bennett who made no mention of her mistake in filing. In contrast, according to Ms. Myer-Bennett, she confessed her malpractice to her client and informed her of all possible proceedings including suing her for malpractice.

dna-fingerprint-4-1163506-1024x724Imagine growing up with a genetic disorder and having to struggle with the difficulties that these disorders bring to people and their loved ones. Nobody chooses to have a genetic disorder, and if severe enough the disorder can cause major setbacks in a person’s life. Even with protections in place like genetic non-discrimination laws, many people throughout the country are denied health care coverage by their insurance providers because they have genetic disorders. Insurance companies do not want to provide coverage to these people because they are more of a “risk.” This can be very frustrating for the individual, especially because health care is so expensive today.

In New Orleans, Louisiana, Jane Doe (“Ms. Doe”) grew up as a dependent on her father’s Blue Cross insurance policy. At the age of eight, Ms. Doe went to her doctor and her doctor noticed that she had some of the physical characteristics of Marfan syndrome. Marfan syndrome is a genetic disorder of the connective tissue. It can have drastic affects on multiple systems in the body including the skeletal, cardiovascular, nervous, and respiratory systems. The doctor submitted claims to Blue Cross with the International Statistical Classification of Disease (“ICD”)-9 code of 759.82 (diagnostic code for Marfan syndrome), and from 1993 to the late 90s different doctors who treated Ms. Doe submitted claims to Blue Cross with the same diagnostic code. Blue Cross stated that the only information they received from the various physicians was the ICD-9 code 759.82. Blue Cross did not receive any other medical information surrounding Ms. Doe’s claims, so it was difficult for them to determine how exactly the physicians came to their medical conclusions. In November 1994 Ms. Doe was tested for Marfan syndrome, but the results were inconclusive. Ms. Doe was never diagnosed with Marfan syndrome, and she was only monitored for the disease because of the symptoms she already displayed.

Around the age of 23, Ms. Doe left her father’s insurance plan and applied for her own coverage with Blue Cross. Ms. Doe was required to take a medical questionnaire as a part of her application, and the questionnaire did not have any questions relating to genetic information. When Blue Cross reviewed Ms. Doe’s application the underwriting department reviewed her prior claims while insured under her father’s policy. Because there were multiple Marfan syndrome claims, Blue Cross denied Ms. Doe her health coverage.

erasure-1237046-1024x768Courts are not perfect, and sometimes they do not always render the correct decision. When a court makes an error in their judgment it can be very frustrating for all of the parties involved. Error can be very costly especially when a major issue, like finding coverage for a victim of an automobile accident under an umbrella insurance policy, needs to be determined. Both the plaintiff and defendant wants the court to look in their favor, but it is also the responsibility of the court to make an error free and accurate decision that is fair and just to both sides.

One such case where the trial court made an error in rendering a final judgment comes from St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana. On May 26, 2010, Gary Michael Brown (“Mr. Brown”) was driving a truck that was owned by his employer J&J Diving Corporation. While driving, Mr. Brown got into an accident with St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Deputy, Scott Jarred (“Mr. Jarred”). Mr. Jarred filed a lawsuit against Mr. Brown, J&J Diving Corporation, and Progressive Insurance Company. On May 22, 2012, Mr. Jarred amended his original complaint and added two more defendants. These defendants were XL Specialty Insurance Company and Valiant Insurance Company, and they provided a Marine Excess Liability Policy, or Bumbershoot policy, for J&J Diving Corporation. Two days later, Mr. Jarred entered into a Gasquet release. A Gasquet release is where the plaintiff settles all claims with the primary insurance provider for a smaller amount than policy limits, but does not settle with the umbrella policy insurer. Gasquet v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 391 So.2d 466 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1980), writ denied, 396 So.2d 921 (La. 1981). Mr. Jarred settled all of the claims against J&J Diving Corporation, Mr. Brown, and Progressive; but he reserved his claims against both XL Specialty Insurance and Valiant Insurance.

