Litigation

January 9, 2014

Rear-End Collision Case Examines Liability, Statutes in Louisiana

A case arising out of a St. Martin Parish accident has shed light on the responsibility placed on drivers following behind another vehicle. According to Journet v. Mouton out of the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit, a driver following another vehicle must exercise great care. The case arose out of an accident where a man and his family swerved to miss a slowing sheriff’s deputy, crossed the center line, and slammed into a ditch on the other side of the road. The driver of the vehicle was severely injured and was left quadriplegic.

Reports indicate the deputy was responding to an emergency call but had missed the driveway and was slowing to turn around in another drive. The driver of the following vehicle, who was driving without a license, knew the officer knew him and knew he did not have a license. Therefore, the following driver deliberately chose not to pass the deputy and claimed there were no brake lights and no turn signal used by the deputy. However, the plaintiff’s wife contradicted this testimony, stating that she did see brake lights and a turn signal. The defendants filed for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeal.

To reach its decision, the court looked to relevant Louisiana statutes. Most pertinent amongst these is La.R.S. 32:81(A), which states a driver shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and shall have regard for the speed of the other vehicle. The court also looked to a Louisiana Supreme Court interpretation of the matter, which held that it is the duty of the following driver to exercise a great deal of care and to keep a safe distance behind the lead car.

January 7, 2014

Louisiana Medical Malpractice Case Examines Federal Antidumping Laws

by Berniard Law Firm

A recent case arising from occurrences in West Carroll Hospital considers the Louisiana and federal antidumping laws. In addition, it also explains the requirements for a case under medical malpractice. Several hospitals were involved in the case, but only two were actually involved in the suit. A woman who had serious kidney and urinary problems was admitted to West Carroll Hospital; however, once the hospital realized that they did not have the specialized equipment to treat her, they desperately tried to find somewhere to transfer her that did have the ability to help her. After several days of miscommunications, the woman died because they could not transfer her fast enough to address her medical issues. Her six daughters then attempted to find some kind of remedy against the hospitals for the wrongful death of their mother.

In Louisiana, La. R.S. 40:2113.4-2113.6, the “antidumping law,” requires hospitals to take patients who need emergency services and live in the territorial area regardless of whether they are able to pay for their care or if they have insurance. Federal law has the same type of requirement under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act even specifies that hospitals cannot turn away patients who have Medicare or Medicaid, and hospitals cannot discriminate based on race, religion, economic status, or national ancestry.

The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act further defines “emergency” as a “physical condition which the person in imminent danger of death or permanent disability.” The definition of “emergency services,” then, is “those services which are available in the emergency room and surgical units in order to sustain the person’s life and prevent disablement until the person is in a condition to travel.” Louisiana law requires that the patient be stabilized before they are moved to another facility. However, the Louisiana antidumping law does not permit a private cause of action. That is, an individual cannot sue the hospital for a violation of this law. Even if they could, however, the first hospital, West Carroll, admitted her without incident, so there would be no claim under the antidumping law.

January 3, 2014

Medical Malpractice Subject to Prescription Limits

by Berniard Law Firm

Doctors at the Women and Children’s Hospital in Lake Charles, Louisiana, botched Beverly Lebouef’s surgery in 2003. Eventually Lebouef sought legal advice and brought action against her surgeon. Much later in the pre-trial phase, arguably over a year later, she added a new doctor to his lawsuit who had helped perform one of the surgeries. The question is not about prescribed medication, but “prescription periods” and the accompanying rules.

In Louisiana, no action for damages for injury against any physician or hospital shall be brought unless filed within one year from the fate of the alleged act or negligence or within one year from the date of discovery of the alleged act or negligence. This period is considered a prescriptive period. Prescription begins when a plaintiff becomes aware of facts that would suggest to a reasonable person that he or she suffered injury that could be remedied by law. Prescription starts even if the plaintiff does not have actual knowledge, but constructive knowledge, which is the minimum amount of notice required to make the injured plaintiff aware and allow for the injured plaintiff to inquire further. If the notice is enough to make reasonable victim aware, then prescription has begun.

