Civil Matter

September 19, 2013

Spoliation of Evidence Key Concern in Personal Injury Cases

After you have been in a terrible accident or lost a loved one, especially when the accident or death was caused by the negligence of someone else, you probably want justice. The outrage, the pain, and the sense of loss are too much to bear, and you want someone to pay for what was done. You want to be made as whole as possible. But what if the evidence that would allow that justice to come to pass has been ruined? And what if it was the allegedly guilty party who destroyed it? This intentional destruction of evidence primarily for the purpose of depriving the opposing party of its use is known as spoliation of evidence.

While a party might assume that spoliation of evidence has occurred, mere allegations will not get you far, and actually proving that spoliation of evidence has occurred can be much harder than you might think. In the state of Louisiana, there are several rules and standards with regard to how a party must prove that such spoliation of evidence actually occurred. First of all, merely accusing someone of negligently destroying evidence is not enough to prove spoliation of evidence. The standard is much higher than that. The plaintiff actually has to prove that the evidence was intentionally destroyed, and it can be quite difficult to prove the intentions of one’s actions.

If a party fails to produce evidence within his or her reach, there is a presumption that the evidence would have been detrimental to the case; however, it is still essential to prove that the evidence was intentionally destroyed. Furthermore, the defendant has a duty to preserve evidence. This duty arises because of the foreseeability of needing that evidence in the future. If there is no ability to foresee the need for that evidence in the future, though, the duty does not exist.

September 17, 2013

Proper Service Essential for Successful Legal Remedy

by Berniard Law Firm

Under Louisiana law, there are very specific rules about how to properly serve someone, and one of the important aspects of service that an attorney has to get right is the timing of it. Furthermore, not only does the service have to be carried out in a timely manner, but it also has to be perfected properly.

This particular Supreme Court of Louisiana case dealt with service on a state entity, and it is important for your attorney to be aware of any differences that exist with regard to service requirements depending on who the other party is. According to the applicable state law, La. R.S. 13:850, “perfecting” a service request requires that the appropriate filing fees and transmission fees have been received by the clerk of the court and that the original signed document has been received by the clerk. All of this must be received within the proper timeframe. As stated in La. R.S. 13:850, the proper timeframe for perfection in this case is seven days.

In this case, the service request was received within the required ninety-day timeframe (ninety days since the filing of the petition), and the service request was perfected five days later once the requisite documents and fee payments were received by the clerk of the court. The question then is whether or not this counts as proper request for service: Was the request for service properly received within ninety days even though perfection of the request was outside of that ninety-day timeframe?

September 16, 2013

Inspecting Summary Judgment When Case Involves Improper Lawyer Actions

by Berniard Law Firm

Filing a Motion for Summary Judgment in Louisiana

Can a trial court properly grant a motion for summary judgment when material issues of fact still remain? According to Louisiana law, a motion for summary judgment is not properly granted if material issues of fact still remain. Summary judgment is only properly granted if pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show that no genuine issues of material fact exist.

The purpose of summary judgment is to circumvent a full-scale trial if there are no issues of fact. At trial, fact finders determine what the genuine facts are, and in the case of dispute, the fact finders have to decide what proposed facts are the most plausible in the context of the case. If no issues of fact exist, then this costly and time-consuming process can be avoided by granting a motion for summary judgment.

September 14, 2013

The Role of Court-Appointed Experts in Complex Litigation

by Berniard Law Firm

In order to aid the court, a judge might occasionally appoint an expert to help with specific aspects of the case. Court-appointed experts are different from a specific party’s experts because the court-appointed experts do not favor one side or the other, but rather, help the judge with certain tasks or analyses.

A trial court-appointed expert can be especially useful in a class action lawsuit in which several people have a claim against the defendant and there is no way that the court can hear each individual person’s case. In that instance, a court-appointed expert can help properly group the members of the class action lawsuit and help bring order to an otherwise unwieldy case.

In a recent case from Orleans Parish, the appellate court had to determine when a court-appointed expert is proper and what the limits of such an expert’s duties should be. Before getting into the applicable Louisiana law and how the appellate court ultimately ruled, some knowledge of the background facts is useful: The case from Orleans Parish was a class action lawsuit in which several employees were suing over medical problems they experienced from working in a building that had serious mold damage. Over 600 individuals had claims in the suit, and in order to deal with the case in a more organized and manageable manner, the class was to be broken up into various groups. In order to help with this enormous task, the trial court stated that it wanted to appoint an expert to help group individuals according to damages. Each party was allowed to submit nominations and discuss any issues they felt might arise if such an expert was appointed. Ultimately, an expert was appointed to help with the necessary tasks, and after the case was decided at the trial court level, the State argued that the court-appointed expert had outstepped his appropriate boundaries.

September 12, 2013

Louisiana Legal Malpractice Claim Arises from Car Accident

by Berniard Law Firm

If you feel like your attorney has engaged in malpractice, what can you do? First, you should have a basic idea of what actually constitutes legal malpractice. In Louisiana, the plaintiff has to prove (with evidence that is strong enough to convince a reasonable trier of fact) three things. 1) That an attorney-client relationship exists. 2) That there was negligent representation by the attorney. 3) That there was actual loss caused by that negligence. What constitutes negligence? The plaintiff would have to prove that the attorney did not use the same degree of care, skill, and diligence which other prudent practicing attorneys exercise in the same locality.