XL Specialty Insurance and Valiant Insurance filed a motion for summary judgment on December 5, 2013. Their main argument surrounding the motion, was that the Bumbershoot policy only provided coverage to J&J Diving Corporation for their commercial diving contractor operations. The accident between Mr. Jarred and Mr. Brown was not related to those commercial diving contractor operations. Because there was no relation, the Bumbershoot policy should not provide any coverage for Mr. Jarred’s accident. Mr. Jarred filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on February 14, 2014 and requested that the trial court should find coverage for him under the Bumbershoot policy provided by XL Specialty Insurance and Valiant Insurance. Mr. Jarred’s main argument was that because the policy contained the word “contractor,” the Bumbershoot policy therefore expanded the coverage and should be provided to him. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Jarred on June 5, 2014 and certified that their decision was a final judgment because there was no just reason for delay.

old-truck-lublin-1449942-1024x658Has your business sought to avoid litigation over its insured business activities by negotiating an out of court settlement? Louisiana business Meyers Warehouse, Inc. (“Meyers) pursued this route assuming its insurer, Canal Indemnity Company (“Canal”), would join Meyers in settlement negotiations. However, to its surprise, Canal refused to participate in Meyers’s defense. Unfortunately for Meyers, it misinterpreted key terms within its insurance policy specifying when Canal’s duty to defend it against claims and lawsuits arises.

Meyers is the owner and operator of several trucks, trailers, and trucking operations in Louisiana. Like many businesses, it purchased insurance coverage to protect against liabilities stemming from core business activities. In November 2011, Meyers received notification that one of its shipments contained contaminated liquid sugar. The contamination caused significant damage to the client’s production line.

Meyers and the client reached a settlement agreement in lieu of pursuing litigation. The agreement transferred the liability for damages to the third party contractor responsible for cleaning Meyers’s tankers. Canal was not involved in the negotiation process. Meyers filed its lawsuit against Canal because Canal refused to participate in Meyers’s defense during the settlement negotiations arising out of the November 2011 notification. The primary dispute between the parties was whether or not Canal had a duty to defend Meyers during the settlement negotiations even though no lawsuit against Meyers was ever filed.

blacksmith-1500444-1024x768Accidents occur in daily life. Often, severe injuries result. However, prison accidents rarely are discussed. Prisoners who are victims of  accidents while serving time  are often provided with the same legal protections as an average person.

Mr. Fisher was serving time in Louisiana. During his time incarnated, Mr. Fisher worked within the prison where he was in charge of keeping the gas furnace running. On the day in question, Mr. Fisher followed the same procedure as he did daily for lighting the gas furnace. Unfortunately, upon lighting the furnace, an explosion occurred which caused Mr. Fisher’s severe injuries.

In his first trial, the Court concluded that Mr. Fisher did not meet the requirements to bring a lawsuit against prison officials for his injuries. In order to recover for this injury—much like an average person—Mr. Fisher was required to prove both of the following: vice or defect and actual or constructive notice. See La.R.S. 9:2800La. Code Civ. P. arts. 966 and 967. The trial court held that Mr. Fisher did not meet his the standard for both elements. Therefore, the Court concluded summary judgment for the prison officials was appropriate. This decision dictated that Mr. Fisher could not recover for his injuries.

truck-1422454-1-1024x683What happens if the trial court makes a mistake? The case can work its way through the court of appeals and even the state supreme court just to be sent back to trial court to begin again. This case involves a lawsuit filed in Louisiana court by a transportation company (“Star”) against another corporation (“Pilot”). Star is a national trucking company and Pilot owns a collection of truck stops that supply fuel to Star.

In 2014, the trial court decided to deny Pilot’s motion to dismiss the case for forum non conveniens, to grant Star’s motion in limine to exclude a certain promissory note from evidence, and to deny Pilot’s exception of prematurity and motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration. Forum non conveniens is a power the court can decide to use to dismiss a case where another court would be better suited to hear the case. A motion in limine is a motion filed by a party to a lawsuit which asks the court for an order or ruling limiting or prevent certain evidence from being presented in the case. Pilot appealed these decisions as well as applying for a supervisory writ challenging the rulings. A writ of supervisory control is issued to correct an erroneous ruling made by a lower court either when there is no appeal or when an appeal cannot provide adequate relief and the ruling will result in gross injustice.

In 2015 the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal denied Pilot’s writ application and Pilot sought a review of this decision in the Louisiana Supreme Court. The appeal was continued pending the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The issue was then sent back to the court of appeals for an opinion.

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