A plaintiff’s apprehension that something is wrong does not start prescription except when the plaintiff knew or should have known through reasonable diligence that the plaintiff’s issues may have resulted from medical malpractice. The crucial issue is the plaintiff’s reasonableness in taking action or not acting, which considers the plaintiff’s education, intelligence, symptom severity and the defendant’s conduct.

December 29, 2013

Rayville Doctor Found to Have Acted Within Standard of Care

by Berniard Law Firm

Going to the hospital can be an unsettling experience. There are many ways treatment can go wrong and result in serious injury or death. Medical conditions can be misdiagnosed or wrongly diagnosed, wrong prescriptions or doses can be prescribed, and surgical errors can occur. When these mistakes happen and a medical malpractice lawsuit is filed against a doctor and hospital, the trier of fact must determine three elements in order to decide whether or not medical malpractice occurred, which often requires a careful examination of a doctor’s standard of care.

In a recent case heard by the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit, Crockham v. Thompson, a woman filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against her mother’s doctor and hospital after her mother died from a brain hemorrhage induced by high blood pressure. According to the lawsuit, the mother had been paraplegic for 20 years and often suffered from bowel blockages. In this instance, the woman went to the hospital to have a blockage removed, but failed to get better after the operation was completed. The plaintiff took her mother back to the hospital where she was given oral medication for her high blood pressure, but she later suffered the stroke and her family chose to take her off life support.

In her wrongful death claim against the doctor, the plaintiff in this case claimed the doctor breached his duty of care to the deceased. The plaintiff claimed the blood pressure medication should have been given intravenously rather than by pill because the pill would have bypassed her mother’s non-functioning bowel. Also, the plaintiff suggested the standard of care had been breached because the doctor failed to make his daily round in the morning, failed to admit the patient to the ICU, and failed to develop a cardiovascular profile for the patient. The plaintiff supported her argument with the fact that the hospital’s medical board had found the doctor breached the standard of care. However, at trial, a jury found for the doctor and denied the plaintiff compensation. The Court of Appeal affirmed.

December 28, 2013

Car Accident Leads to Examination of Mutual Responsibility

by Berniard Law Firm

We’ve all been there: you’re running late for work, so you rush out the door and into your car. You drive ever so slightly above the speed limit, and all the traffic lights you come across are green. Fortune seems to be on your side. Suddenly, a car seemingly comes out of nowhere and hits you. Are you partially to blame because you were in a rush and drove over the speed limit? If you are liable, how does it affect your ability to collect damages from the other driver and his or her insurance company?

Laura McKinney of Shreveport, Louisiana, faced those very questions after she collided with another driver on the morning of July 23, 2009. She was running late for her 6:00 a.m. shift at Holy Angels Residential Facilities, and the accident occurred just as she turned into its parking lot. A co-worker was leaving the parking lot and cut across several empty parking spaces to enter the main travel lane when she collided with McKinney. Neither party reported any injuries at the time, but McKinney developed left knee pain three weeks later and was diagnosed with a left knee contusion. She subsequently filed a lawsuit against the other driver and her insurance company.

At trial, several witnesses to the accident provided vital eyewitness accounts to help the court determine who was at fault. One witness testified that it appeared that McKinney was driving faster than the parking lot’s signed speed limit of 15 miles per hour. Another witness, however, testified that she did not think McKinney was driving above the speed limit. After weighing the evidence, the trial court ruled that McKinney was 40 percent at fault and the other driver was 60 percent at fault. McKinney’s damages award was therefore reduced by 40 percent, and the trial court entered a judgment in her favor in the amount of $7,632.60. McKinney appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that she was 40 percent at fault and that the trial court also erred in awarding her an excessively low amount of damages.

December 24, 2013

Medical Malpractice Ruling Awards Wrongful Death Damages

by Berniard Law Firm

Imagine taking your mother to the emergency room for abdominal pain and vomiting. A CT scan and x-ray do not reveal any serious medical issues, and blood work merely shows that her potassium level is low. But within a few hours, she is dead. Now imagine witnessing her death – seeing her break out in convulsions, foam at the mouth, gasp for breath, and lose consciousness.