In order to prove that the attorney did not exercise an adequate level of care and diligence, normally the plaintiff will hire an expert witness in order to establish what the standard of care in that locality is. The plaintiff also has to establish that the attorney’s actions did not live up to this standard of care. If the attorney was particularly negligent or the malpractice was obvious, then it might not be necessary to call in an expert witness to establish malpractice. If the malpractice or negligence was not gross, however, then bringing in an expert witness is almost essential.

A recent case in Louisiana is a great example of a legal malpractice claim. In early 2000, a woman filed suit for injuries she sustained in an automobile accident with another man. The attorney she retained never filed an opposition to the Motion to Limit the Ad Damnum (a motion that would limit her amount of recovery), which was filed by the other party. Because the attorney did not oppose the motion, the motion was granted and the woman’s claim was limited to recovery in the amount of $30,000.00. According to the woman, her attorney also went ahead and settled the case without her authority while she was still being treated for her injuries. He settled the case for only $22,000.00. The woman then went ahead and settled her case and dismissed her attorney, filing a petition claiming legal malpractice.

September 10, 2013

The Burden of Proving Legal Malpractice Claims in Louisiana

by Berniard Law Firm

Every detail matters at trial and can make the difference between winning and losing. In a recent Louisiana case, BCM L.L.C (“BCM”) and Nawlins Kajun Foods, L.L.C. (“Nawlins”) sued Copeland’s of New Orleans under the theory of detrimental reliance. At the end of the trial, the jury sent a request to the judge to clarify certain words and phrases in the jury instructions. After discussion with both parties’ lawyers, the judge issued supplemental instructions regarding the theory of detrimental reliance. Neither party objected to the instructions and the jury returned a verdict denying BCM and Nawlins’ claim for detrimental reliance, but it did reward them damages for conversion. In a post-trial motion, the lawyers for BCM and Nawlins claimed the jury instructions were confusing and misleading, entitling them to a new trial. The trial court denied the motion. BCM and Nawlins then filed a legal malpractice suit against their former attorneys, claiming they should have objected to the jury instructions because they were confusing and misstated the law on detrimental reliance.

The burden of proof for legal malpractice is tough to meet. BCM and Nawlins had to produce evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable trier of fact of (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) negligent representation by the attorney; and (3) loss caused by that negligence” and also had to prove their attorneys, now the defendants, failed to exercise the degree of care, skill, and diligence which is exercised by prudent practicing attorneys in their locality. Clearly BCM and Nawlins can establish prong number one, but prongs number two and three requires more analysis.

In order for the attorneys to have been negligent in not objecting to the jury instructions, the jury instructions must have been inadequate or misstated the law. The relevant governing law of Louisiana sets forth certain requirements for jury instructions. To be satisfactory the instructions given to the jury must contain a correct legal principle to apply and be presented in a reasonable and fair manner. The judge presiding over the case at trial is not required to tailor the instructions to the wishes of either party, but the judge is required to correctly state the law that the jury will apply. Reversible error occurs when a legal principle that must be applied to the case at trial is left out of the jury instructions. The judges at the trial level can generally formulate the instructions to the jury in whatever way they prefer. And their judgement in that formulation will not be overturned as long as the law is correctly conveyed. When an appellate court is deciding whether the jury instructions given were sufficient the court will consider whether the jury was misled to the point that it could not fairly decide the case. The court must weigh the degree of any error or confusing term with the instructions in their entirety as well as the state of affairs of the case. Therefore, small errors that do not affect the statement of law as a whole will not necessarily be fatal.

September 9, 2013

Missing One Deadline is Crucial to Victim’s Suit in the Parish of Acadia

by Berniard Law Firm

Understanding the distinction between a final judgment and an interlocutory judgment is crucial to making sure your case does not get dismissed as untimely. A final judgment determines the merits of the case in whole or in part while all other judgments are interlocutory.

Interlocutory judgments are intermediate rulings decided by the trial court. These judgments do not dispose of the merits of the claims. Usually, an interlocutory judgment cannot be appealed immediately; only final judgments can be appealed. However, in Louisiana, the Court of Appeals allows for individuals to file a writ for supervisory review within 30 days from when the trial court makes its interlocutory ruling. If the writ was filed in a timely fashion, the appellate court will review the merits of the claims that were decided by the trial court. If the writ was not filed in a timely manner, the appellate court will dismiss the case.

The 30 day period to file the writ is a steadfast rule. Countless cases have been dismissed because writs are filed after the given 30 day time period. Many fail to realize that the 30 day period begins right when the trial court makes its ruling. Filing a writ after this 30 day time period results in a complete dismissal of the case.

September 5, 2013

Medical Malpractice Cap Reviewed By Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal

by Berniard Law Firm

Recently, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal considered the assertion that the Medical Malpractice Act’s limitation of recovery or the “cap” contained within La.R.S. 40:1299.42(B) is unconstitutional.

At trial, the court determined that the Louisiana statute La.R.S. 40:1299.47(B) was unconstitutional “as violative of the equal protection and adequate remedy guarantees of the Louisiana constitution.” Moreover, the trial court relied upon the opinion of the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal in a recent case that held that the cap of La.R.S. 40:1299.42(B) was unconstitutional “to the extent it includes nurse practitioners within its ambit, [and] violates the equal protection and adequate remedy guarantees of the Louisiana Constitution …” Subsequently, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed that very aspect of the Court of Appeal’s ruling, finding the medical malpractice cap unconstitutional. Rather, the Louisiana Supreme Court declared “the MMA’s cap described in La.R.S. 40:1299.42(B) is constitutional as it applies to all qualified health care providers, including nurse practitioners.

As such, the subsequent ruling of the Louisiana Supreme Court vacated the prior judgment of the trial court and the trial court was then directed to reconsider its ruling in light of the changes in the recent case law precedent. Ultimately, the trial court found La.R.S. 40:1299.42(B) constitutional and plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s decision.

August 27, 2013

Accident at Hospital Highlights Importance of Causality Proof (But-For Test)

by Berniard Law Firm

In personal injury cases, there are a number of elements that must be met in order to be successful in a lawsuit. First, a plaintiff must show that they were owed a duty of care by the other party. Second, they must show that there was a breach of that duty of care. Third, there must be actual harm resulting from the breach of that duty of care. Fourth, and most importantly, the harm must be caused by the breaching party. Causation may seem easy to understand on its face, but in lawsuits it can become a very complex matter where the entire result can hinge on this very element.

Typically, the plaintiff carries the burden to prove that her injuries are actually caused by the defendant. One usual method of establishing factual causation is the “but-for” test. The test inquires: ‘but for’ defendant’s actions, would the harm to the plaintiff have occurred?” If the answer is “no,” then the plaintiff fails to prove causation, because the defendant’s act is not necessary to cause her injuries.

Let’s consider the following scenario: a lady went to a hospital to visit her grandson. She sat on a sofa bed while waiting in the emergency room. Unfortunately, because the springs that hold the supporting tarp for the sofa bed were missing, the lady fell through the sofa bed onto the floor. As a result, she suffered severe back injuries that ultimately required surgeries.

August 26, 2013

Litigation for Workplace Injury Requires Proper Naming of Defendants

by Berniard Law Firm

In Louisiana, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal upheld a summary judgment against plaintiff Louis Fox in a tort claim ensuing from a work-related injury at the Rodemacher Power Station. On August 12, 2008, Louis Fox, while working inside a cyclone tower at the Rodemacher Power Station, sustained an injury when an object fell from above, striking him in the head and neck area. At the time of the accident, CLECO Power L.L.C. is the owner of the Rodemacher Power Station. Shaw had a contract with CLECO Power L.L.C.in furtherance of the project known as Rodemacher Unit 3. Shaw subcontracted a portion of the work to Foster Wheeler CLECO Power while Mr. Fox was employed by Foster Wheeler Constructors, Inc. as a refractory gunner. Mr. Fox and his wife filed a petition for personal injuries against several defendants: Shaw, CLECO Power, L.L.C., CLECO Corporation, Rodemacher Power Station, etc. CLECO Power and Shaw filed a motion for summary judgment requesting the court find that CLECO Power and Shaw are the statutory employers of Mr. Fox and thus immune from any tort claim brought by him.

If CLECO Power and Shaw were statutory employers of Mr. Fox, it would render the issue of liability moot as workers’ compensation was Mr. Fox’s exclusive remedy against those two defendants. Therefore, the main question is, whether CLECO Power and Shaw were statutory employers of Mr. Fox? There are two instances in which a statutory relationship will be found, thus holding the statutory employer only liable for workers’ compensation benefits: (1) being a principal in the middle of two contracts, referred to as the “two-contract” theory, and (2) the existence of a written contract recognizing the principal as the statutory employer. In addition, the “two-contract” theory “applies when: (1) the principal enters into a contract with a third party; (2) pursuant to that contract, work must be performed; and (3) in order for the principal to fulfill its contractual obligation to perform the work, the principal enters into a subcontract for all or part of the work performed.

However, in Mr. Fox’s case, the existence of a written contract is lacking. In other words, CLECO Power and Shaw’s summary judgment motion was based on “two-contract” theory. Firstly, there is no question the first two requirements for application of the “two-contract” theory were met. Shaw entered into a contract with CLECO Power and, pursuant to that general contract, work was performed. There is no question the first two requirements for application of the “two-contract” theory were met. Regarding the last element, Shaw did not subcontract directly with Foster Wheele and it was Stone who signed directly with Foster Wheele. The court agreed with the defendants that Stone was acting on behalf and for the benefit of Shaw, as the principal of Stone, thus entitling Shaw to classification as the statutory employer of Foster Wheeler’s direct employee, Louis Fox. The trial court did not err in granting Shaw and CLECO Power’s motion for summary judgment.