Such was the experience of one of Virginia Martin’s thirteen adult children. Ms. Martin’s daughter, Betty Farmer, brought her to the emergency room after Ms. Martin complained of abdominal pain, vomiting, and diarrhea. Ms. Martin was 69 years old, and she was otherwise in very good health at the time of her hospital visit. She did not have any heart problems or other serious health-related issues.

The ER physician determined that she suffered from simple gastroenteritis. A chest x-ray came back normal. Ms. Martin began to receive pain medication via an IV, and her blood work revealed that her potassium was low. A CT was performed and showed that there were no abdominal abnormalities that could have caused her gastric distress. Ms. Martin returned from the CT scan to the ER at 9:35 p.m. By 9:44, Ms. Martin started convulsing, her face turned red, she began to foam at the mouth, and her eyes rolled into the back of her head. She lost consciousness, and efforts to resuscitate her failed. Her cause of death was listed as acute cardiac arrhythmia and arteriosclerotic heart disease.

December 21, 2013

Medical Malpractice Claims Rely Heavily Upon Prescriptive Period

by Berniard Law Firm

In Louisiana, a civil law doctrine known as “prescription” limits the amount of time that may pass before someone files a lawsuit. Prescription is the extinction of a right of recovery and occurs due to a failure to exercise that right over a period of time. In other states, this doctrine may be referred to as a statute of limitations or a statute of repose. Louisiana’s prescription period for filing a lawsuit based upon personal injury is one year. Often this doctrine is not an issue in litigation, but in a recent case in St. Tammany Parish, one doctor’s objection of prescription has fundamentally altered the life of a woman, alleging to have suffered from medical malpractice.

On November 21, 2008, Glenda DeBram was hospitalized by her attending physician, Dr. Keshelava, after complaining of painful urination, fever, and cough. On October 15, 2009, pursuant to LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a), Ms. DeBram filed a request for a medical review panel with the Patient’s Compensation Fund. According to her request, Ms. DeBram alleged that St. Tammany Parish Hospital and Dr. Keshelava fell below the standard of care owed to her between November 21, 2008 and October 20, 2009. Subsequently, Dr. Keshelava filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription, arguing that Ms. DeBram’s complaint was prescribed on its face as it was filed on January 29, 2010, which was more than one year following her discharge from the hospital stay during which she claims Dr. Keshelava and the hospital breached the standard of care. As such, on September 16, 2010, the trial court sustained the exception and dismissed Ms. DeBram’s medical malpractice claims.

The prescriptive period for a medical malpractice claim is contained in LSA-R.S. 9:5628A. Any action seeking damages, regardless of whether for a fatality or the severity of injuries, and whether against a doctor, nurse, or the hospital within which they work, may be brought unless the action is brought within 365 days (1 year) from when the incident or injury occurred or was found to have occurred, regardless of whether the act was that of unintentional or intentional neglect, omission or some other form of injury. Even with claims filed within the time limit, the law suit must be filed within three years of the incident’s occurrence, regardless of discovery

December 20, 2013

Employer-Employee Relationship Must Be Defined In Car Accident Lawsuits

by Berniard Law Firm

Under the respondeat superior legal theory, an employer can be held liable for his employees’ acts that occur within his scope of employment. This means that a truck company, for example, may be held responsible for an accident caused by one its drivers who was speeding or intoxicated while driving his route. This doctrine can be complicated when questions arise as to whether or not the employee was within the scope of his employment, or whether the person who caused the injurious accident was in fact an employee.

To determine scope of employment, one must look to what the employer pays the employee to do and what, exactly, the employee was doing when the accident occured. If a truck driver deviated from his route to go to a bar, for example, then it will likely be determined the driver was engaged in frolic for his own benefit and therefore was not within the scope of his employment. This means if an accident occurs while that truck driver is on his way to the bar, then the truck company will not be held liable. If, on the other hand, the truck driver had to deviate from his standard route because of a flooded road, then the detour is still considered to be to the employer’s benefit and within his scope of employment. An accident that occurs while on detour will still be imputed to the truck company.

A recently decided case by Court of Appeal for the First Circuit helps illustrate issues of determining the employee/employer relationship. The importance of this aspect is if the party responsible for the accident is found to be an independent contractor rather than an employee, liability cannot be placed on the employer. So, in the case heard on appeal by the First Circuit, a woman who was injured by the negligent driving of a delivery van driver sought to join the subcontracting broker and the delivery service that hired the individuals responsible for the accident. To determine whether an independent contractor relationship existed, the court looked to case law and the facts before it.

December 19, 2013

Injured Employee Limited to Workers’ Compensation Following Accident at Lena Power Plant

by Berniard Law Firm

Work-related injuries, especially in construction, are not uncommon. However, the outcomes in workers’ compensation cases vary because the contractual relationship between the parties is often not clear. Under Louisiana law, workers’ compensation is provided to an employee if they’re injured by an accident “arising out of” and “in the course of” his employment with a statutory employer. However, the issue centers on whether the defendant is a statutory employer thereby limiting the plaintiff to workers’ compensation as their sole remedy. If a valid, written contract recognizes the existence of a statutory employer relationship, it creates a rebuttable presumption; this requires careful interpretation of the terms of the contract.

On August 12, 2008, Louis Fox (hereinafter “plaintiff”), employee of Foster Wheeler North America Corp. (hereinafter “Foster”), was assisting with the installation of boiler units at the Rodemacher Power Station near Lena. While working inside a cyclone tower, the plaintiff alleged that he sustained an injury when an object fell from above striking his head and neck. The plaintiff sought damages beyond workers’ compensation against several defendants including CLECO Power (hereinafter “CLECO”), owner of the power station, and general contractor Shaw Constructors, Inc. (hereinafter “Shaw”).

The installation of the boiler units was the result of a written contract between CLECO Power, owner of the station, and Shaw Constructors, Inc. As general contractor, Shaw selected Stone and Webster, Inc. (hereinafter “Stone”) to take charge of engineering and procurement services. Stone then entered into a purchase order agreement with Foster for the sale and installation of the boiler units.

December 17, 2013

Summary Judgment Tripping Case from Baton Rouge Illustrates Court Complexities

by Berniard Law Firm

A recent case appealed from the Parish of East Baton Rouge provides a great example not only of the potential difficulties of recovering damages for negligence from a merchant, but also of summary judgment and how it works. In November 2006, the plaintiff entered the defendant’s store, tripped on what she claims was a ‘flipped-up’ doormat, and struck her head on some shelving. She was injured as a result and tried to recover damages from the merchant, claiming that she was injured as a result of the merchant’s negligence in maintaining the premises. The trial court granted summary judgment in the merchant’s favor, and the appellate court affirmed.

If someone is injured while lawfully on a merchant’s property and wishes to recover damages for negligence from that merchant, they must meet four requirements provided by Louisiana law. The claimant must show that their injury was the result of an unreasonably dangerous condition on the merchant’s property, that the danger presented by that condition was reasonably foreseeable, that the merchant knew or should have known of the danger prior to the claimant’s accident, and that the merchant did not take reasonable steps to correct the situation.

Summary judgment is rare and requires clearing some pretty high hurdles. A court must first find that there is no genuine contention as to any facts that might influence the outcome of the case. If the court so finds, then it will simply apply the law to the relevant facts and rule in a party’s favor as a matter of law, perhaps before there is even a chance for a trial. Where the party moving for summary judgment will not bear the burden of proof at trial, for instance if that party is a merchant defending against a negligence claim, then s/he need only show the opposition’s inability to prove or disprove one or more key elements of his/her action or defense. The opposing party must then answer somehow to prove that s/he will be able to prove the element(s) in question at trial, or lose on summary judgment.